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This thesis examines the abolitionist community that corresponded through 
the weekly abolitionist periodical The Liberator, organised into four different circles of 
the Liberator Circle, over the years 1860-1863.  Chief editor William Lloyd Garrison, 
notable agitator Wendell Phillips, editor Charles Whipple, and their coadjutors in the 
Liberator Circle, believed that political abolition was impossible because the entire 
political system was founded on the proslavery compromise of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, it was impossible to take an uncompromising moral stand as a 
politician, for achieving consensus within any given party, as well as with the 
opposition, required compromise, as defined by George Santayana in Character and 
Opinion in the United States. Garrison and his coadjutors in the Liberator Circle 
fervently refused to compromise over the evil of slavery, and demanded immediate 
abolition through the anti-political means of northern disunion. This thesis argues 
that from 1860 to 1863 Garrison and the majority of the Liberator Circle 
compromised their ideal means of anti-political abolition and accepted the political 
abolition of the Emancipation Proclamation. The Circle’s process of accepting 
political means was not immediate, as revisionist and post-revisionist historiography 
suggests. Rather, it occurred over three distinct periods: Certainty, from 1860 to 
Abraham Lincoln’s election on November Eighth, Crisis, from Lincoln’s election to 
the bombardment of Fort Sumter on April Fourteenth 1861, and Compromise, from 
Fort Sumter to the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation, January First 1863. 
Each of these periods align with a change in the masthead slogan of the Liberator, 
and represent different challenges to the identity of the Liberator Circle. This thesis 
analyses Garrison and his coadjutors’ path to compromise and what effect it had on 





1860 to 1863 was a time of immense change for the United States. The 
election of Abraham Lincoln as the first antislavery president prompted the secession 
of eleven Southern States and led to a Civil War where 650,000 Americans lost their 
lives. Yet it also led to the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, which declared all 
slaves in the rebellious states free and signalled the end of the peculiar institution. 
William Lloyd Garrison, founder and chief editor of abolitionist periodical The 
Liberator, believed that the Proclamation would ‘if energetically and 
uncompromisingly enforced, inflict a staggering blow upon that fearfully oppressive 
system.’1 Garrison was supportive of the Proclamation, as long as Lincoln and the 
Republican Government that enacted it followed it to the letter and truly ended 
slavery. This response was undoubtedly muted and critical. But the fact that Garrison 
was willing to accept any form of political abolition at all was a remarkable change 
from the anti-political agitation he had championed in The Liberator for nearly two 
decades.2 Over the course of 1860 to 1863, Garrison and the individual abolitionist 
agitators who corresponded through The Liberator, henceforth termed the Liberator 
Circle, went through a process of personal compromise that saw them shift away 
from demanding immediate, unconditional abolition through the repudiation of the 
Constitution and towards accepting the limited, political emancipation of the 
Proclamation. This compromise towards political means was not universal nor 
                                            
1 William Lloyd Garrison, ‘National Anti-Slavery Subscription Anniversary [Advertisement]’ The 
Liberator, Vol. 32 No. 50, 12/12/1862. In the interest of brevity, all further references to The Liberator 
will omit the publication title, but include the author, article title, volume and issue number, and 
publication date. 
2 Alieen S. Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics on Strategy 
and Tactics: 1834-1850, (Pantheon Books: New York, 1969), p. 202 
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immediate amongst the Circle. But it did fundamentally alter the Circle’s activist 
community and challenged the hitherto concrete definitions of what it meant to be a 
Garrisonian abolitionist. 
Unlike other contemporary abolitionist societies, the Liberator Circle did not 
have any formal hierarchy. Although Garrison was the de-facto leader, he had no 
official title to this regard; he was an equal agitator along with every member of the 
Circle.3 Some form of an organizational structure can be ascribed to the four main 
groups of the Circle, however, by historical importance and amount of 
correspondence within the Liberator.4 Garrison, abolitionist agent Wendell Phillips, 
and co-editor Charles Whipple form the primary, or Inner Circle. Notable agitators 
like Henry Wright, Parker Pillsbury, and Lydia Child (who generally have published 
biographies) form the secondary circle, or Outer Circle. Regular correspondents form 
the tertiary circle, and the wider readership make up the quaternary circle, both of 
which fall under the Wider Circle. Only the tertiary circle prove problematic in terms 
of methodology. Essentially, they were anonymous; even though some signed with 
their full names, the majority choose to go by their initials, or a moniker such as 
‘JUSTITIA’ or even ‘Yale College.’5 Because of this anonymity, it is impossible to 
identify these correspondents and ascertain the importance of their views in a 
historiographical sense. The tertiary circle cannot be ignored, however. Unlike the 
quaternary circle, the tertiary circle consisted of readers who were moved enough by 
the Liberator that they felt they had to actively engaged in correspondence, and were 
                                            
3 Lawrence J. Freidman, Gregarious Saints: Self and Community in Antebellum American 
Abolitionism, (Cambridge University Press: 1982), p. 48 
4 See Frontispiece: The Liberator Circle for a complete list of the Liberator Circle members referenced 
in this thesis. 
5 JUSTITIA wrote four pieces of correspondence over 1860-1863: ‘What is Abolitionism? Who are the 
Abolitionists?’, Vol. 30 No. 4, 27/01/1860, ‘A Gratifying Testimonial’, Vol. 30 No. 13, 30/03/1860, ‘It 
Has Had some of the Bacon’, Vol. 32 No. 22 30/05/1862, ‘The Cause’, Vol. 32 No. 31 01/08/1862; 
Yale College, ‘Not a War for Liberty’, Vol. 31 No. 19 10/05/1861 
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considered to be equal agitators alongside Garrison. Therefore, their views are of 
equal importance in examining the concerns of the Circle as a whole.  
The masthead slogan of the Liberator changed twice over the period of 
Certainty, Crisis, and Compromise. The changes in the masthead slogan align with 
the Liberator Circle’s overall unity and ideal means of abolition. ‘NO UNION WITH 
SLAVEHOLDERS’ held pride of place from 1845 to 1861.6 A bold, unambiguous 
statement, this slogan represented the fundamental demand that united the 
abolitionist readership of the Liberator: the complete, unconditional abolition of 
slavery through the repudiation of the Constitution and the creation of republic that 
truly represented the ideals of its citizens. The only way to repudiate the Constitution 
was through the dissolution of the Union, a revolutionary process that was 
legitimized by the Declaration of Independence. Garrison formulated northern 
disunion in 1843 and championed it as the only morally acceptable means of 
abolition.7 Attempting abolition through politics was a futile endeavour, because to 
gain any form of progress in Congress antislavery Congressmen had to reach some 
form of compromise with their moderate and proslavery counterparts. Such was the 
case in 1820 with Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 1850. Garrison 
demanded immediate, universal abolition, not the gradual half-measures of 
politicians.  
The first slogan change occurred in January 1861 in response to the 
Secession Crisis. Garrison chose a slogan that did not deviate from northern 
disunion: ‘The United States Constitution is a “covenant with death, and an 
                                            
6 Garrison, ‘Masthead’, from Vol. 15 No. 1, 3/01/1845 to Vol. 30 No. 53, 31/12/1860  
7 Kraditor, Means and Ends, p. 202 
8 
 
agreement with hell.”’8 Instead, it reflected the next step in the Liberator Circle’s ideal 
means of abolition: the repudiation of the Constitution. For the slaveholders had 
removed themselves from the Union through secession. Although the Union had 
been broken by an unrepentant populace, Garrison and the Circle welcomed 
secession as a step in the right direction. Without the slaveholder’s influence on 
Congress, the only things stopping the North from repudiating the Constitution were 
obstructionist politicians and a moderate, non-abolitionist citizenry. Therefore, the 
object of the Circle’s moral suasion remained the same: convincing the North of the 
moral necessity of disunion. Garrison and the wider Circle had no need to reconsider 
their ideological certainties of disunion and immediatism. As such, the Circle 
experienced the greatest level of unity that their community had ever seen. 
The second and final change in the masthead came in December 1861, and 
represented a far greater deviation of policy than the first.9 The new slogan, 
‘Proclaim Liberty throughout all the land, and to all the inhabitants thereof,’ was 
generic in comparison to the strict disunionism of the previous two. It still called for 
universal abolition, but did not demand the dissolution of the Union or the 
Constitution. On the contrary, the slogan reflected Garrison’s shift away from anti-
political action and acceptance of the Constitutional method of abolition known as 
the war power theory. Formulated by former President and antislavery advocate 
John Quincy Adams, the war power theory stated that in times of war the President 
and Congress had the Constitutional power to adopt any means that could help the 
prosecution of the war, including the abolition of slavery.10 Alongside the new slogan, 
                                            
8 Garrison, ‘Masthead’, Vol. 31 No. 1, 04/01/1861  




Garrison included an excerpt from Adams’ war power speech to Congress which 
summarized the war power theory:  
‘From the instant that the slaveholding States become theatres of war, CIVIL, 
servile, or foreign, from that instant the war powers of Congress extend to 
interference with the institution of slavery, IN EVERY WAY IT CAN BE 
INTEREFERED WITH, from a claim of indemnity for slaves taken or destroyed, to the 
cession of States, burdened with slavery, to a foreign power . . .’11 
It appears that Garrison had simply shifted the radical, challenging tones of 
the disunionist slogans to Adams’ speech. Yet Garrison’s choice of less inflammatory 
abolitionist language reflected the compromise of anti-political principle that he had 
embarked on at the start of the Civil War. Adams’ speech provided context to 
Garrison’s repeated assertions in favour of the war power theory.  
The changes in the masthead of the Liberator align with the three distinct 
periods of unity and division the Liberator Circle faced over 1860-1863. The period of 
Certainty from 1860 to Abraham Lincoln’s election saw the Circle united as 
immediate abolitionists, a distinct minority of individuals who believed in the 
righteousness of abolition and the necessity of repudiating the Constitution. Garrison 
and his contemporaries all campaigned in a manner that aligned with their own 
morality, regardless of the intellectual differences in their abolitionist theories. For 
their various efforts were all directed towards the immediate repudiation of the 
proslavery constitution through northern disunion. Anti-political northern disunion 
was the practical means of abolition that bound together the various modes of 
personal agitation each coadjutor adhered to. An idealistic, preferably bloodless, 
                                            
11 John Quincy Adams, ‘Quote in Masthead’, Vol. 31 No. 50, 13/12/1861 
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democratic revolution of enlightened, abolitionist American citizens against a 
compromising, tyrannical government was a future that all abolitionists of the 
Liberator could work towards. Even though northern disunion was extremely 
unpopular with moderate Northerners and vilified as intolerable extremism by 
proslavery Southerners, the Liberator Circle was content to campaign for a brand of 
abolition that they knew was completely in line with their moral core.  
The period of Crisis encompassed the Secession Winter from November 1860 
to the bombardment of Fort Sumter on April fourteenth 1861. Secession was not the 
ideal disunion that the Circle sought, but it could be rationalised as having the same 
outcome as disunion. Hence the slogan ‘The United States Constitution is ‘a 
covenant with death, and an agreement with hell.’12 Secession might have been the 
greatest challenge the Union had ever faced, but for the Circle it was a step on the 
path to complete abolition. The Civil War, however, made disunion completely 
irrelevant. Instead of being united under the ideal means of disunion, the Circle was 
divided by questions of means, where to direct their agitation, and what purpose their 
society served.  
From Fort Sumter to the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, Garrison and 
the majority of the Liberator Circle chose to compromise their anti-political beliefs 
and work towards political abolition. They justified their deviation from disunion by 
championing abolition as war goal, made possible through Adams’ war power 
theory.13 Garrison’s compromise was not immediate. It took time to develop into the 
acceptance of the Emancipation Proclamation. However, during this period of 
                                            
12 Garrison, ‘Masthead’, Vol. 31 No. 1, 04/01/1861 
13 Adams, ‘Quote in Masthead’, Vol. 31 No. 50, 13/12/1861; for an explanation of Garrison’s 
interpretation of Adams’ war power theory see Garrison, ‘The War Power’, Vol. 31 No. 46, 15/11/1861 
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Compromise the Liberator Circle suffered a crisis of identity from which it never truly 
recovered. The Inner Circle of Garrison, Phillips, and Whipple chose to compromise 
their personal beliefs and left it up to the Outer and Wider Circle if they wanted to 
follow them. Garrison’s compromise was an exercise of the individualism celebrated 
by the Liberator Circle. Yet because it revoked the fundamental Certainty of northern 
disunion, embraced a political mode of abolition, and did not come about after a 
period of inclusive debate and discussion, Garrison’s compromise altered the way 
the Circle operated as an activist community. The Liberator Circle could no longer 
position themselves as radicals agitating outside of the Union. Instead, the majority 
of the Circle gradually came to accept to the limited abolition of the Emancipation 














Frontispiece: The Liberator Circle 
 
All those in the Liberator Circle referenced in this thesis, in alphabetical order 
by last name. 
Primary/Inner Circle 
William Lloyd Garrison Wendell Phillips Charles K. Whipple 
Secondary/Outer Circle 
Charles Burleigh   Maria Chapman   Lydia Child   
David Child   Abbey Foster  Daniel Foster 
Stephen Foster  Beriah Green  Ezra Heywood 
Samuel May Junior  Parker Pillsbury  John Rock 
Henry Wright  
Tertiary/Wider Circle 
An Old Line Abolitionist  J. P. B.   F. W. Bird  
George Boutwell   Yale College   James Freeman 
Clark     Moncure D. Conway Charles G. Davis 
Emmet Densmore   J. T. Everett   J. H. Fowler 
Lizze de Garmo   D. S. Grandin  G. 
W. P. G.    Josephine S. Griffing A. J. Grover 
D. H.     Thomas Haskell  Josiah Henshaw 
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A. Hogeboom   George Hoyt   Insurrectionist 
Justitia    S. M. J.   L. 
Alfred H. Love   M.    Sella Martin 
Orson S. Murray   A Colored Man  George F. 
Noyes     General Observer  God help THE 
PEOPLE    The Boston Pionier  Frank Sanborn 
Daniel Somes   George W. Stacy  H. G. Rollins 
J. W.     Robert F. Wallcut  N. H. Whiting  
B. G. Wright    ** 
Quaternary/Wider Circle 













The historiography of the Civil War can be broadly defined in three phases: 
traditionalism, revisionism, and post-revisionism. The traditionalist and revisionist 
phases align with the historiography of the abolitionists in the sense that abolitionism 
is dealt with as a secondary issue in the bigger picture of ascertaining the causes of 
the war. The post-revisionist phase however, which encompasses everything from 
the 1960’s to the present, is unique in that it has a very clear focus on defining the 
abolitionists and determining their impact on history. As such, my main body of 
historiographical sources are drawn from this phase. Post-revisionist works are 
characterised by an element of strong reaction to the arguments of the previous 
phases, distinct individualism, and, beyond the 1970’s, a repetitious cycle of building 
on past theories with limited original deviations. The works of current historians from 
the 1970’s onwards represents a fourth phase of historiography. However, the 
historians in this phase, such as Henry Mayer and Manisha Sinha, were the students 
of the post-revisionists of the 1960’s, and inherited their focus on defining the 
abolitionists. As such, modern abolitionist historians can be qualified as the children 
of the post-revisionists for their tendency to build on the Civil Rights era theses. 
Historians prior to the 1960’s viewed the role of the abolitionist as essentially 
binary and focused around the figurehead of Garrison. Thomas J. Pressly’s excellent 
account of Civil War historiography prior to 1960, Americans Interpret their Civil War, 
analysed the works of Northern traditionalists John Burgess, William Schouler, and 
James Ford Rhodes, and found that Garrison was praised as a hero for his role as 
an uncompromising moral leader against slavery.14 Rhodes in particular emphasised 
                                            




slavery as the sole cause of the war. The sectional tension over slavery’s morality 
brought the United States into an irrepressible conflict, and the proslavery South was 
undoubtedly immoral and in the wrong.15 The Northern traditionalists were focused 
on justifying their victorious war, and unequivocally hailed Garrison for his 
commitment to morality above all else and praised the role the abolitionists had in 
agitating for change.16 Garrison and The Liberator were seen as representative of 
the entire abolitionist movement who worked in tandem with the Republican Party to 
bring about emancipation.17 In contrast, the revisionist movement, which spans 
roughly from 1900 to 1950, is characterized by a revulsion of the abolitionists. This 
trend began with Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard’s move away from 
emphasizing slavery as the defining cause of the Civil War; if slavery was not a key 
issue, then the abolitionists become less relevant.18 Beard and Turner still worked 
within the framework of the irreconcilable conflict theory, but instead of focusing on 
the triumph over slavery they sought to find an empirical, balanced answer to the 
causation of the war that incorporated economic, social, and cultural factors as well 
as political ones.19  
Avery Craven, J. T. Randall, and Charles Ramsdell, three of the most 
prominent revisionists, adopted a more extreme theory, claiming that the abolitionists 
were religious fanatics who brought the abstract issue of slavery into the political 
realm and unnecessarily aggravated sectional tension.20 Craven in particular 
dismisses the abolitionists as ‘hypersensitive Northerners’ who misguidedly directed 
                                            
15 Ibid., pp. 172-173 
16 Ibid., pp. 160-172 
17 Ibid. 
18 Merton L. Dillon, ‘The Abolitionists: A Decade of Historiography, 1959-1969’, The Journal of 
Southern History, p. 500 
19 Pressly, Americans Interpret their Civil War, pp. 208-213 
20 J. G. Randall,  “The Civil War Restudied”, JSH, VI (1940), pp. 446-452 
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their absolute desire to eradicate sin towards slavery in the abstract without 
considering the reality of the institution.21 Randall and Ramsdell developed Craven’s 
thesis further by arguing that slavery was not sustainable as an economic system 
and, had it not been the target of abolitionist agitation, would have eventually died 
out.22 The introduction of an abstract concept of absolute morality into a political 
system that was designed to operate on mutual compromise transformed otherwise 
reconcilable sectional differences into unresolvable sources of conflict. In reducing 
slavery into an abstract concept, a mere talking point used by abolitionist radicals 
against the South, the revisionists downplay the fact that the Liberator Circle was 
agitation against the racism inherent in all Americans as well as the institutionalised 
racism of the Constitution. Regardless, the revisionists held that the abolitionists 
were a profoundly negative influence on a nation that would have avoided Civil War 
if it were not for their moral, but impractical, unfounded, and extreme, agitation. 
The revisionists’ outright dismissal of the abolitionists was not quite a 
complete consensus, however. During the first half of the twentieth century Gilbert H. 
Barnes, Dwight Lowell Dumond, and Whitney Cross formulated a thesis and 
methodological approach that would form the initial basis of abolitionist 
historiography. Barnes, Dumond, and Cross are united with Craven, Randall, and 
Ramsdell in the sense that they do not agree with the traditionalist’s thesis regarding 
Garrison’s primacy in the movement. Yet rather than discounting the abolitionists 
entirely or painting them as a destructive force, they argued that the true activists 
were not the Liberator circle’s radical ‘fanatics,’ but the evangelical and political 
                                            
21 Avery O. Craven, Civil War in the Making, (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1959), 
pp. 18-20 
22 Randall, “The Civil War Restudied”, p. 447; Charles Ramsdell, ‘The Natural Limits of Slavery 
Expansion’, The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1929), p. 111 
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abolitionists who consistently endorsed moral suasion as the ideal means of 
achieving abolition. In order to propagate this idea, they developed a methodology 
that focused on defining strict boundaries of abolitionist thought, organisation, and 
practical action. This approach, henceforth termed the definitions framework, 
facilitated the ‘rescue’ of marginalised abolitionists from the shadow of Garrison’s 
radical disunionism. 
Barnes’ The Anti-Slavery Impulse: 1830-1844 was one of the first 
monographs that utilized the definitions framework. Barnes traced the origins of 
political abolitionists such as James Birney, Joshua Giddings, and Gerrit Smith, and 
evangelical abolitionists Theodore Weld, Arthur Tappan, and Lewis Tappan, through 
the united moral suasion of 1830’s until the second election that the abolitionist 
Liberty Party ran in. Barnes’ short timeframe does not cover the entire lifespan of 
political abolitionism might appear to place limits on what he can authoritatively 
conclude. Yet within the context of the definitions framework it is entirely justified. 
Barnes identified the political abolitionists as the most effective group, asserting that 
their method of working towards abolition through representative, democratic change 
was superior to the anti-political agitation of the Garrisonians.23 By the 1840’s a 
significant amount of Northern Americans believed in abolition (or were at least 
partial to antislavery thought) thanks to the mass agency and moral suasion of the 
1930’s.24 Barnes argued that influencing and working with politics was the best way 
to capitalize on the base of Northern antislavery opinion.25 For Barnes, the factor that 
defined the political abolitionists as the most effective was their consistent, logical 
attempt to build on the moral suasion of the 1830’s with the aim of achieving realistic 
                                            
23 Ibid., pp. 164-167   
24 Ibid., pp. 194-196 
25 Ibid., pp. 189-190  
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progress towards abolition, even if it took until Lincoln’s election for political 
antislavery to actually bear fruit.26  
Dumond took Barne’s pro-political antislavery argument to its logical 
conclusion with his monograph Anti-Slavery: The Crusade for Freedom in America. 
Building on Barnes’ narrow approach, Dumond created a unified history of 
abolitionist thought up to the founding of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1833, 
but highlighted the split of 1838 over methodology between political and radical 
Garrisonian abolitionists as the key moment in defining abolitionist factions.27 
Dumond argued that Garrison was central to the division of the abolitionists, for 
‘Garrison gloried in opposition, magnified it beyond reality, thought of himself as a 
potential martyr, and became insufferably arrogant . . . to the detriment of his 
cause.’28 Garrison’s anti-political, anti-Constitutional means showed ‘. . . abysmal 
ignorance or complete disregard for of the fact that slavery was established and 
sustained by law, that legal protection of the civil rights of Negroes was desperately 
needed, and that the only actual gains against slavery had been by political action.’29 
Garrison and the Liberator Circle, whom Dumond considered one and the same, 
were nothing but disruptive radicals with ‘distinctly narrow limitations amongst the 
giants of the antislavery movement’ who served as ‘obstacles to political action 
against slavery.’30 The political abolitionists, despite falling prey to their own internal 
conflicts on means and principle, were still the ‘true’ representatives of the 
movement, however.31 Dumond argued that the failures of the Liberty and Free Soil 
                                            
26 Ibid., pp. 190-197 
27 Dwight Lowell Dumond, Antislavery: The Crusade for Freedom in America, (W.W. Norton & 
Company: New York, 1966), pp.286-290, p. 370 
28 Ibid., p. 173 
29 Ibid., p. 284 
30 Ibid., pp. 174-179 
31 Ibid., p. 290 
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parties were irrelevant, as the conglomeration of Liberty men, antislavery Democrats, 
and conscience Whigs that formed the Free Soil party developed into the Republican 
Party in the 1850’s.32 Therefore, the Republican Party represented the culmination of 
the true trajectory of abolitionism. When Lincoln was elected, the triumphs of the 
Republicans (war against the slavepower, the Emancipation Proclamation, and 
finally the Thirteenth Amendment) became the triumphs of the abolitionists.33 The 
political abolitionists were right to compromise their absolute principles in the name 
of working within the framework of the Constitution.34  
Cross’ Burned Over District utilized the definitions framework in a very 
different manner to Barnes and Dumond. Rather than defining and tracing the 
development of an abolitionist group in their entirety, Cross limited his study to 
Western upstate New York.35 However, this district is notable for being settled by 
New Englanders and possessing a strong, revivalist, evangelical religion.36 This 
distinctly Northern religiosity allowed abolitionism to prosper unlike anywhere else in 
America. Cross argued that the ideological force of Barnes’ antislavery impulse 
travelled along the ‘psychic highway’ of DeWitt Clinton’s canal to ‘a people . . . 
particularly devoted to crusades aimed at the perfection of mankind and the 
attainment of millennial happiness.’37 Although not directly related to Liberator clique 
or events beyond 1860, the microscopic method of The Burned Over District was 
unique amongst abolitionist historiography. Cross proved that extrapolating 
                                            
32 Ibid., pp. 286-299, p. 363  
33 Ibid., p. 363 
34 Ibid., p. 393 
35 Whitney R. Cross, The Burned Over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic 
Religion in Western New York, 1800-1850, (Cornell University Press: 1950), p. xi-x 
36 Ibid., pp. 12-17 
37 Ibid., p. 3 
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conclusions on the wider movement from a focused sample base was highly 
effective when dealing with the history of convoluted groups of activists.  
The traditionalists and revisionists deal with the abolitionists in Manichean 
terms: they were either an undeniable benevolent force or the purveyors of harmful 
abstract moralism. Although not as binary as the Civil War revisionists, the 
abolitionist revisionists remain dogmatic in their denunciation of Garrison and 
emphasis on less radical abolitionists. The post-revisionists, however, engage in a 
multi-faceted argument over definitions, methods, and the influence of absolute 
moralism in the growth of sectional antagonism. Not unlike the Liberator Circle, an 
unusual combination of consensus and discordant individualism characterised the 
works of James Stewart, Aileen Kraditor, James McPherson, Ronald Walters, and 
Lawrence Freidman. They are loosely united in their use of the definitions 
framework; each historian grouped the abolitionists within broad political, 
evangelical, and radical Garrisonian spheres.  
The post-revisionists draw their definitions from examining the splits in the 
movement that occurred after the unified, moral suasion based agitation of the 
1830’s. The first phase of organized abolitionism in the 1830’s was characterized by 
postal campaigns, petitions to Congress, and mobile agents hijacking sermons to 
declare the corruption of slavery and the need for repentance at a national level.38 If 
all Americans took part in the revelation that was the acceptance of abolitionism, 
then the slavepower dominated government would have no choice but enact policies 
that reflected the views of the masses. However, mass moral suasion failed to 
                                            




provoke the mass conversion that the united abolitionists sought.39 Focusing solely 
on affecting a change in the hearts and minds of the people created a strong (but by 
no means extensive) base of antislavery support in the North, but failed utterly in the 
South and had the adverse effect of mobilizing proslavery supporters into a violent 
‘mobocracy.’40 Regardless of the success in the North, it was apparent that the 
abolitionists could not just sit back and let the tide of antislavery bear down upon 
Congress.  
By 1840 it was clear that moral suasion alone was not enough to convince the 
majority of Americans that abolition was a righteous imperative. It had to be paired 
with some form of direct action on the abolitionists’ part if there was to be any 
chance of realistically affecting change on the government. Disagreements over 
exactly what form this action should take resulted in the first schism of the movement 
in 1840, and would continue to divide and define the movement as a whole.41 The 
experience of the 1830’s dispelled the early idealism that being educated to the 
obvious evil of slavery and how it had perverted the Union would be enough to 
convince Americans of the need for change. Such education was still a vital part of 
abolitionism, and agitation would never cease to be defining aspect of what it meant 
to be an abolitionist. Yet where to direct this agitation towards and how to capitalize 
on the small, but vocal, base of antislavery supporters were issues of great 
contention within the movement. Gerrit Smith and the political abolitionists decided 
the best route was to work within the political system, capitalizing on the constituent 
                                            
39 Robert William Fogel, Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery, (W. W. 
Norton & Company: New York, 1989), pp. 271-274 
40 James Brewer Stewart, ‘Reconsidering the Abolitionists in the Age of Fundamental Politics’, Journal 
of the Early Republic, Vol. 26, No. 1, (Spring, 2006), p.10 
41 Stewart, James Brewer, William Lloyd Garrison and the Challenge of Emancipation, (Harlan 
Davidson Inc.: Illinois, 1992), pp. 116-119 
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base created by moral suasion by forming the Liberty Party on the sole platform of 
immediate abolition.42 Lewis Tappan and the evangelical abolitionists believed that 
strict religious change was the ideal way forward.43 For Garrison and the Liberator 
Circle, however, the only method that would have any chance of success was the 
thoroughly anti-political Northern disunion.  
Kraditor, and Stewart offered more detailed and less dogmatic definitions than 
Dumond, yet they both agreed that there was a clear difference between political 
abolitionists and radical Garrisonians centred around means and compromise.44 
They attempted to show less of a bias towards a particular group than Dumond, yet 
still concerned themselves with evaluating the effectiveness of political means with 
disunionism. Kraditor in particular parsed up the abolitionists around the Garrisonian 
anti-Constitutional means, defining political abolitionists as anti-Garrison and 
evangelicals as conservatives.45 McPherson focused equally on the Garrisonian, 
political, and evangelical abolitionists from Lincoln’s election until the reconstruction 
of the South under Andrew Johnson.46 McPherson also identified a third group of ‘. . . 
all those who advocated the immediate, unconditional, and universal abolition of 
slavery, but who did not belong to any of formal abolitionist organizations. . .’47 
McPherson did not expressly define this third group as being contributors to the 
Liberator, but it can be assumed that these individual agitators read and engaged 
with the Liberator as part of the Wider Circle. 
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Walters was one of the few post-revisionists who did not follow the definition 
methodology.48 He made the accurate claim that the post-revisionist had to choose ‘. 
. . whether to trace the boundaries between groups or to deal with the larger debate 
in which they participated. By the latter way of going about things, abolitionists 
belong more with their contemporaries (even the ones who hated them) than with 
twentieth century reformers and radicals.’49 Walters did not directly link the 
abolitionists to the activism of the 1950’s and 1960’s, rather, the post-revisionist 
‘rediscovered’ the abolitionists in light of the Civil Rights movement.50 Furthermore, 
he did not focus on the ideological splits between the various movements and 
instead sought to create a ‘history of commonality and structure rather than of 
distinctiveness and movement.’51 Even the radical Garrisonians fit in with Walter’s 
‘common’ abolitionism, despite being of ‘divided mind’ in regards to political action 
and violent means  ‘Garrison and the nonresistants [were] increasingly drawn to the 
Union cause, especially after the Emancipation Proclamation turned the war 
(however begrudgingly) into a struggle against slavery.’52 Regardless of the many 
dissenting opinions on abolitionist means, Walters found that they were united in 
their abhorrence of ‘spiritual emptiness’ and ‘moral cowardice.’53 
Freidman’s Gregarious Saints was published on the tail end of the Civil Rights 
inspired interest in the abolitionists that motivated the post-revisionists. Yet he still 
falls within the definitions framework, albeit taking an impartial approach to the 
traditional political, evangelical, and radical Garrisonian groupings. Freidman did 
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build on Walters’ united movement thesis, holding that all abolitionists were united as 
immediatists, as opposed to antislavery gradualists: 
‘. . . immediatist abolitionists showed a decidedly different cast of mind and 
personality from that of antislavery gradualists. Immediatists refused to temporalize with evil. 
They craved a sense of inner grace and moral sincerity by conquering temptations towards 
selfish and calculating expediency. They sensed that by plying slow, calculating gradualist 
measures, such as African colonization and nonextensionism, in the hope of ending slavery 
eventually, one compromised with sin.’54 
Despite being unified as immediatists, Freidman defined the Liberator Circle 
as expressly rejecting any form of gradualism that was perpetrated through 
government institutions.55 The political and evangelical abolitionists, however, were 
willing to work within the constraints of the Union and move towards abolition 
gradually, so long as the process of abolition began immediately.56 
Aside from the three main groups of political, evangelical, and radical 
Garrisonian abolitionists, the post-revisionists also examined the minority of 
abolitionist politicians within the Republican Party known as the radical republicans. 
Senators Charles Sumner, William Seward, Henry Wilson, and Representatives 
Joshua Giddings, Thaddeus Stevens, and Owen Lovejoy all pushed for more of a 
strict focus on the abolition of slavery in Republican policy.57 Beyond the radicals’ 
desire for a more definitive end to slavery, it is difficult to generalize exactly what role 
they served in the Republican Party. T. Harry Williams characterised the radicals as 
being ‘scornful’ of Lincoln, ‘. . . but not primarily because they regarded him as an 
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inept leader or administrator. Rather, it was that he had no appreciation of doctrine, 
of moral theory. [The radicals] might unfortunately have to work with Lincoln . . . but 
they would never cease in their efforts to push and educate and remake him.’58  
Williams stressed that the radicals were the ‘firmest of nationalists’ who were driven 
by the moral urge of the antislavery movement.59  
Whereas Williams asserted that the radicals were fundamentally immediatists, 
Hans Trefousse described the radicals as ‘essentially free-soilers, rather than 
immediate abolitionists, opponents of the expansion of slavery who also favoured the 
extinction of the institution by constitutional means.’60 Like the Liberator Circle, the 
radical republicans did not possess a completely uniform view on antislavery policy, 
and often debated amongst themselves as much as they did with the conservative 
republicans.61 Still, Treffouse did not equate the antislavery of the radical republicans 
with the abolitionism of the Liberator Circle, the difference being ‘a question of 
means and immediate goals.’62 Because the radical republicans supported political 
antislavery through the Constitution, not outright immediate abolition, Sumner, 
Giddings et al could not be considered direct allies of Garrison and the Circle, but 
nor were they enemies. Rather, the Circle gave them space to work their radical 
politics and engaged in discourse and debate when necessary. 
All of the post-revisionists agree that the abolitionists were worth taking 
seriously in analysing the Civil War. Whereas the revisionists reduced the impact of 
race and racism in their abstraction theory, the post-revisionists viewed race as a 
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critical aspect of the cause of the Civil War and saw the abolitionists as one of the 
precursors to the Civil Rights movement of the 1950’s. Kenneth Stampp, who could 
be best described as a transitional historian between revisionists post-revisionists, 
had a slight beginning with his 1964 monograph Peculiar Institution, where he 
emphasized slavery and race as central to Civil War historiography.63 
The idea that moral suasion based agitation was, in of itself, enough to 
influence politics to change for the better is a major point of consensus amongst 
post-revisionists scholars. When taken in the context of wider abolitionist 
historiography, this conclusion, while difficult to refute entirely, is weak and suffers 
from over generalization. This weakness stems from the methods and motivations of 
the first phase of post-revisionists. Writing in the 1960’s and 70’s, the post-
revisionists were motivated in part to trace the development of American activism 
back to the abolitionists.64 Analysing the practical methods the various abolitionists 
engaged in, the effectiveness of moral suasion based agitation, and what progress (if 
any) they made towards resolving the issue of racial discrimination became 
extremely important in an era of popular demand for political change. Although the 
NAACP, SNCC, and CORE were hardly as anti-political as the Liberator circle, the 
fact that they were dealing with similar issues over what methods to adopt beyond 
simple agitation made it valuable to examine the failures and successes of their 
progenitors. As the driving factor behind Stewart, Kraditor, and McPherson’s work, 
Civil Rights activism had a strong influence on their methodology and that of the 
post-revisionists.65  
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The post-revisionists’ desire to draw a connection between the activists of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to a watering down of actual analysis and 
highlights the critical failures of the definitions framework. Unlike Barnes and 
Dumond, Stewart and Kraditor were not so much concerned with identifying the ‘true’ 
abolitionists as providing a relatively impartial analysis of the practical success of the 
movement as a whole. They recognized the differences between the political, 
evangelical, and radical Garrisonian abolitionists, yet concluded that the separate 
forms of abolitionism remained united under the broad banner of moral suasion. Both 
shared a strong emphasis on the disagreements of practice and principle that split 
that movement. From this basis they tracked the development of the movement to 
what they define as its apex. Stewart ended his monograph Holy Warriors with the 
ambivalent conclusion that the abolitionists (particularly Garrison) gradually shifted 
towards ‘mundane practicality’ of traditional, conservative moral suasion.66 Kraditor 
agreed, stating that radical and conservative abolitionists were not on opposite ends 
of an exclusive continuum, but simply had different ideas on what consequences 
abolition would have for American society.67 Indeed, ‘. . . their [radicals and 
conservatives] differences were not quantitative but qualitative; to one faction 
abolition would preserve and strengthen the social order, and to the other it would be 
a step toward the subversion of that social order and its replacement by a new 
one.’68 In essence, the main source of contention between the abolitionist sects was 
differences over the particulars of means, not of fundamental principle. After all, the 
movement had been unified in the 1830’s in the initially successful moral suasion, 
the most simplistic form of agitation that focused solely on promoting immediate 
                                            
66 Stewart, Holy Warriors, p. 193 




abolition.69 The later conflicts over practical methods were ultimately irrelevant so 
long as abolition was achieved.  Regardless of the many internecine quarrels 
between the abolitionists over politics, principle, and practice, Stewart and Kraditor 
concluded that because the abolitionists did agitate unceasingly for change had no 
slight effect on antebellum society.70  
Kraditor, Stewart, Walters, and McPherson believed that the Circle’s 
commitment to radical, anti-political agitation was necessary in of itself, serving as an 
alternative viewpoint to the huckstering compromises of politicians. Kraditor in 
particular argued that the Circle’s extremism helped the moderate antislavery of the 
Republican Party appear less reformist, and paved the way for political abolition 
through the Emancipation Proclamation: ‘. . . the more extreme the demand of the 
agitator makes the politician’s demand seem acceptable and perhaps desirable in 
the sense that the adversary may prefer to give up half a loaf rather than the whole. 
Also, the agitator helps define the value, the principle, for which the politician 
bargains.’71 Walters agreed: ‘Abolitionism’s contribution was to provide the Northern 
public with a way of interpreting events that became more and more credible in the 
1840s and 1850s as the South increased its demands. Phrases and insights from 
the antislavery movement . . . passed into the Free Soil and Republican parties, and 
from there into political relevance.’72 McPherson shared a similar notion: ‘. . . [the 
abolitionists] served as the conscience of the radical Republicans. They provided an 
idealistic-moral-humanitarian justification for the policies of the Republican party – 
policies which were undertaken primarily for military or political reasons.’73 Therefore, 
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the post-revisionists reached a consensus that the anti-political agitator, while not 
engaging directly in politics, ultimately aimed to influence the government into 
adopting their principles, ideally in whole, but realistically in part. The theory that the 
Liberator Circle inadvertently served as the Union’s conscience has merits, and 
ensures that Garrison and his cohort take a well-deserved place in history in 
advancing the nation towards emancipation. Yet it conveniently ignores the Circle’s 
initial aversion to political and personal compromise, as well as the crisis of identity 
they faced that led them to accept a modified form of abolition under the Constitution 
that they had reviled for three decades. 
The post-revisionists reached a consensus that politics, in of itself, was far too 
partisan to be the ideal means of practical abolition. However, when tempered by the 
moral based activism of a dedicated minority, it is capable of enacting major moral 
reform. Essentially, all abolitionists, regardless of their preferred practical mode of 
abolition, fell back on moral agitation in the wake of the Civil War and the failure of 
the explicit political abolition of the Liberty and Free Soil parties. Radical disunionist 
agitation was rendered irrelevant in the face of a treasonous, secessionist South, 
therefore, the focus shifted to that of the 1830’s: the broad, yet singular, goal of 
immediate emancipation. The Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth 
Amendment would represent the culmination of this goal. However, they would not 
solve the issues of racism and racial and inequality. Stewart recognized this flaw in 
the abolitionists serving as the Republican’s ‘conscience,’ yet concludes that 
emancipation itself was enough of a success to validate moral suasion as method.74 
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There is another factor that can be regarded as a deficiency in post-revisionist 
scholarship: their treatment of the period beyond 1860. In regards to 1860-63 the 
general consensus is that the methodological divide between radical and 
conservative abolitionists was rendered irrelevant by Lincoln’s election and the 
outbreak of the Civil War. The movement is either seen as rallying behind the 
Republicans until the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 or continuing to agitate for 
emancipation much as they did before 1860.75 Stewart roughly followed Dumond’s 
time constraint, although not Dumond’s theory. Kraditor limited her study to 1830-
1850, as she believed that Of the early post-revisionists, only McPherson in his 
monograph The Struggle for Equality presents a different, detailed analysis of the 
abolitionists from 1860, and while he shows that the movement was still far from 
united and did not necessarily align with the Republicans, he still reached the 
conclusion that agitation along the lines of moral suasion proved to be the most 
influence they asserted on events.76 Indeed, despite their differences in definition, 
Kraditor and Stewart also reached the conclusion that, regardless of their quarrels 
over methodology, by continuing to agitate against the majority the abolitionists 
indirectly, but effectively, worked towards the end of slavery.77  
The first proponents of the definition framework, formulated by Barnes and 
refined by Dumond, and adopted by John Thomas in his biography of Garrison, 
argued that the political abolitionists were the true representatives of abolitionism; 
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they were right to work within the Constitution to secure real antislavery progress 
rather than denounce the Union as inherently stained by proslavery compromise.78 
This interpretation is focused on rescuing the political abolitionists from Garrison’s 
shadow, and had a tendency to place less of an emphasis on abolitionist activity 
beyond the collapse of the Free Soil Party in 1850.79 Because the revisionists saw 
the Republican Party as the apex of abolitionist trajectory, Garrison became little 
more than an irrelevant fringe radical, and as such the abolitionists of The Liberator 
and their internal conflict over compromise did not play an important role before or 
after 1860.80 The more impartial post-revisionists who utilize the definition framework 
also reach this conclusion. Stewart held that by 1859 the differences between radical 
and moderate abolitionists had become meaningless, both groups saw the benefit in 
abolition by ‘the ballot or the bullet.’81 Kraditor argued that ‘. . . most of the major 
tactical problems that arose in the entire history of the abolitionist movement were 
thrashed out within those seventeen years [1834-1850].’82 Both are accurate in the 
claim that the abolitionist movement as a whole became less divisive by 1860.  
However, in responding to Dumond and Thomas’ militant disregard of Garrison by 
presenting more balanced definitions, Stewart and Kraditor failed to recognize the 
critical moments of self-introspection regarding tactics evident in The Liberator from 
1860-1863. And McPherson’s theory of the abolitionist’s as agitators, while well-
founded, ignores the underlying conflict within The Liberator that kept the movement 
paralyzed in their traditional role of the activist. The bulk of current post-revisionist 
historiography still focuses on the boundaries and definitions, rediscovering or 
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responding to the scholarship of the 1950’s and 1960’s.83 The visceral fight for equal 
rights that dominated this era made abolitionist research relevant, and accounts for 
the proliferation of works during this time and the comparative lack of works in the 
last two decades.  
The need to justify (or in some cases, rescue from the shadow of Garrisonian 
dominance) the actions of one group or individual over the rest within this agitation 
has created a pattern of reaction in historiography that has yet to be broken, with 
each new generation of historians either reacting to or attempting to rediscover the 
theses of the 1960’s. Such is the case with current historiography, the children of the 
post-revisionists. Henry Mayer’s biography of Garrison, All on Fire, maintains the 
definitions framework while chiefly responding to and refuting Thomas’ revisionist 
biography, which unambiguously criticised Garrison as a radical saboteur of the 
abolitionist movement.84 Mayer also utilized a unique methodological approach to 
The Liberator as a source: ‘. . . I have regarded The Liberator not simply as a source, 
but as a rightful character in the story, taking my cue from the editor’s sons, who 
observed that “to an extent seldom witnessed in journalism, The Liberator involves at 
once the biography and autobiography of its editor.”’85 This thesis takes Mayer’s 
method one step further, treating The Liberator as a biography of the entire Circle 
rather than just Garrison. Bruce Laurie’s monograph Beyond Garrison sought to 
rectify the post-revisionists focus on Garrison by examining the growth of the political 
                                            
83 Bruce Laurie, Beyond Garrison: Antislavery and Social Reform, (Cambridge University Press: 
2005), p. 1; David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World, 
(Oxford University Press: 2006), p. 4; W. Caleb McDaniel,, ‘Repealing Unions: American Abolitionists, 
Irish Repeal, and the Origins of Garrisonian Disunionism’, Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 28, No. 
2, (Summer, 2008), pp. 243-269 
84 Henry Mayer, All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery, (W. W. Norton & 
Company: New York, 1998), pp. xiii-xvii 
85 Ibid., p. xvii 
33 
 
abolitionists and their eventual merging of their ideals with the Republican Party.86 
Manisha Sinha, in examining whether or not the abolitionists caused the Civil War, 
could not entirely depart from the definitions framework, particularly in relation to 
defining the rest of the movement against the Liberator Circle.87 Futhermore, Sinha 
continues to assert the importance of race when analysing the abolitionists, because 
what distinguished them ‘. . . from their opponents was not moral rigidity or religious 
enthusiasm but a principled commitment to black equality.’88 The general conclusion 
that it ultimately did not matter whether the abolitionists compromised their principles 
or not still stands. Slavery was eventually abolished through Constitutional reform, 
therefore, according to the post-revisionists the end goal of abolitionism was 
achieved. The fact that true equality, both in law and in the hearts and minds of all 
Americans, was not achieved, is lamented but not investigated. While most studies 
of the abolitionist look to 1860, it is the great challenge of secession and war that 
begs for exploration in all aspects of the United States polity, not in the least the 
Liberator Circle. 
There is a dominant trend in abolitionist historiography, spearheaded by 
Stewart, Kraditor, McPherson, and Mayer, that argues that all abolitionists, not just 
the Liberator Circle, abandoned any and all anti-political agitation in the wake of the 
Civil War and accepted the realities of Republican antislavery. ‘By April 1861,’ 
Stewart writes, ‘whatever non-resistance, disunionism, and “antipolitics” were left 
within abolitionism vanished almost entirely as nearly everyone in the movement 
accepted the realities of civil war . . . as the troops began to march, most abolitionists 
were discarding the last vestiges of their romantic radicalism for the hard world of 
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power politics.’89 Revisionists on the whole dismiss the Circle as irrelevant in 
achieving abolition and place the success of emancipation firmly at the hands of the 
Republicans.90 Dumond in particular believed Garrison’s fanaticism hampered the 
cause by seeking a solution outside of American democracy.91 Neither revisionist nor 
post-revisionist are completely right. Both ignore the critical period of certainty, crisis, 
and compromise that the Liberator Circle went through from 1860-1863. Kraditor 
went as far as to argue that the Circle, but particularly Garrison, fell in lockstep with 
the Republican Party’s political abolition rapidly after the start of the Civil War.92 This 
is not a sound enough appraisal of the Liberator Circle’s effect on history. It is broad 
in scope, and neglects the process of personal compromise that Garrison and the 
majority of the Circle went through in recanting anti-political disunion and accepting 
political emancipation. Examining how and why Garrison and the Circle came to 
engage in compromise, the element of American liberty they had rejected for 
decades, is critical to understanding the broader conclusion that the post-revisionists 
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Chapter One: Certainty 
 
For nearly three decades, the activists of the Liberator Circle fervently 
believed that there could be no compromise over slavery, either in politics or 
personal principle. ‘NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS!,’ the first of three masthead 
slogans the Liberator had over 1860-1863, had been in place since 1845.93 Its 
longevity shows that the fundamental principles of the Liberator Circle did not 
change from 1845 to the Secession Crisis. The undeniable evil of slavery and the 
necessity of immediate abolition through northern disunion were the principles that 
all abolitionists of the Circle agreed on. Northern disunion, a means of abolition that 
entailed the repudiation of the proslavery Constitution and the establishment of a 
Northern republic free of slavery, was the only morally acceptable way of achieving 
abolition for the Circle. ‘NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS!’ was what separated 
the Liberator Circle from their political and evangelical contemporaries who were 
willing to accept gradual means of abolition under the Constitution. The principles of 
immediatism, anti-political agitation, and northern disunion that had been formulated 
fifteen years before were still as central and as relevant as ever to the Circle. The 
Circle’s anti-Constitutional view of the history of the United States justified and 
defined disunion as their ideal means of abolition. Therefore, the Liberator Circle 
operated on an intellectual continuity from 1845 right up until the Secession Crisis. 
The majority of 1860 was a period of certainty for the activist community, where 
Garrison and his fellow abolitionists remained confident and comfortable in their 
position as radical, anti-political agitators. 
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The Circle detested the Constitution so much that Garrison symbolically 
burned the Constitution in 1854 during a public meeting, decrying it as a ‘covenant 
with death’ and ‘agreement with hell.’94 He interpreted the Constitution as a 
thoroughly proslavery document, by virtue of several clauses that did not explicitly 
mention slavery, but perpetuated it, most notably the three-fifths clause and fugitive 
slave laws that rendered certain humans as property.95 These clauses were part of a 
compromise the Founding Fathers made in order to secure the ratification of the 
Constitution.96 Garrison fervently believed that through the Founder’s compromise 
‘the deadly venom of slavery was infused into the Constitution of freedom.’97 
Furthermore, the Constitution should never have been adopted, and the Founders 
were blind to believe in gradual emancipation.98 Although the Founders recognized 
the incongruity of allowing slavery to exist in a nation devoted to liberty, they thought 
slavery to be expedient in the context of securing the Union.99 For a radical 
abolitionist such as Garrison, however, slavery was not and never could be 
expedient, as expressed by tertiary circle member James Clark: ‘Compromises are 
good when they surrender what is expedient only, giving up a part of a good thing to 
save the rest; but not good when they surrender justice and right.’100 The Union was 
not a good thing for the Liberator Circle. The entire political system of the United 
States was sabotaged by the proslavery compromise of the Constitution.  
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George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams et al knew that slavery 
was evil. But they compromised their own beliefs and left slavery ambiguous in the 
Constitution so that the United States could be created. Current constitutional 
historian David Waldstreicher argues that despite favouring abolition, the Founders 
ingrained slavery in the United States:  
‘[The founders] wanted the wealth and power that slavery brought without the 
moral responsibility that . . . they also knew came with slavery. Silence, compromise, 
and artful design characterised their solutions. The silences are not absences: they 
had meanings that were understood and debated.’101  
Waldstreicher maintains that these ‘silences’ over slavery in the Constitution 
were necessary in order to resolve the ‘basic issues’ that led to the Revolution: 
debates over taxation and representation.102 Slaves were counted in representation 
as three-fifths not because they were three-fifths of a person nor because they ‘. . . 
deserved three-fifths of a vote . . . Rather, their presence was being acknowledged 
as a source of power and wealth, for their owners [Waldstreicher’s italics].’103 
Waldstreicher believes that antislavery framer’s such as John Adams compromised 
away any explicit antislavery measure in the Constitution because ‘Silence about 
slavery would emphasize what the Americans had in common, such as a desire for 
equitable taxation grounded in the consent of the people.’104 Despite their desire for 
sectional unity, by compromising over slavery the Founders created a precedent that 
allowed it to always be an expediency and placed it at the centre of the Union’s 
democratic government.105 In the words of Dumond ‘Slavery had suddenly become 
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than an economic and social system, more than a system of racial adjustment – it 
was the foundation of political power.’106 That is why the Circle believed that slavery 
could never be abolished through political means; it was far too engrained in the 
representative democracy of the United States.107 Abolition could only be achieved 
through the repudiation of the Constitution and the separation of the Free States 
from the Slave States through Northern disunion, on this there could be no 
compromise. 
From the perspective of the Liberator Circle, compromise was a mistake. Yet 
for the majority of Americans, compromise was the essential genius of their 
democracy. The act of political compromise at a Congressional level was and is 
essential for the American government to operate at any level resembling efficiency 
whilst still remaining a representative democracy; the same can be said for a 
willingness to accept compromise on a personal level, as an individual citizen. 
American philosopher George Santayana defined compromise as a ‘requisite for 
feeling free under American liberty.’108 Citizens and Congressmen alike must be 
willing to ‘be moulded by example and by prevalent opinion . . . find the majority right 
enough to live with, give up lost causes, [and] be willing to put your favourite notions 
to sleep in the cradle of family convention.’109 In other words, in American democracy 
it is your right to hold absolute beliefs, elect representatives that subscribe to those 
beliefs, and to have a government that reflects your beliefs. However, you cannot 
expect everyone to conform to your views. What you might see as an unequivocal 
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truth might be seen as debatable by the majority and outright wrong by other 
minorities. While the elected representatives of your faction might share your fervent 
belief, the practice of democracy requires some level of compromise between the 
majority and minority factions.  
Therefore, a willingness to engage in compromise is the key component of 
managing factionalism. The ideal of the ‘American’ compromise, defined by 
Santayana as ‘. . . meet[ing] in a genuine spirit of consultation, eager to persuade but 
ready to be persuaded . . . [and agreeing] in every case, that disputed questions 
shall be put to a vote, and that the minority will loyally acquiesce in the decision of 
the majority and build henceforth upon it, without a thought of ever retracting it,’ is 
the lynchpin that prevents the government from being dominated by the tyranny of 
the majority and the minority.110 By definition this compromise will not fulfil the exact 
wishes of any faction. But because it is grounded in what Santayana calls the ‘cradle 
of family convention’ that all Americans agree to be the heart of the Union, the 
‘fundamental unanimity’ of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, 
this compromise will be agreeable to all parties, maintain freedom for all individuals, 
and ensure that the government is able to function to progress the nation.111 Of 
course, before the Thirteenth and Fourtheenth Amendments, the American 
compromise only applied to white Americans. Indeed, the blatant exclusivity of 
compromise based on race was one of the key reasons why Garrison and the Circle 
detested politics and the Constitution. 
By compromising over slavery, the Founders engaged in the genius of 
American democracy: resolving a disputed issue in a manner acceptable to all 
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parties that will ultimately benefit the nation, but not realizing the exclusive goals of 
either. Indeed, the Constitution of 1787 was the first compromise made under the 
unique form of American liberty:  
‘The practice of liberty presupposes two things: that all concerned are 
fundamentally unanimous, and that each has a plastic nature, which he is willing to 
modify. If fundamental unanimity is lacking and all are not making in the same 
general direction, there can be no honest co-operation, no satisfying compromise. 
Every concession, under such circumstances, would be a temporary one . . . it would 
amount to a mutilation of one’s essential nature, a partial surrender of life, liberty, and 
happiness, tolerable for a time, perhaps, as the lesser of two evils, but involving a 
perpetual sullen opposition and hatred.’112 
Although the Founding Fathers objected to the immorality of slavery, they 
were all committed to the ‘general direction’ of forming a nation. Therefore, the 
delegates of the Constitutional Convention were willing to be ‘plastic’ in regards to 
slavery. Of course, the Founders’ fundamental unanimity was that slavery was evil 
and had no place in a Union based on liberty. Yet they had no federal power in 1787 
that allowed them to abolish it. The purpose of the Constitutional Convention was to 
establish a system of federal government that was agreeable to all of the Thirteen 
Colonies. Instead of taking the absolute paths of condemning or condoning slavery, 
they left its status ambiguous within the Constitution. This ambiguity became central 
to the ‘fundamental unanimity’ at the heart of American democracy as defined by the 
Constitution. The workings of American government, specifically the make-up of 
Congress, was also skewed in favour of the Slave States through the three-fifths 
clause.  
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For Garrison and the Liberator Circle, there could be no expedience in 
regards to slavery. The Circle believed that by compromising over slavery, the 
Founding Father’s skewed the American political process in favour of the slave 
states and betrayed the ideals of the Declaration of Independence. It was an 
obvious, absolute evil that had no place in any government, much less a democracy. 
Santayana’s American compromise was entirely irreconcilable with the Liberator 
Circle. Garrison could not accept any political compromise because the proslavery 
Constitution directly contradicted his belief in the immorality of slavery. ‘And as for 
the Union,’ Garrison exclaimed in June 1860, ‘we say that it was based upon certain 
compromises, everywhere understood, everywhere conceded, whereby slavery was 
rendered secure, and the slaveholders had extraordinary power put into their hands . 
. . it is sinful to uphold it; and we therefore exclaim, ‘No Union with Slaveholders!’113 
Indeed, ‘NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS!’ was a statement of the Circle’s goal 
and a call to all Americans to recognize the truth that repudiating the Constitution 
was an absolute necessity on the path to abolition. As a slogan of the Circle, it 
unequivocally called for disunion, and dismissed any notion that slavery could ever 
be a part of the United States. Rather, the Constitution had to be revoked and a new 
Union of Northern, free states be created, without slavery and truly representative of 
the Declaration of Independence. 
Garrison undoubtedly wanted enough Northerners to accept disunion and 
bring about a democratic revolution. But he would not modify his principles to make 
them more palatable to moderate Americans. Garrison believed that ‘. . . [the 
abolitionists of the Liberator are] the only class in America who are true to the 
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principles they profess, and cannot be induced to compromise them to avoid danger 
on one hand, or gain applause on the other.’114 Popularity, either in politics or 
amongst the populace, was not a concern for the Circle. For  
‘[Abolition] is incapable of intimidation; it disregards all threats and assaults; it 
laughs and scorns at projects of “conciliation” and “compromise;” whether resisted or 
let alone, its growth is vigorous and its course onward; its elements are justice, 
mercy, goodness and truth; its object is freedom for all who are deprived of its 
inestimable blessings; it is divinely inspired and sustained; no weapon against it can 
prosper; it will assuredly succeed.’115  
Garrison spoke with nothing but confidence in his cause, as long as it was not 
hampered by compromise. He did not seek to be ‘persuaded’ by proslavery or even 
antislavery factions, and he certainly did not want to support a Union that allowed 
slavery in any form. Therefore, the abolitionists of the Liberator did not fit into the 
mould of Santayana’s acquiescent minority. They would not compromise their 
personal principles to conform with the majority, or even accept a modified, 
universally agreeable course of action.   
The Liberator Circle’s dismissal of the American compromise did not make 
them undemocratic anarchists, however. Indeed, the Circle complies with the 
majority of Santayana’s conditions for American liberty. Garrison and his coadjutors 
were certainly ‘eager to persuade’ through abolitionist publications, meetings, 
travelling agents, and the various means of moral suasion.116 They were also in 
favour of democratic process, the Liberator served as their forum for public debate 
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and decision making within their community. Yet the democracy of the Circle was 
removed from the democracy of the United States. And because the Circle was so 
small a minority, they were able to operate as an ideal democracy where every 
individual’s opinion could expressed and responded to, without being diluted by 
vagaries of party policy making. So long as one believed in the immediate end of 
slavery through Northern disunion and the Declaration of Independence, the Circle’s 
own fundamental unanimity, they could be a part of the Circle’s democracy. 
One of the defining principles of the Liberator Circle was its refusal to engage 
in both political and personal compromise. By 1860, all political compromises over 
slavery had been proven by history to be abject failures: the initial Constitutional 
compromise of 1787, the Compromise of 1821, and the Compromise of 1850 were 
all political compromises that were intended to resolve sectional tension over slavery 
once and for all.117 The former established the boundary as below the 36° 
30′ parallel (inclusive of Missouri) and the latter extended that line to the Pacific.118 
Despite being far too proslavery for the Circle, both 1820 and 1850 can be described 
as true compromises in line with Santayana and the Founders’ original compromise 
of 1787. The compromises of 1820 and 1850 succeeded in obtaining resolution for a 
time, but they were ultimately skewed towards the Slave States and entirely 
unsatisfactory for antislavery Northerners.119 Most importantly for the Circle, no 
political compromise ever had any pretentions towards immediate abolition.120 All 
political antislavery measures were exercises in gradualism, designed not to end 
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slavery, but to keep it within the boundaries defined by the Constitution. Because the 
Constitution ultimately sanctioned slavery, the Circle believed there was no point in 
restricting the institution under its clauses.  
The Liberator Circle more than opposed political compromise, however. 
Personal compromise, having to give up a portion of your individual principles to 
conform with the nation as a whole was regarded as worse than any political failure. 
One of the main reasons why immediatism through disunion was asserted as a 
qualifying certainty of the Circle was that it eliminated any possibility of being 
persuaded to compromise by outside forces, whether they be politicians, fire-eating 
secessionists, or antislavery moderates. Stewart encapsulates the Circle’s rejection 
of personal compromise: ‘Practicality thus dictated compromise, and abolitionists 
rejected it in all forms . . . All such discussion . . . deflected attention from society’s 
fundamental problems – white racism and Negro enslavement. Until whites had 
accepted blacks as equals, digressions on practical alternatives to immediatism 
would only reinforce prejudice and encourage complacency.’121 Here, Stewart 
highlighted the Circle’s commitment to more than just abolishing slavery. Eliminating 
racism, on an institutional and a social level, was the ultimate goal of the Liberator 
Circle.  
However, Stewart also states that ‘practicality dictated compromise.’122 Here 
Stewart referenced a problem the Liberator Circle faced as a result of their rejection 
of compromise: achieving practical progress towards abolition. Garrison knew how 
ideal abolition would be achieved: Northern disunion and repudiation of the 
Constitution. The men and women of the Circle were united behind the Declaration 
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of Independence and strived to make equality for all, regardless of ethnicity or 
gender, a reality in the United States.123 All talks of compromising, gradual methods, 
such as restricting slavery’s expansion into the territories, or ‘colonizing’ blacks in 
Liberia, were akin to heresy against the higher law, and only detracted from the 
greater crusade for true equality.124 Yet compromise, personal and political, was the 
accepted method of progress in the United States, and if the abolitionists of the 
Circle were willing to meet antislavery moderates in compromise, it was highly likely 
that some form of practical advance towards abolition could be achieved.  
For the Liberator Circle, however, a gradual advance towards abolition was 
less than pointless, as any and all progress would be limited by the proslavery 
Constitution.125 Garrison staunchly believed in maintaining ‘Personal integrity and [a] 
straight-forward regard for the right [that] can allow no temptation to swerve a hair’s 
breadth from the line of duty; for [our commitment to justice is] of more consequence 
than all the compacts and constitutions ever made.’126 The Circle strongly believed in 
abolition as a vocation, and taking up the mantle of immediatism was a critical step 
in moving towards personal and national redemption, as Donald Scott states: 
‘Immediatism was less a program of what to do about slavery than, in evangelical 
terms, a “disposition”, a state of being in which the heart and will were set irrevocably 
against slavery . . .’127 Although gradual abolition might allow for practical abolition, 
accepting it meant recognizing the Constitutional interpretation of slavery as 
something that could be tolerated, not as an unquestionable evil. Garrison and the 
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Circle stood steadfast by their beliefs, and took pride in refusing personal 
compromise, even though their pride was taken for self-righteousness by antislavery 
Americans.128  
Alongside the certainties of the evil of slavery, immediate abolition through 
northern disunion, and the rejection of compromise, a number of sub-principles 
characterised of the Liberator Circle until the onset of the Civil War. Anti-political 
agitation, non-violent resistance, and a commitment to individualism were 
predominant aspects of the Circle that distinguished them other abolitionists and 
Americans as a whole. A deep respect for the rights and of the individual citizen and 
their centrality to the democratic process is evident throughout the Liberator. 
Freidman, in Gregarious Saints, his seminal examination of the social aspects of the 
various abolitionist communities, described the Circle as ‘. . .freewheeling 
individualists who often argued among themselves, even over minor matters. At the 
same time, they demonstrated overwhelming concern with orderly, efficient, and 
socially harmonious collective effort.’129 It was this push and pull between the 
opposite extremes of individualism and collectivism that made the Liberator Circle 
unique as an activist society. The Circle often engaged in tempestuous debates 
through the Liberator, but until the Civil War they never fractured as a society.  
Although Garrison’s views loomed above the wider Circle, every member 
could hold views to the contrary and had the right to express them in an official 
context. Garrison, as the founder and chief editor of the Liberator, held a critical role 
within the Circle, yet he did not have the power to veto any democratic decision. 
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Rather, Garrison’s position as a leader stems from his role as arbiter of the social 
aspects of the Liberator Circle. Freidman described the circle members as being 
willing ‘. . . to restrain themselves on certain particulars and to follow Garrison’s 
directives.’130 Social rituals [and] common allegiance to the vision of a Government 
of God taming exploitative human institutions was still another factor drawing Clique 
abolitionists into concerted action.’131This still allowed room for ‘idiosyncratic thought’ 
and ‘uncompromised individual responsibility to God.’ No one expect Garrison to 
have a veto, or any other equivalent ‘presidential’ power. Nor could Phillips or 
Whipple demand the adoption of any single principle or means. What made them the 
Inner Circle, then, was not any official or unofficial governmental powers, but a 
combination of rhetorical proclivity and enigmatic personality. Garrison and 
Whipple’s status as editors did give them some authority over what articles got 
published. But it was their regular contributions in the form of editorials that defined 
their status within the Primary circle. Phillips in turn frequently gave lengthy 
speeches at the meetings of the various Anti-Slavery Societies subscribers to the 
Liberator attended, as well as on impromptu occasions at Tremont Temple.  
Garrison was fervent, persuasive, and prolific with his rhetoric. However, in 
the context of the Liberator his views were not those of a leader, but another 
individual agitating for abolition. The same can be said of Phillips and Whipple, the 
other members of the primary circle, and even those in the secondary circle who 
held roles as agents and officiators such as Henry Wright, Stephen Foster, Lydia 
Child, and Parker Pillsbury. According to Freidman, ‘There were no drab conformists 
in the group. Major ideological differences among Cliques members underscore their 
                                            




strongly independent qualities.’132 There was nothing to stop any member or 
members of the Circle from forming their own abolitionist societies apart from the 
Liberator, if they felt that Garrison did not align with their views. Stewart agreed with 
Freidman, stating that ‘Agitation reconfirmed the self-purifying discovery of evil and 
the lifetime duty to engage and subdue it. Garrisonian politics ultimately made a 
person into a sanctified and militant party of one.’133 Stephen Foster attempted to 
form another political abolitionist party in 1860, and although Garrison openly 
disapproved he made no effort to prevent it.134 Maria Chapman and Lydia Child held 
positions of authority within the Anti-Slavery Subscription Society (whose annual 
meetings were reported in the Liberator), and Pillsbury openly dissented with 
Garrison’s shift away from Northern disunion as the Civil War progressed.135 
Regardless of how each activist might choose to agitate on a personal level and 
what amount of support this had garnered them, within the Liberator Circle their 
opinions were equal.  
The universal equality of the Circle was possible because they operated as a 
small, ideal democracy, where every person was free to express their opinion and 
influence democratic discourse without fear of repercussion or any pressure to 
compromise their beliefs to fit a party line. Other than rejecting the ‘covenant of 
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death’ that was the Constitution, members of the Circle were free to interpret their 
abolitionism how they saw fit within a core set of immediatist beliefs. Individual 
freedoms, particularly freedom of speech, were upheld to extreme degrees of 
idealism. This was reflected in the open, unmoderated debates on policy and 
principle within the Liberator and at the annual meetings of the American Anti-
Slavery Society (AAS), New England Anti-Slavery Society (NEAS), and 
Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society (MAS). Indeed, the Liberator was not designed 
to be an ‘exclusively anti-slavery journal’ or the ‘organ of any society.’136 It was 
intended to present evidence from all quarters and allow its readers to make 
informed decisions on any given topic. In this sense, the Liberator distinguished from 
other contemporary periodicals by not explicitly backing the view of any one 
organization.  
This is not to say that the Liberator did not have a modus operandi. Garrison 
proclaimed that ‘Its primary and paramount object was, indeed, the abolition of 
slavery; and to that it has adhered more strictly than any journal in the land . . .’137 
Therefore as a propagandistic periodical, it was undoubtedly a vehicle of immediatist 
agitation. Yet the Liberator also fulfilled the role of a forum for the core minority of 
agitators that formed its readership. These ‘few who had the moral courage to enrol 
their names on its subscription list,’ utilized this forum to discuss, compare, and 
debate their views with the Liberator Circle as a whole.138 Through the act of 
correspondence, individual activism became relevant and acknowledged as part of 
the greater abolitionist crusade. Not only that, but any correspondent who disagreed 
with Garrison (or any other Circle member) could write in and engage in debate. The 
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‘Refuge of Oppression’ and ‘Selections’ sections, which collected excerpts from 
Southern and Northern periodicals respectively, were designed to facilitate such 
correspondence. The inclusion of outside works, which often the subject of editorial 
pieces, gave readers an insight into Garrison’s thought; they could essentially check 
his sources, and expect their opinions to be published ‘thoroughly untrammelled,’ 
even if they dissented.139 In the interest of publication space, fairness to other 
correspondents, and, most importantly, the main purpose of agitation for 
unconditional abolition, Garrison and Whipple did state ‘It is not our habit to prolong 
a personal discussion with any one.’ However, this claim does not detract from 
Garrison ‘Endeavouring at all times to state our sentiments in pain language, tersely 
and without circumlocution, [and] submit[ing] them to the good sense and honest 
judgement of our readers, without needless repetition.’140 Garrison’s editorial policy 
certainly lines up with this statement. In this particular editorial he was justifying his 
decision to end a prolonged discussion with a tertiary circle member who adamantly 
argued that disunion and secession were one and the same.141  
As long as one believed in the necessity of immediate abolition through 
Northern disunion and rejected politics, they were welcomed within the Circle, and 
accepted as an equal agitator. Exactly what form this agitation would take was up to 
the individual, committed Circle member. In general practice, abolitionist agitation 
took the form of moral suasion. The Declaration of Sentiments of the AAS, written by 
Garrison in 1833, outlined the main practical forms that the Circle’s moral suasion 
would take over three decades of agitation: 
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‘We shall send forth agents to lift up the voice of remonstrance, of warning, of 
entreaty, and of rebuke. We shall circulate, unsparingly and extensively, anti-slavery 
tracts and periodicals. We shall enlist the pulpit and the press in the cause of the 
suffering and the dumb. We shalt aim at a purification of the churches from all 
participation in the guilt of slavery. We shall encourage the labor of freemen rather 
than that of slaves, by giving a preference to their productions: and We shall spare 
no exertions nor means to bring the whole nation to speedy repentance.’142 
So the Circle encouraged an active form of agitation that, by 1844, had 
developed a clear aim in convincing enough Americans to accept Northern disunion. 
The only promise Garrison had not achieved by 1860 was bringing the whole nation 
to a ‘speedy repentance.’ This failure was not a cause for dejection. Although the 
Circle hoped to swiftly end slavery, they understood that it would take time to 
convince the entirety of the United States to cast off their compromising government 
and begin anew. Agitation through moral suasion, aiding the nation on their road to 
repentance, was the mainstay practice that the Circle engaged in before and after 
the Civil War. While the Circle could never fulfil Northern disunion on their own, they 
were unceasingly committed to convincing the nation that the repudiation of the 
Constitution was demanded by the higher law of justice.  
The Liberator Circle’s unwavering adherence to Northern disunion that 
distinguished them the most from other abolitionist societies. Quite simply, Northern 
disunion involved the removal of the Free States from the Slave, the repudiation of 
the proslavery Constitution, and the creation of a new government that was truly 
based on universal freedom. Tertiary correspondent S. M. J. (not to be confused with 
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secondary circle member Samuel May Junior) succinctly outlined the intent behind 
Disunion: ‘The work to be done is to construct a new and a NORTHERN REPUBLIC; 
and that Republic must omit, in all its basis papers, both the words male and white, 
else it will be a weak, rickety thing, and will “fall asunder like flax at the touch of 
fire.”143 S. M. J.’s insistence on omitting ‘male’ as well as ‘white’ emphasized the 
Circle’s commitment to universal equality inclusive of women, not just abolitionism.144 
This commitment would be lost as part of the compromise accepting emancipation, 
and was a definite point of contention amongst the Circle.  
Prior to the Civil War, disunion played a critical role in managing the diverse 
opinions of individual agitators and, like immediatism, was a reveille that called for an 
end to gradualism and compromise. Phillips wrote that ‘Disunion startles a man to 
thought. It takes a lazy abolitionist by the throat, and thunders in its ear, “Thou art the 
slaveholder.”’145 Disunion was the only legitimate way to get rid of the physical 
connection to slavery, and an important step on the road to personal and national 
redemption. Disunion could even regenerate the political system of the United States 
through the creation of a new Constitution, as argued by correspondent ‘God help 
THE PEOPLE’: 
‘Let the whole policy of government be openly and avowedly hostile to 
slavery, and let the people of the free states at once meet in Convention to wipe out 
every clause of the Constitution which has been, or can be, tainted with pro-slavery 
interpretation. This is the way, the only way, to set ourselves right-to be just, to be 
magnanimous, to be generous. Then, if civil war must come, let it come; then, if the 
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South must perish, let it perish – we shall be innocent, we shall be saved, yet so as 
by fire.’146 
This piece was published near the end of the Secession Crisis when the 
Confederate States were a reality and the entirety Liberator Circle called to let the 
South go. God help THE PEOPLE’s vitriolic tone towards the South reflected the 
heightened tensions leading up to Fort Sumter, and called back to the fundamental 
principle of disunion whilst simultaneously embracing the possibility of redemption 
through fire as opposed to moral suasion. It is important to note that the Circle were 
not insurgents seeking to sabotage any part of the nation, Northern or Southern. 
Rather, they sought to bring about disunion as part of a democratic revolution 
legitimised by the Declaration of Independence. That is why disunion was the focus 
of all their agitation; if the majority of Northerners believed that the Constitution had 
to be repudiated, then they had every right to reform the government. 
Instead of Constitution, the Liberator Circle held the Declaration of 
Independence as the foundation of their democratic community. The Declaration 
promoted ideals of individualism, equality, and the rights of the people as taking 
precedence over the government. The Constitution, however, presented a 
convoluted political process tainted by the three-fifths compromise. Garrison found 
legal justification for disunion with the Declaration, specifically ‘whenever any Form 
of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to 
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such 
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely 
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to effect their Safety and Happiness.’147 Of course ‘Governments long established 
should not be changed for light and transient causes.’148 Yet the abolition of slavery 
was far from a ‘transient cause,’ and the Circle argued that all Americans had 
undoubtedly suffered ‘a long train of abuses and usurpations’ by the Government in 
its continued failure to abolish slavery.149 Therefore, it is every citizen’s right and duty 
‘to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future 
security.’150  
The Declaration was first and foremost a revolutionary document. It contained 
none checks and balances of political process outlined in the Constitution, and as 
such was entirely unsuited to be the basis of a government. Yet the Liberator Circle 
was not a government, but a minority faction agitating for radical change. In 
appealing to the Declaration, Garrison sought to enact a revolutionary right inherent 
to all American citizens. Garrison was steadfast in his belief that believing in disunion 
via the Declaration did not make him a fanatic or an anti-American traitor:  
‘The people of this State profess to believe in the Declaration of 
Independence. That is my Abolitionism. Every man, therefore, who disdains 
Abolitionism, repudiates the Declaration of Independence. Does he not? “All men are 
created equal, and endowed by their creator with an inalienable right to liberty.” 
Gentlemen, that is my fanaticism – that is all my fanaticism. (Cheers). All I ask is that 
this declaration may be carried out everywhere in our country and throughout the 
world.’151   
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Disunion was the ideal, the critical end goal towards which all agitation, in a 
personal or organized capacity, was directed to. It did not matter that disunion was 
impossible for the Circle to achieve by themselves. What did matter was that they 
could agitate in the complete certainty that they were justified not only morally, but 
legally as well. Garrison was confident in his abolitionism, and more than willing to 
be patient in seeing its fulfilment: ‘We shall be ridiculed as fools, scorned as 
visionaries, branded as disorganizers, reviled as madmen, threatened, and perhaps 
punished as traitors. But we shall bide our time . . . Our faith in God is rational and 
steadfast. We have exceeding great and precious promises on which to rely, that we 
are in the right.’152 Tertiary correspondent J. P. B., writing early in 1860, echoed 
Garrison’s faith in disunion:  
‘. . . [there is no method] more effectual and unobjectionable than that of a 
peaceful separation of the free from the slave states, by mutual consent . . . it is true, 
this would not be an abolition of slavery where it now exists; but it would be a 
removal of all fear from of it in the free States and the Territories; and they would 
have no complicity with it, or mortifying responsibility for it, than they now have for its 
existence in Asia or Africa; and it would be easy to show that such a separation must, 
in a few years, be followed by entire emancipation . . .’153 
J. P. B. recognized that universal abolition would not immediately follow as a 
result of northern disunion. But it would ‘remove all fear of it from the free States and 
the Territories,’ effectively resolving all the section tensions that had paralyzed the 
Union under the grip of the slavepower.154 J. P. B. believed that emancipation would 
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soon follow disunion, however, as the South would be unable to hold their slaves for 
long without the federal support of the Union.155 
Just because the Circle found justification for disunion in the Declaration did 
not mean that they supported secession. At first glance it is easy to equate the 
minority of the Liberator Circle to that of the Southern fire-eaters. Idealistically they 
are polar opposites, but in practice they are both advocating the dissolution of the 
Union through the revolutionary right of the Declaration. This similarity was not lost 
on contemporary Americans, and Garrison was called out several times by 
correspondents to clarify how the Circle’s disunion differed from Southern 
Secession.156 In April 1861, the final month of the Secession Winter, Garrison 
explicitly stated this difference: 
‘The right of a State to secede from the Union, ad libitum, “for no reason,” is a 
doctrine never advocated by us, or by the Anti-Slavery society. We are disunionists 
on very different grounds . . . They [the Founding Fathers] did not make it [the 
Constitution] to be dissolved, but to be perpetuated. “The Constitution,” says Mr. 
Webster, “does not provide for events which must be preceded by its own 
destruction. Secession, therefore, since it must bring these consequences with it, is 
REVOLUTIONARY.” If, then, no State has a right to secede “without cause,” has it a 
right to secede for any cause? The answer to this is – not a constitutional right, but a 
revolutionary right, for the cause set forth in the Declaration of Independence.’157 
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Therefore, the key practical difference was that the secessionists were 
attempting to leave the Union as they pleased, in spite of the Constitution. The 
Confederate States might appeal to the revolutionary right of the Declaration, but 
their appeal could only be denied on the grounds of morality and, crucially, as a 
refusal to engage in democratic process. For as Wendell Phillips postulated in the 
wake of Fort Sumter: 
‘The right of a State to secede, as a revolutionary right, is undeniable; but it is 
the nation that is to recognize that; and the nation offered, in broad convention, at the 
suggestion of Kentucky, to meet the question. The offer was declined. The 
government and the nation therefore, are all right. They are right on constitutional 
law; they are right on the principles of the Declaration of Independence.’158 
This speech marked the first time that Phillips acknowledged the government 
in any positive sense, and is a critical point in the Circle’s transition towards 
compromising their principles and accepting political emancipation. In terms of 
defining secession, however, the key aspect is that the majority of the nation had to 
agree that invoking the right of revolution was absolutely necessary. The 
Confederate States ignored this point, while the disunionist Liberator Circle always 
acknowledged it. By Garrison’s definition disunionists were distinguished by their ‘. . . 
reverence for “higher law,” as paramount to all human enactments and compacts,’ 
and principles based on ‘eternal justice and unswerving rectitude,’ whereas 
secessionists sought nothing but the ‘. . . utter subversion of free institutions, and the 
extension and perpetration of their monstrous slave system . . .’159  
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The Circle and southern secessionists both embraced the American 
revolution, but with different understandings. Secession was always distinguished 
from disunion on a moral and methodological level. An anonymous correspondent by 
the name of M. believed that ‘To secede from injustice, oppression, wrong; is loyal, - 
a sacred duty; to secede or attempt secession away from the presence and sway of 
truth, justice, integrity, is rebellion and treason evermore.’160 Although anti-political, 
the Circle was far from undemocratic. In contrast to the dictatorial demands of 
secession, disunion called for a democratic revolution. Though the masthead of the 
Liberator proclaimed ‘NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS!’, the Circle advocated 
revolution only when the majority of Americans were enlightened to the evil of the 
Constitution through moral suasion. Indeed, even as the Circle began to rethink their 
place as agitators during the Civil War, they never refrained from chastising the 
Secessionists. Daniel Foster, a Secondary circle member who unusually chose to 
serve in the Union army as a medic, epitomized the Circle’s denunciation of 
secession: ‘What hissing scorn will then be sent forth against the men who trampled 
on the Declaration of our fathers as ‘glittering generalities,’ to be set aside and 
disregarded in the practice of the nation.’161 Writing in 1862, Foster’s commitment to 
the Declaration shows that opposition to secession remained strong long after 
disunion had been made irrelevant as a means of abolition. 
The activists of the Circle were acutely aware that Northern disunion was an 
impossible task for them to achieve on their own. Its importance did not lie in its 
feasibility, however. Disunion served as the ideal goal towards which all individual 
agitation could be directed. Northern disunion allowed the Circle to continue their 
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democratic community whilst still making moves towards abolition. ‘We cannot make 
crises.’ Phillips declared, ‘We can only prepare for them [by employing the 
abolitionists’] only weapon . . . an appeal to the conscience against slavery as a 
sin.’162 Garrison’s theory of anti-political Northern disunion was far from popular and 
did not gain widespread support outside the minority of the Circle.163 This lack of 
mainstream support allowed the Circle to exist as a democratic minority community, 
as well as an activist organization. Indeed, one of the catalysts for the Liberator 
Circle’s crisis of identity in 1861 was the sudden turn of Northern opinion against the 
secessionist South. Prior to the Civil War the majority of the North held to moderate 
antislavery principles. Most Northerners recognized that slavery had no place in the 
land of free, yet they also respected the Constitution.164 Slavery was a problem that 
had to be resolved, but not at the expense of the Union. Although the main goal of 
the Circle was to convince all Americans of the necessity of disunion, the fact that 
the majority of the population opposed this course of action allowed Garrison and his 
followers to distinguish themselves as a minority faction. With the Secession Winter 
and Civil War, however, Northern opinion shifted against the South. Although this 
shift was against the Confederate States and not strictly motivated by abolitionism, it 
was received by Garrison, Phillips, and many in the secondary circle in a positive 
light. When it seemed like the war would end in swift triumph for the North, the 
questions it posed about the certainty of Northern disunion and the nature of the 
Circle’s community could be ignored in a wash of newfound patriotism. As it became 
apparent that the war would not be a short one, Garrison and the Circle as a whole 
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had to ask themselves exactly what the nature of their agitation would be in a climate 
of conflict. 
A similar issue regarding of what place, if any, violence had in the Liberator’s 
crusade occurred after John Brown’s ill-fated raid on Harper’s Ferry, Virginia in 
October 1859. Brown and twenty-one abolitionist companions seized the federal 
arsenal with the intent of stealing arms and inciting a slave revolt. After a brief siege 
led by then United States’ Colonel Robert Lee, Brown was captured, charged with 
treason, and executed on December second 1859.165 Although Brown’s attempt at 
forcing the end of slavery through insurrection was viewed by contemporary 
Americans as misguided at best and insanity at worst, the fact that he took direct 
action against the evil of slavery made him a hero to the Liberator Circle.166 Outer 
Circle member Lizzie de Garmo reported of the favourable reception of a speech 
Pillsbury gave praising John Brown: ‘It is a noticeable fact, and one worthy of 
remark, that the great Northern heart is everywhere beating with a more steady and 
healthy pulsation, since witnessing that noble and godlike sacrifice to principle, made 
by John Brown and his associates . . .’167 Pillsbury continued, stating that Brown’s 
‘lesson on armed resistance has been dearly learned, still it is not without its 
cheering results already; for it has shown us what manly courage, heroic fortitude, 
and true Christian love, such firm reliance on God can give, when the trying hour 
should come . . .’168 Pillsbury acknowledged that Brown’s rash, violent action failed 
and cost several lives, but also upheld the uncompromising abolitionist principles 
that motivated his raid. Garrison shared Pillsbury’s opinion, exalting Brown not for his 
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violent means, but for his willingness to back up abolitionist dedication with practical 
action and for bringing abolition further into the ‘public interest’: 
‘For the last four months, John Brown and Harper’s Ferry have been the 
absorbing objects of public interest and sympathy, so as to divert attention from any 
local struggle, (more or less,) though not from the tremendous question at issue before 
the country. Before the solemnity of that world-thrilling tragedy, everything else had to 
give way, for the time being. The result of it is to be seen in more efficient action of 
every kind, hereafter.’169  
Garrison and Pillsbury’s denunciation of Brown’s violent means and 
praise for his practical action reflected the view of the Wider Circle. The 
resolutions of the annual meeting of MAS presented a finalized interpretation of 
Brown’s raid: 
‘. . . to be a true abolitionist, it is necessary to be true to humanity, and therefore 
any measures which violate the great cause of human rights, though intended for the 
good of the slave, cannot be sound [yet] so long as the Anti-Slavery agitation is 
conducted on the principles of peace and goodwill, we can reasonably absolve 
ourselves from any violent measures adopted by others for the liberation of the 
oppressed.’170 
The organisers of the MAS separated the actions of an extremist such as 
Brown from the non-violent moral suasion of the Circle. Therefore, they could accept 
the violent actions of others, so long as that violence actually achieved progress 
towards abolition. 
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In March 1860, Garrison could confidently and unambiguously proclaim the 
ideal goal of the Liberator circle: ‘Let there be a free, independent Northern Republic, 
and the speedy abolition of slavery will inevitably follow . . . I am laboring to dissolve 
this blood-stained Union. . .’171 There was no ambiguity, nor any space for 
compromise. Garrison and his coadjutors were proud individualists who often 
differed on exact matters of principle and practice, yet from 1843 onwards they were 
unified by the means of northern disunion.172 It did not matter that this was a 
completely unachievable goal for a radical minority. In fact, its unrealistic idealism is 
precisely why it was such a strong means of abolition. The reality of agitating as an 
uncompromising, anti-political minority meant that realistic progress towards abolition 
was incredibly difficult to obtain. Northern disunion, by virtue of being idealistic and 
unfeasible, served as a blanket method that the Circle could agree on as the ultimate 
goal whilst debating amongst themselves the vagaries of more workable practical 
means. The infeasibility of northern disunion was crucial to the maintenance of the 
Liberator circle’s society of free discourse, as it embodied everything that the 
individual agitators agreed upon.  
Garrison, in February of the Secession Winter, firmly stated that ‘. . . [the 
abolitionists of the Liberator Circle are] the only class in America who are true to the 
principles they profess, and cannot be induced to compromise them to avoid danger 
on one hand, or gain applause on the other.’173 Although in this case he was 
referring directly to the prospect of yet another weak, conciliatory compromise to the 
Secessionists in return for peace (as the entirely redundant Peace Conference was 
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due to be held in Virginia), his words also ring true for the Circle’s response to 
compromise as a whole.174 Neither the threat of conflict nor the promise of popularity 
could sway Garrison to abandon immediatism for a political compromise. The most 
significant challenge that the Liberator Circle faced from 1860-1863 was 
compromising their ideal of absolute, anti-political abolition in return for the political 
abolition of the Emancipation Proclamation.  
Strident opposition to political compromise was not only a logical, practical 
subset of immediatism, but a key principle of the Liberator Circle in of itself. Garrison 
was definitely not alone in his cry of no compromise. A correspondent by the name 
of W. aptly stated that ‘. . . the truckling of principle to expediency, for a present or 
seeming good, can only end, sooner or later, by inevitable law, in bitter regret to 
ourselves . . .’175 Ezra Heywood, known mostly as individualist anarchist, but also as 
a member of the secondary circle, confidently predicted in August 1860 that ‘If the 
future thanks the abolitionists for anything, it will be that God gave them strength to 
look in the angry countenance of a compromising, huckstering age, and speak the 
truth.’176 And Henry Wright, an extremely vocal Outer Circle member, proclaimed in 
October of the same year to ‘Heed not constitutions, compacts, compromises, or 
creeds! Stamp them all beneath your feed, if they sustain slavery anywhere . . . 
Heed only the voice of the anti-slavery God in your own soul, who says – Deliver the 
enslaved out of the hands of the enslavers!’177 There was no indecisive language 
here. Only an unwavering belief in the inefficacy of political compromise. 
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The 157 issues of the Liberator published between 1860 and 1863 show the 
intricacies of the Circle’s path to compromise. Garrison did not accept abolition 
through politics and war immediately. He did realize, however, that the path of the 
Civil War was unpredictable and entirely out of the Liberator Circle’s hands. The 
Liberator Circle abruptly transitioned from a world of certainty and inarguable 
principles to one of uncertainty and war in April 1861. ‘We have praised our Union for 
seventy years,’ Phillips proclaimed during the Secession Winter, ‘This is the first time 
it is tested. Has it educated men who know their rights, and dare to maintain them? 
Can it bear the discussion of a great national sin, anchored deep in the prejudice of 
millions? If so, it deserves to live. If not, the sooner it vanishes out of the way, the 
better.’178 Phillips’ viewpoint was still fervently anti-political and disunionist, even as 
eleven Southern states began to secede. Their question of whether or not the Union 
can ‘bear discussion of a great national sin’ was one that weighed heavily on the 
nation. Of course, discussion turned to war. And while the Union would emerge from 







                                            








Chapter Two: Crisis 
 
In January 1861, Garrison changed the masthead slogan of the Liberator to 
‘The United States Constitution is “a covenant with death, and an agreement with 
hell.’179 While still in line with anti-political disunionism, the change from demanding 
separation from the slaveholders reflected the Circle’s new priority as a result of the 
Secession Crisis: letting the South secede as an alternate means of repudiating the 
proslavery constitution. Accompanying the new slogan was a quote from former 
President and antislavery advocate John Quincy Adams. The quote, from Adams’ 
war power speech, fervently denounced the Constitution as a proslavery 
compromise. Slavery was introduced into the Constitution under an ‘equivocation . . . 
a representation of property under the name of persons.’180 Futhermore, the 
members of the convention from the Free States could not have imagined nor 
forseen ‘what a sacrifice to Moloch was hidden under the mask of this 
concession.’181 Although Garrison had changed the masthead, his choice of 
replacement shows that there was not a major rethink from the Circle’s principles of 
anti-political, non-compromising anti-Constitutionalism. 
                                            





In February 1860, Maria Chapman, former executive member of the AAS and 
editor of the antislavery journal Non-Resistant, wrote to the Liberator with a 
prediction of why the United States might erupt in Civil War: 
‘If ever our country become a battle-field, and the slaveholders and non-
slaveholders two camps . . . it will be because men of leading positions and sufficient 
cultivation are too ignobly slow of heart to act seasonably in this all-comprehending 
Cause. It is to kindle among them, and all those they influence, the sacred fire of Truth, 
and Love, and Liberty, that we spend and are spent – not without success.’182 
Chapman presented a prediction that is vague enough to be considered 
accurate in hindsight. It could be argued that if ‘men of leading positions,’ like 
Abraham Lincoln, the Republicans, and even Southern Democrats, embraced the 
revelation that slavery had to be abolished immediately, then war would not have 
torn the Union asunder. Yet such a dramatic turn of principle was entirely unlikely to 
happen, especially from politicians working under the ‘compromise of 1787.’ 
Chapman, a committed Garrisonian, was well aware of the impossibility of political 
abolition. All politicians had to compromise to gain office, first with their own party 
members, then with the opposition, and the proslavery nature of the Constitution 
made slavery an acceptable point of compromise.183 Given this context, the 
prediction element of Chapman’s correspondence becomes little more than a 
framing device. In actuality, she was both critiquing the failure of politicians to see 
reality that slavery cannot be compromised over, and suggesting that the moral 
suasion of the Liberator Circle should, in part, be directed towards bringing the 
‘sacred fire of Truth, and Love, and Liberty’ of abolitionism to politicians. 
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Chapman was prophetic in her belief that the agitation of the Circle could 
advance abolitionism by targeting politicians as well as their constituents. Although it 
was highly unlikely that the Circle would convince any Southern, proslavery 
congressman of the righteousness of abolitionism, the antislavery elements of the 
Republican Party were a much more viable target of moral suasion. Yet exactly how 
to approach the political antislavery of the Republican Party was a point of 
contention within the Circle that changed from 1860-1863. From the Civil War to the 
Emancipation Proclamation, there was widespread debate within the Liberator over 
whether to criticize, rally behind, or outright resist the Republican administration. 
Indeed, a significant part of Garrison’s own personal compromise involved setting 
aside his dogmatic refusal to accept political antislavery and endorsing the limited 
abolition of the Emancipation Proclamation. Garrison, Phillips, Henry Wright, and 
many others (but not all) within the Wider Circle came to realize over the course of 
the Civil War that compromising their own principles, and disrupting the ideal 
democracy of their Circle, in order to secure progress towards abolition was better 
than continuing their long standing role as obstinate agitators. Rejecting 
compromise, on a personal level and in the form of the ‘covenant with death,’ that 
Lincoln and the Republicans were committed to upholding, was so central to the 
Liberator Circle’s identity that it could not be discarded lightly. Garrison and his 
coadjutors were so fervently against compromise that it would take the crisis of Civil 
War to provoke a change of opinion significant enough to endorse Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation. 
In 1860, however, Garrison and the majority of the Circle believed that Lincoln 
represented nothing more than another antislavery gradualist ‘too ignobly slow of 
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heart to act seasonably in this all-comprehending Cause.’184 It did not matter that the 
platform of the Republican Party contained the first hard-line antislavery policy in the 
form of restricting slavery from the Territories of Nebraska and New Mexico.185 
Because Abraham Lincoln and his fellow party members had not accepted 
immediatism, they were destined to amount to little more than another cabal of well-
intentioned, but ultimately ineffective and compromising, politicians. There was an 
element of the tertiary circle that saw the Republican Party as the best chance of 
achieving abolition. For Garrison, however, the proof of the Republican failure as 
abolitionists lay within their antislavery platform. Not because it antislavery, but 
because it was very clearly designed as a compromise plea to the Southern States, 
a statement of what the Republicans were willing to accept in regards to slavery and 
what they were not.  
The Republican platform of 1860 explicitly stated that the Founding Fathers 
believed ‘the normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of 
Freedom,’ and that any theory that the Constitution safeguards the expansion of 
slavery was a ‘dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit provisions of 
that instrument itself.’186 Aside from ending the growth of slavery, however, the 
platform did not contain any overt abolitionist measures. On the contrary, it called for 
an end to sectionalism that had become endemic within politics and outlined what 
the Republicans viewed to be a true compromise over slavery.187 In accordance with 
Santayana’s definition of compromise, the Republican platform gave up a portion of 
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the national antislavery measures they desired in order to compromise with the 
South.188 Furthermore, the proposed compromise was completely in line with the 
Constitution, the initial compromise over slavery and other sectional differences. In 
exchange for a total restriction of slavery from the Territories, the Republican 
administration would respect ‘the right of each State to order and control its own 
domestic institutions,’ and denounced ‘the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil 
of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of 
crimes.’189 Slavery would be untouched by any federal power in states where it 
already exists. Yet it could not grow beyond those states anymore. 
In the lead up to the election Garrison discounted the Republicans entirely for 
their willingness to compromise under the proslavery constitution:  
‘Our compromises keep the slaves in their chains. It is because we are content 
with something besides inexorable justice, that the millions are held in bondage. It looks 
plausible to choose between two corrupt and time-serving parasites, one being a great 
deal worse than the other; but I hold it to be unsound in moral philosophy. If we have a 
radical principle, we ought to stand by it, come what may; and, in standing by it, we 
shall do better than we can by any compromise thereof.’190  
Garrison recognized the Republican platform for the compromise that it was, 
and continued to hold fast to immediatism rather than accept the ‘unsound moral 
philosophy’ of constitutional antislavery. He did not even consider the option of trying 
to reason with the Republicans through moral suasion as Chapman suggested.191 A 
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policy of restricting slavery in the Territories was certainly something other than 
‘inexorable justice,’ and could not be accepted by an immediatist abolitionist.  
The Circle did not expect any progress towards abolition or any real 
antislavery policies if the Republican Party secured the government. Rather, they 
believed that even if Lincoln did succeed, he would just be another compromising 
politician who put on airs of antislavery principles, but would ultimately sacrifice them 
to placate the South. Garrison did not support the Republican party, despite 
believing their antislavery was genuine, because ‘. . . the greater includes the less, 
and the immediate abolition of slavery is a matter of incomparably greater concern 
than simply preventing its extension.’192 Phillips, upon hearing of the Republican 
platform of 1860, declared that the ice of Northern anti-slavery sentiment was so thin 
that ‘Mr. Lincoln, standing six feet and four inches, cannot afford to carry any 
principles with him on to it!’193 Ezra Heywood believed that the Republican Party was 
‘Sworn upon the altar of slavery, [and] affects to fight the battles of freedom. 
Antislavery in sentiment, it is proslavery in principle.’194 Clearly, the Circle were 
unimpressed by the Republicans. Antislavery gradualism and political compromise 
had consistently failed to advance abolitionism, and the Republican Party’s 
adherence to both did not make them a revolutionary political party to the Circle. 
Because they failed to make a definitive stand for abolitionism, the Republicans, and 
particularly Lincoln, were, in the eyes of the Circle, nothing more than a rehash of 
complacent, compromising Whig antislavery. 
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The Republican alignment of antislavery with the interests of the free soil 
movement certainly made antislavery more relevant to the predominately white, 
middle-class Northern Republican constituency.195 For the Circle, however, it 
appeared to be little more than another example of politicians sacrificing principle for 
popular support, political consensus building, and, crucially, ignored the plight of 
millions of slaves. ‘Resolved,’ read the resolutions of an antislavery meeting at 
Worcestor ‘we feel bound to declare that no one of the men . . . likely to be 
nominated for the next presidency is worthy of the confidence or the support of those 
who have, from principle, arrayed themselves on the side of freedom . . .’196 Tertiary 
correspondent D. S. G. predicted that the Republicans would adhere to the ‘white-
manism’ of free soil over antislavery as early as March 1860: ‘[For the Republicans] 
the Union must preserved for the benefit of the white men, and freedom must rule for 
the benefit of ‘white men.’197 Pillsbury confirmed D. S. G.’s suspicions in October of 
the same year, having heard Republican Josuha Giddings admit at Jefferson, Ohio, 
that: ‘. . . the published declarations of Abraham Lincoln . . . and the general voice of 
the Republican press and politicians, was in favor of keeping faith with all 
constitutional compromises for slavery ever claimed by Calhoun or conceded by 
Webster.’198 To Pillsbury, conceding to the proslavery constitution was more than 
enough to disqualify Lincoln from any abolitionist support. 
A correspondent who signed his name as ‘A Colored Man,’ remained 
staunchly opposed to the racism of both major parties: ‘For me, there is not much 
difference between a Democrat and a Republican; they are both unsound. The 
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Republicans in this section are as much afraid of anything dark as a booby would be 
in passing through the woods.’199 A Colored Man’s concerns over the racism of the 
Republican Party was not unfounded. Lincoln had declared in the Stephen Douglas 
debates that ‘I have no purpose to political and social equality between the white and 
black races. There is a physical difference between the two which, in my judgement, 
will probably forever forbid their living together upon the footing of perfect 
equality;’200 Dr. John Rock, a free black and long-time member of the Secondary 
circle, criticised the Republican Party for having no idea how to treat the free black 
population of the North, as Lincoln was content to uphold the ruling of the ‘Supreme 
Ignoramuses’ that blacks had no rights a white man is bound to respect.201 Rock was 
pleased that the Republican party was taking an antislavery stand, but it was obvious 
that they truly had the interests of whites at heart.202 
 Whereas Lincoln was called out for his racism, Garrison was chastised by 
Tertiary Correspondent David Wasson for ‘exalting the black and denigrating the 
white.’203 Garrison fervently denied Wasson’s claim: ‘We are quite unaware of any 
thing said or done by abolitionists, indicative of a disposition or even a remotest 
tendency, to exalt unduly the African race, or to screen them from impartial criticism. 
. .’204 The Liberator Circle campaigned for equality for all and a nation that truly 
reflected the universal liberty of the Declaration of Independence. Creating this new 
nation required penance from the whites who had upheld the ‘covenant with death’ 
                                            
199 A Colored Man, ‘Wendell Phillips – Democracy’, Vol. 30 No. 11, 16/03/1860 
200 Abraham Lincoln, The Lincoln-Douglas Debates, ed. Edwin Earl Parks, (Hall & McCreary: Chicago, 
1918), p. 30 
201 John Stewart Rock, ‘Speech of Dr. John S. Rock [Annual Meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-
Slavery Society, Boston, 27/01/1860]’, Vol. 30 No 5, 03/02/1860 
202 Ibid. 
203 David A. Wasson, ‘Justice vs Admiration’, Vol. 30 No. 53, 31/12/1860 
204 Reply of Garrison to: Wasson, ‘Justice vs Admiration’, Vol. 30 No. 53, 31/12/1860 
73 
 
for decades in the form of accepting abolition and demanding the repudiation of the 
constitution, but the need for repentance did not place whites below blacks. 
Wider Circle member S. E. W. argued that: 
‘Lincoln is more obnoxious than Garrison, because one represents merely 
incarnation of an idea, the other one, one of the practical results, however imperfect, 
of that idea. One is the flaming sword standing at the Garden of Eden, whose sacred 
precincts they never intended to approach near enough to feel his almighty power; 
the other is the scare-crow, which, if they had the courage to approach, they would 
find perfectly harmless.’205 
Lincoln, by virtue of his white-centric antislavery, was nothing more than a 
harmless ‘scare-crow’, an ‘incarnation’ of abolitionism that twisted the idea of 
universal equality in order to gain political success. Garrison’s northern disunion 
might be ‘imperfect’ due to its difficulty to enact in the first place and its unexpected 
realisation in the Secession Crisis. But for S. E. W., disunion represented a 
commitment to realistic, practical abolition, when Lincoln remained content with 
compromising antislavery. Tertiary circle member Josephine Griffing lamented the 
same paralyzing impact the Chicago Platform had on antislavery that S. E. W. spoke 
of, with its implied vilification of John Brown.206 Pillsbury also cited Lincoln’s failure to 
acknowledge the heroism of John Brown as one of many reasons not to support the 
Republicans.207 And Lydia Child, although speaking in 1862, offered a key insight 
into why the Circle rejects the vagaries of political process and why Republican 
policy could not be anything other than white-centric antislavery: ‘Politicians never 
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understand great impulses, and never have enough faith to make use of them. 
Instead of taking a wide, comprehensive view, they look downward to their own 
game, studying how to checkmate each other; and this they sometimes continue to 
do long after the concussions of an earthquake. . .’208 Child highlighted why 
Republican policy could not be anything other than white-centric antislavery; Lincoln 
and his contemporaries had to compromise any desire for strict abolitionist measures 
in order to unite their party behind a single platform and appeal to the majority of 
white Northerners. Pursuing abolitionist measures would have removed any chance 
of achieving a consensus within the North as well as potentially with the South. 
In September of 1860, Garrison wholeheartedly agreed with Child’s 
uncompromising anti-political opinion: ‘It is not the object of the abolition movement 
to put up or put down any political party as such; but, holding the scales of justice 
impartially, it is to create such a moral and religious sentiment against slavery as 
shall mould all parties and sects to effect its overthrow.’209 Garrison’s emphasis on 
all influencing all parties, rather than placing their faith in a single, albeit promising, 
one, indicated his continued belief that constitutional politics could not affect 
abolition. Therefore, in relation to the election, Garrison believed that ‘[the Circle] 
should keep their feet firmly planted on the rock of uncompromising principle.’210 
Phillips agreed, and rallied behind tried and true anti-political agitation: 
‘[Abolitionists should] not allow our hopes to centre on the success of a certain 
political party or candidate. I have no objection, personally, to the success of Mr. Lincoln 
or Mr. Seward; but I would rather that Stephen A. Douglas should be president than 
either of them. We cannot afford yet to let Lincoln succeed, because, if he should, the 
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country will say, ‘The North has got the helm, let us see what the North is ready to do – 
wait!’ – and we shall have four more years of waiting, to see what Abe Lincoln won’t 
do!’211 
Despite not objecting to Lincoln or Seward succeeding on the political stage, 
Phillips pointed out that he placed no hope in any political party or candidate to 
further abolition. Phillips’ preference of Stephen Douglas, the proslavery Democrat 
candidate who championed popular sovereignty in regards to slavery in the 
Territories, speaks volumes about his disillusionment with politics as a means of 
abolition. Phillips would have Douglas not because he would enact any abolitionist or 
even antislavery measure, but because a proslavery president would be far more 
likely to convince moderate Northerners to join the democratic revolution of Northern 
disunion. Lincoln, being the representative of the North, would not invoke the need 
for immediate change that another slave-power dominated government would bring. 
The North would be content with the compromise outlined in the Republican Platform 
and, provided the South accepts an antislavery president, all abolitionists ‘shall have 
four more years of waiting, to see what Abe Lincoln won’t do!’212 Phillips’ pessimistic 
view of the Republican administration would have probably come to pass, had it not 
been for Secession.   
Garrison, Phillips, and the anti-political element of the Secondary circle 
dismissed Lincoln as a politician bound to compromise. Phillips furthered his 
admonition of Lincoln by denouncing as the ‘Slave-Hound of Illinois,’ due to his 
recognition of the Fugitive Slave Law.213 Staunchly anti-political Pillsbury argued that 
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despite being antislavery, ‘. . . the published declarations of Abraham Lincoln and the 
general voice of the Republican press and politicians, [are] in favor of keeping faith 
with all constitutional compromises for slavery ever claimed by Calhoun or conceded 
by Webster.’214 Former vice-president and proslavery advocate John Calhoun 
infamously championed South Carolina’s attempt at opposing a federal tariff in the 
Nullification Crisis of 1832.215 Calhoun supported the theory that any state could 
declare a federal law null and void if that state deemed the law unconstitutional, an 
extreme state’s rights argument that justified the dismissal of any antislavery 
legislation.216 Although the nullification theory was quashed by President Andrew 
Jackson, it did not stop the most extreme proslavery fire-eaters from claiming that 
state’s rights were above federal law.217 Daniel Webster had a long career as a 
conservative Whig senator, but Pillsbury is specifically referencing his involvement in 
the Compromise of 1850.218 Webster and his Whig contemporary, the ‘great 
compromiser’ Henry Clay, masterminded the compromise that narrowly reduced 
sectional tension, at the expense of granting the South the right to expand slavery 
further into New Mexico and Utah territory and passing a much more stringent 
Fugitive Slave Law.219 By comparing Lincoln to Calhoun and Webster and 
referencing his past career as Whig, Garrison, Phillips, and Pillsbury called him out 
as nothing more than another timid political compromiser. 
Lincoln’s past and present belief in upholding the laws of the ‘covenant with 
death’ had a major part in ensuring that his party received little more than an 
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ambivalent reception in the Liberator. Contrary to Heywood, Lincoln did not consider 
the Constitution to be the ‘altar of slavery.’220 Rather, he believed it was the positive 
law interpretation of the Declaration of Independence. This is not say he gave it 
primacy over the Declaration. Lincoln wrote that the Declaration was an ‘apple of 
gold’ and ‘the Union, and the Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently 
framed around it. The picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to 
adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the apple --- not the apple for the 
picture.’221 Therefore, the law must be respected, but not at the expense of ‘life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’222 Lincoln and Garrison had common ground in 
their belief that the fundamental principles of the Declaration cannot be usurped. But 
whereas Lincoln believed that all the laws of the Constitution should be upheld even 
if some allow for slavery, Garrison believed that all of its laws were irrevocably 
corrupted by the Three-Fifths Compromise and the other proslavery clauses. 
The speeches of radical republicans Sumner, Seward, Lovejoy, and Giddings 
all appear in the Liberator under the ‘Selections’ section, as pieces of note and 
points of discussion. Very few radicals engaged directly with Circle, however, either 
through correspondence or attending meetings. Giddings wrote in twice and Sumner 
once in 1860, to clarify the position of leading radicals in relation to black suffrage, 
defend the past statements of Lincoln, and the merits of constitutional antislavery.223 
Giddings in particular attempted to convince the Circle that Lincoln’s willingness to 
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compromise, firstly in 1849 over the Fugitive Slave Law, and in the Republican 
Platform of 1860, was not only a good thing, but also necessary for any antislavery 
progress to be achieved at all.224 Phillips responded that ‘It is not because Lincoln 
compromised in 1849 that I blame; it is the nature [author’s italics] of the compromise 
with which I find fault . . . Our [Founding] Fathers had no right to make a slave 
hunting compromise in 1789. Lincoln had a thousand times less to make one in 
1849.’225 Here Phillips remained firm in his commitment to the Liberator Circle’s 
principle of no compromise over slavery. In the same correspondence he accused 
Lincoln of being a ‘Constitutional Hound’ kept firmly on his leash by the rest of his 
party, as any deviation from endorsing the proslavery elements of the constitution 
might result in the alienation of pro-Union Northerners.226  
One of the few radical republicans who attempted to sway the Liberator Circle 
towards political abolition personally was Senator Henry Wilson. A former member of 
the Whig Party, Wilson became involved in political abolitionism through the Free-
Soil Party in 1848, and, when that dissolved in the mid-1850’s, helped organized the 
coalition of antislavery politicians that became the Republican Party.227 Wilson stated 
that his brand of antislavery was for emancipation under the Constitution, ‘for ours is 
a nation of laws,’ therefore, he could not condone the attempted insurrection of John 
Brown.228 Even though Wilson did not completely agree with Garrisonian principles, 
he still saw value in speaking in favour of the Republicans directly to the Circle at the 
annual gathering of the AAS at Framingham, Massachusetts: 
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‘The Republican party believes slavery to be a moral, political, and social evil. 
It has pronounced against human slavery everywhere. It recognises slavery as a 
local institution, which Congress may not touch in states where it exists; but claims 
the power to keep slavery out of the Territories, knowing that in time it will give us 
such an overwhelming power as to enable us to check slavery all over the continent. 
If it fails in 1860, it will be because the country is not ripe enough for it. If it succeeds, 
it will overthrow the influence of slavery in the government. The Republican Party 
leaves slavery in the South to be dealt with by the people of the South, whenever we 
can change the heart and judgement and conscience of the people of those 
States.’229 
Wilson had effectively outlined a plan where Republican antislavery could be 
connected to the Circle’s moral suasion. His argument was one of northern disunion 
without the sundering of the Union. If Lincoln succeeded in his bid for the presidency, 
then slavery will be legally contained to the South, and the Circle can focus their 
agitation there. Of course, the abolitionist movement had already attempted a 
campaign directed at the slave states during the 1830’s, and that only served to 
inflame extreme proslavery elements against them.230 The Circle also sought a 
sincere national repentance for slavery, not just a begrudging eventual realization by 
the South that slavery had to end.231 It is not surprising, then, that very few within the 
Circle agreed with Wilson’s theory of a political, Republican form of federal moral 
suasion. Phillips even suggested that the reverse of what Wilson proposed, the 
Republicans should fail so that promising agitators such as Lincoln and Sumner 
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could fall in line with the Circle.232 Regardless, he still thought Wilson and Sumner to 
be ‘the best Republican antislavery minds,’ if only they would cease to bring political 
antislavery to the ‘communion table.’233 
Despite the shared desire of the Circle and the radical republicans to end 
slavery, the two groups do not align on principle and means. The beliefs that made 
Sumner, Wilson, and Giddings ‘radical’ in comparison to more moderate 
Republicans, namely, an antislavery-centric policy rather than strictly free soil, made 
them little more than compromising politicians in the eyes of the Liberator Circle. 
Williams’ definition of the radicals as ‘men of principle who, on the issue of slavery, 
would not compromise [and] who advocated an absolute solution,’ suggests a strong 
similarity with the Liberator Circle.234 Yet the radical republicans still sought a 
solution within the boundaries of the constitution. Although Williams’ emphasis on 
the radical republicans’ refusal to compromise morality hints at their similarity with 
the Circle, Trefousse was more accurate in describing the difference between the 
radical republicans and the Liberator Circle as a ‘question of means and immediate 
goals.’235 Even though Sumner had been subscribed to the Liberator since 1835, he 
had ‘never been satisfied with its tone. I have been openly opposed to the doctrines 
on the Union and the Constitution which it has advocated for several years. It has 
seemed to me often vindictive, bitter, and unchristian.’236 Wilson denounced the 
Circle as ‘extremists,’ and wished that ‘some of them [Garrisonian disunionists] were 
ever more to keep silent.’237 Lincoln, Wilson, Sumner et al respected the Constitution 
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as law, and saw northern disunion as the method of madmen. Therefore, the radical 
republicans can be described as a minority faction similar to the Liberator Circle, but 
not directly allied with them. Still, the radical republicans were largely left alone by 
the Circle to work their own brand of abolition through politics, and did not draw the 
criticism that Lincoln and the moderate republicans did. 
Despite Garrison and Phillips’ dismissal of the Republicans as timid 
compromisers, not all of the Circle members were anti-Republican. In the months 
before the 1860 election, fifteen pieces of correspondence were published 
supporting the Republicans, although only three of these were exclusively positive. 
The rest recognized the many problems of Republican antislavery, but believed that 
the party was the best chance the United States had for making realistic progress 
towards abolition. Tertiary correspondent F. W. Bird upheld the radicals as the best 
hope for abolition outside of the Circle: ‘I find that the radicalism of the extreme wing 
of the Republican party is necessary, and even that such men are in danger of 
becoming popular; and I find that whenever this danger becomes imminent, all they 
need to do is go to a Garrisonian meeting, and the danger is averted at once. 
(Laughter and applause).’238 Although Bird’s praise was tongue-in-cheek, and 
highlighted the problem of the radical Republicans being moderate when compared 
the Circle, it was praise nonetheless. Bird’s correspondence also gives credence to 
the leftist, post-revisonist interpretation of the Liberator Circle as something akin to 
the Republican moral conscience at least in the sense that truly moderate antislavery 
Northerners could more willingly accept radical republican policy when it is 
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contrasted with the radical abolitionism of the Circle.239 Garrison and his coadjutors 
were quite happy to adopt the platform of unofficial moral advisors to Lincoln, the 
Republican Party, and the nation, particularly in 1862.240 Yet to call the Circle the 
Republican moral conscience incorrectly suggests that all Republicans were amoral. 
Lincoln and Seward, Wilson and Giddings, and all of their contemporaries might 
have held an interpretation of antislavery that differed from the Circle’s immediatism, 
but simply holding a different point of view did not make them amoral. 
D. S. G., who opposed the Republicans on the basis of their ‘white-manism’ 
earlier in the same correspondence, expressed an uncharacteristic rejection of anti-
political action when he suggests that ‘. . . those who find no moral impediment to 
their voting under the Constitution can do no better in the coming contest than to 
vote the Republican ticket.’241 George F. Noyes simply states ‘I am a practical man; I 
want to do something.’242 Charles G. Davis presents a similar argument, admitting 
that despite the Republicans’ timid antislavery, a vote for them would be ‘a practical 
step in the right direction.’243 Even Phillips recognizes that the act of voting is the 
proper way for the individual citizen to seek the fulfilment of their opinion in 
democracy: ‘The Saxon race, left to itself finds vent through the ballot-box; but close 
up the ballot-box, and it loads the rifle.’244 Writing in February, Phillips and the Circle 
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were still very much in the wake of John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry. Frank 
Sanborn, although believing that another John Brown insurrection would create a 
‘Southern Republican Party,’ was so disillusioned by the lack of progress that he was 
willing to accept Lincoln’s antislavery over nothing at all: ‘I hope that, after the 
inauguration of Lincoln on the fourth of March, we shall see the wheels of the 
Administration reversed in their course; that we shall see some stop put to our 
present lamentable decline.’245 D. H. amusingly predicts that on Lincoln’s election the 
capitol’s statue of Washington will be replaced by John Brown, and the tomahawks 
replaced with gods and goddesses of peace.246 Despite admitting they ‘do not care 
for political parties,’ D. H. saw enough potential in the Republican party for abolition 
that he was willing to equate a republican victory with the beacon of immediatist 
action himself.247 
Garrison never went as far as to openly endorse the republican party, he did 
pen an editorial addressing the motivations behind secession and the high likelihood 
that the South would take drastic action if Lincoln was elected: 
‘She [the South] has not been aroused, and inflamed to madness, by a shadowy 
abstraction, but by the consciousness that, if she loses the Territories, her days of 
supremacy are numbered . . . She is alive to the fact that her system of slave labor soon 
exhausts the most fertile soil, and requires new lands by constant acquisition to prevent 
its final extinction.’248 
Although Garrison did not mention secession in this extract, he was clearly 
aware of the desperate state the slave-owners would find themselves in if Lincoln 
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was elected. Losing the ability to spread slavery into the Territories would not only 
signal the end of the slavepower’s representative dominance in Congress, but it 
would also mean a slow decline in the profitability and sustainability of the slave-
based economy.249 Garrison believed that the political struggle surrounding the 
Territories was  ‘. . . the product of the general moral agitation for the total and 
eternal abolition of chattel slavery in every part of the South.’250 By connecting the 
previous agitation of the Circle to current events, Garrison argued that their actions 
had helped bring the nation to this decision point on slavery. Even though Lincoln 
only sought to take a stand on keeping slavery out of the Territories, not universal 
abolition, Garrison still hoped for his success, if only to secure a small victory against 
the slavepower. 
One of the most pro-Republican articles comes from Daniel Somes, a 
Republican Representative from Maine most notable for his efforts in the Peace 
Convention of February 1861.251 Somes only served in the Thirty-sixth Congress 
(March 4, 1859 – March 3 1861) and is absent from Trefousse’s radical republicans, 
most likely falling under his category of those who ‘remained in Congress for too 
short a time to exert the influence to which their talents might have entitled them.’252 
His exact placement amongst the Circle is also hard to define. Clearly Somes was 
biased towards the Republicans, but felt strongly enough about the anti-Republican 
sentiment in the Liberator that he had to write in. This places him in the Tertiary 
circle, even though his status as a Congressmen put him well and truly outside the 
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realm of Garrisonian abolitionism. Regardless, Somes exercises his right to criticize 
the mainstream, anti-Republican opinion of the Circle: 
‘You [abolitionists of the Circle] have fought a good fight and have fulfilled your 
mission. You struck out in the night of our history, and pushed forward through the dark 
wilderness of bigotry and prejudice, and with your engineering implements cleared the 
way for the great army of progress, and now, instead of sharing in the victory, you stand 
hacking away at the old stumps, and censuring the friends of human rights because 
they are not armed with the kind of weapons you expect them to carry.’253 
Somes’ correspondence is notable because he was among the first of the 
Circle to argue that their first mission on the road to abolition as was complete. The 
idea that Garrison’s anti-political clique had fulfilled their purpose and should re-
evaluate their methods and goals is one that was repeated by many in the secondary 
and tertiary circles during the Civil War.254 Somes, as a strident Republican, saw the 
possibility of a Republican president as enough of a ground-breaking event to 
promote a fundamental change in the abolitionist movement. Although the 
Republicans armed themselves with the ‘weapons’ of politics and gradual antislavery 
under the law of the Constitution, as opposed to the Circle’s disunion and 
immediatism, the fact that an openly antislavery party had the potential to take office 
at all is a crowning achievement worthy of the abolitionist crusade. The Circle’s 
decades of moral suasion represent the ‘engineering implements’ that shaped 
Northern opinion towards antislavery to such a degree that an antislavery party could 
be elected, despite the advantage in representation given to the slave states by the 
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Three-Fifths Compromise.255 Somes was prepared to acknowledge the Republicans’ 
popularity as a victory for ‘human rights,’ because in all likelihood the next president 
would not be a proslavery Democrat or temporalizing Whig, but antislavery Abraham 
Lincoln.256 Debating over the differences between antislavery and abolitionism is a 
pointless exercise. Instead, the Circle should rethink their policy of anti-political 
agitation and decide exactly what their role as activists should be under a 
Republican president. 
Writing a month before Lincoln’s election, Somes was ahead of the curve in 
calling for a society-wide introspection within the Liberator Circle. Arguably, he was 
not in a position to demand such mass self-examination. As a member of the Tertiary 
circle he was certainly free to express his opinions. But as a politician he 
represented nothing but compromising, antislavery gradualism. At least Henry 
Wilson suggested Garrison redirect his moral suasion towards the South, rather than 
give it up entirely.257 It would not be until after Fort Sumter that such a fundamental 
re-examination of purpose would take place, inspired by the outbreak of war and 
invalidation of Northern disunion.258 Still, Somes was prophetic in predicting that 
national events would soon force a change in how the ideal democracy of the 
Liberator Circle operates. He just did not, and could not, know that it would take Civil 
War to provoke a crisis of principle within the Circle.  
The Republicans won the election of 1860. Their coalition of antislavery 
radicals, moderate former Whigs and Democrats, and Eastern manufacturers, united 
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by a desire to secure the ideology of the free, white North, appealed to the varied 
Northern middle-class and became the first strictly Northern based government.259 
While Republican success was hailed as a triumph of consensus based democracy 
by the North and reviled by the Fire-Eaters as the death-knell of their slave-based 
society, the Circle felt that an antislavery president opened up the potential Phillips 
gave his uninterested opinion a week after the election: 
‘It is the moral effect of this victory, not anything which his administration can or 
will probably do, that gives value to his success. Not an abolitionist, hardly an anti-
slavery man, Mr. Lincoln consents to represent the anti-slavery ideal. A pawn on the 
political chessboard, his value is in his position; with fair effort, we may soon change 
him for Knight, Bishop or Queen, and sweep the board. (Applause).’260 
To Phillips, the Republican victory was bought by ‘consenting’ to the 
antislavery of territorial restriction over more decisive action slavery where it already 
exists. Lincoln had no choice but to ‘consent’ to mere antislavery in order to maintain 
unity within his party and to appeal to as many Northerners as possible. In doing so 
he has become nothing more than a ‘pawn on [and, in adhering to compromise over 
personal principle, to] the political chessboard.’ Phillips did concede that Lincoln 
could be influenced towards abolition, but in practice this would amount to continuing 
the same agitation that the Circle had been pursuing for decades. In the immediate 
period after Lincoln’s election, however, Phillips has not diverted from his belief that 
proslavery democrat Stephen Douglas would have been the president most 
conducive to abolitionism. For Lincoln’s antislavery gradualism would only lead to 
inaction at best, and another proslavery compromise at worst. 
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A secondary correspondent by the name of W, who contributed frequently to 
the Liberator over 1860-1863, emphasized the potential problem of the Republicans 
being pressured by the South into another unfavourable compromise: 
‘The question most immediate to us is, how firm do these American voters, who 
have just chosen their standard bearer, mean to stand by the principles they profess to 
hold so dear? As business men, is any portion of them to be intimidated by threats of 
deluded men, and thus compelled to relinquish what they have already gained? Will 
they be driven to apology and concession? For what? For the sake of peace ‘when 
there is no peace?’’261 
W’s emphasis on ‘us’ tells of the divide that still exists between the Liberator 
Circle and ‘American voters.’ The North might have voted in Lincoln on a consensus 
platform that happened to include a single antislavery clause. But W does not know if 
the ‘business men’ of the Republican coalition will stand by the restriction of slavery 
in the Territories, or if they will jettison it in the face of the inevitable threats of 
secession from the South.  
The Secession Crisis from Lincoln’s election on November sixth 1860 to the 
bombardment of Fort Sumter on the twelfth of April 1861 proved to be the test of 
Republican commitment to antislavery. The Republican platform, carefully 
constructed to create a Northern consensus whilst presenting a fair compromise to 
the South, instead provoked so much outrage from the fire-eaters that they 
immediately called to secede from the Union. Secession, like northern disunion, 
appealed to the Declaration of Independence for legitimacy, specifically the right of 
the people to alter or abolish a government that did not reflect the ideals of its 
citizens. The crucial difference between disunion and secession was that disunion 
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followed the Declaration of Independence completely in that it sought to convince the 
majority of Northerners (and, eventually, Americans) that the severing of the Union 
was the only way to repudiate the proslavery Constitution. Secession 
Before the crisis of means of the Civil War, the Liberator Circle experienced a 
period of unprecedented unity. The Secession Crisis provided an unexpected step 
on the way to abolition. The severing of the Union was an unmitigated crisis for the 
majority of Northern Americans. Yet the entirety of the Circle rallied around 
secession as a means of positive progress towards abolition, even though it was a 
far cry from the democratic Northern disunion they had been agitating for. ‘The North 
should recognize the fact that the Union is dissolved,’ Whipple proclaimed in 
February 1861 ‘they should see, in the madness of the South, the hand of God, 
liberating them from ‘a covenant with death and an agreement with hell,” made in a 
time of terrible peril, and without a conception of its inevitable consequences . . .’262 
Whipple represented the most extreme response the Circle had to secession. He 
believed that secession resulted in the same outcome that the Circle had been 
agitating for three decades: the separation of the slave states from the free, and the 
invalidation of the proslavery Constitution.  
The entirety of the Circle agreed with Whipple on the potentiality of secession 
as a stepping stone to abolition. Yet a few individuals in the tertiary circle questioned 
exactly what the separation of North and South would mean for the Circle’s means, 
particularly in relation to the Constitution, the Republicans, and whether or not to 
engage in politics in general. Their questions did not make them detractors, 
however, simply a more forward-thinking element in an anti-political community that 
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suddenly found itself directly involved in a political crisis. The Circle had always been 
seen as an extremist group in the eyes of moderate Northerners. But as Whipple and 
Phillips’ clamouring for disunion became more than the cry of fanatics, public opinion 
turned against the Circle, to the extent that pro-Union mobs protested their meetings 
at Tremont Temple.263 Such pro-Union reaction was a response to the increasing 
fervour of the Circle. Even as questions about future means began to surface, all 
amongst the Circle were inspired by the possibility of finally achieving their goal of 
disunion, and this possibility sparked a greater desire for action over agitation. 
Garrison was stricken by bronchitis from November 1860 to February 1861, 
and is uncharacteristically silent as a result. With Garrison nursing his sickness, it fell 
to Phillips and Whipple to represent the Primary circle for the majority of the 
Secession Crisis. Phillips assumed the mantle of de-facto leader of the Circle, 
becoming the public face of the ‘let them go’ movement and revelling in the Circle’s 
sudden increase in national recognition. The Circle’s willingness to accept secession 
did not endear them to the North. Instead, it provoked widespread protests from pro-
Union Northerners, who saw the Circle as un-American traitors. Whipple described 
the mobs as consisting of Democrat, Bell-Everett supporters, spouting proslavery 
resolutions, and inferred that they were being paid for by the ‘cottonocracy.’264 
Phillips’ was the target of two major mobs during the Secession Crisis, the first at a 
meeting in remembrance of John Brown at Tremont Temple and the second at a 
defiant meeting at the Music Hall.265 Phillips was unafraid of ‘mobocratic’ tactics, 
proudly declaring that:  
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‘The time to assert rights is when they are denied; the men to assert them are 
those to whom they are denied. The community which dares not protect its humblest 
and most hated member in the free utterance of his opinion, no matter how false or 
hateful, is only a gang of slaves.’266  
Free speech would not be threatened by mob action. Phillips was determined 
to campaign for abolitionism, even if it meant he had to violate non-resistance by 
carrying a revolver at all times in self-defence. The abolitionists had been targeted by 
violent mobs before in the 1830’s, most notably the mob of 1835 where Elijah 
Lovejoy was killed protecting his printing press.267 In 1860 and 1861, as in 1835, the 
Liberator Circle did not let such tyrannical tactics dissuade them from moral suasion, 
and above all else retained their unwavering belief in the certainty of immediatism.268 
 Whipple was the staunchest advocate of separation, particularly as an 
alternative to the weak political antislavery of the Republicans: ‘If the mess of 
Republicans do not distinguish which of their leaders in this crisis are men, and 
which are only scheming politicians, they will richly deserve both to fall into the 
hands of the latter, and to be again trodden under the Slave Power.’ W. continues to 
assert the importance of antislavery Northerners and the Republicans remaining true 
to their principles during the Secession Crisis: ‘Let the Republican party hold fast to 
the principles which elevated it to power, and which will send it forward to final 
triumph. A temporizing policy, now or hereafter, as touching the principle of liberty, 
will scatter it like the leaves of autumn.’269 The limited Republican antislavery was 
nowhere close to W’s abolitionist principles. If Lincoln did not hold on to that small 
                                            
266 Phillips, ‘Extraordinary Scenes for a New England Sabbath: Address of Mr. Phillips’, Vol. 30 No. 
51, 21/12/1860 
267 Aptheker, Abolitionism, pp. 46-49 
268 H. G. Rollins, ‘Pro-Slavery Mobs’, Vol. 30 No. 52 28/12/1860; D. S. Grandin, ‘The Portland Mobs’, 
Vol. 30 No. 52, 28/12/1860; Whipple, ‘Freedom of Speech’, Vol. 31 No. 4, 25/01/1861 
269 W., ‘Our Duties in the Present Crisis’, Vol. 31 No. 7, 15/02/1861 
92 
 
amount of ‘liberty’ within the Platform of 1860, the Republicans will be revealed as 
slaves to the maintenance of national consensus.270 Unlike W., who consented to 
look towards the ‘final triumph’ of the Republican Party, Whipple chastised their lack 
of decisive action during the Secession Crisis. Whipple’s ‘scheming politicians’ 
refered to both conservative Republicans and politicians in general.  
Many in the Wider Circle saw positive progress towards abolition in 
secession. Of the forty-nine articles published from Lincoln’s election to the 
bombardment of Fort Sumter supporting letting the slave states go, twenty-one 
pieces were from tertiary correspondents. Charles Burleigh, a regular contributor to 
the Liberator since 1835 and noted campaigner for woman’s suffrage, remained 
firmly behind no compromise: ‘. . . if our concession and compromise, on terms 
involving a surrender of moral and religious principle, are necessary to the 
preservation of the Union, then let the Union go! (Loud applause and hisses.) If 
these are necessary for the preservation and peace of the country, then we are not 
the appointed conservators of the peace of the country.’271 S. M. J. went as far to say 
that ‘The dissolution of the American Union is the destruction of the slave system. 
This being so, every lover of his kind must rejoice that an event so desirable is at the 
door. Let it come – the sooner the better . . .’ However, S. M. J. did concede that 
‘True union is desirable. Peace should be sought; but these great blessings are not 
to be placed above eternal justice. Justice must be done, let the cost be what it 
may.272 A commitment what is moral and just exists above positive law and any of its 
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constructs, including the Union. Though S. M. J. desired Union, if separation meant 
the end of slavery, then he was willing to accept it.  
J. P. B. saw a positive revolution in secession ‘. . . when any of the slave 
states are bent upon secession, it should not be opposed by others, but permitted 
peaceably and cheerfully, as a happier revolution than that which delivered us from 
British dominion.’273 J. P. B. accepted that secession was not the ideal, abolitionist 
inspired revolution the Circle had been campaigning for, but it was still a ‘happier 
revolution’, at least in comparison to the violent revolution of 1776. W. looked 
towards the future of the nation and abolitionism after letting the South go:  
‘That the South must suffer much, by and by, in her political and moral isolation, 
there can be no doubt; but if wisdom can only be born to some of folly and suffering, then it 
may not be a matter of regret to those who are to come after us, that disruption now ensue 
as preparatory to the reconstruction of a political edifice whose foundation shall be laid in the 
broadest liberty.’274 
The ‘wisdom’ that W. wanted to be born out the South’s suffering was, of 
course, abolition. For if the Southern States collapsed under the weight of ‘political 
and moral isolation,’ then the Free States could more easily reintegrate the slave 
states back into the Union without slavery. 
Despite the widespread support for letting the South go, secession was 
certainly not the ideal disunion that the Circle sought. The free North was not 
separating from the slave states as the result of a widespread abolitionist awakening, 
the revelation of the ‘sacred fire of truth, love, and liberty’ that Chapman campaigned 
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for.275 Yet it functionally had the same result. Indeed, secession involved the same 
outcome that J. P. B. described in his argument for the benefits of disunion, 
published in January 1860:  
‘. . . [there is no means] more effectual and unobjectionable than that of a 
peaceful separation of the free from the slave states, by mutual consent . . . it is true, 
this would not be an abolition of slavery where it now exists; but it would be a 
removal of all fear from of it in the free States and the Territories; and they would 
have no complicity with it, or mortifying responsibility for it, than they now have for its 
existence in Asia or Africa; and it would be easy to show that such a separation must, 
in a few years, be followed by entire emancipation . . .’276 
J. P. B.’s argument shows the widespread belief that full emancipation would 
follow ‘in a few years’ after a separation of the slave states from the free. Like many 
of his contemporary agitators, he failed to explain exactly how emancipation would 
occur, or what role the Circle would have in securing it. This might seem to be a lack 
of foresight or planning in the Circle’s means. But in reality Garrison and disunion 
advocates saw disunion as a monumental long term goal, and were content to re-
evaluate their direction as a community once it had been achieved. The most 
important factor to take from J. P. B.’s argument, however, is his emphasis on the 
positive outcome severing of the Free States from slavery.  
The individualistic agitators of the Liberator Circle were able to rally behind 
the idea of letting the slave states go because it was an alternate form of northern 
disunion. Secession was acceptable despite its illegality because it allowed them to 
continue their fundamental refusal of political and personal compromise. Yet the 
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majority of Northerners were stridently pro-union. This desire to prevent secession 
and Senator John Crittenden of Kentucky and Representative Thomas Corwin 
drafted compromises designed to reach a middle ground with the South. Crittenden 
attempted to resolve the issue of slavery in the territories once and for all through a 
series of constitutional amendments protecting the right of expanding slavery 
anywhere below 36° 30' and explicitly preventing Congress from interfering with 
slavery where it already exists.277 Corwin, and fellow republican representative 
Charles Francis Adams, son of former president John Quincy Adams, presented a 
less drastic plan that admitted New Mexico Territory immediately as a slave state, 
but did not give a final ruling on the issue of expansion.278 Despite being legitimate 
attempts at creating a political consensus, neither Crittenden’s nor Corwin’s 
compromises made any realistic progress towards resolving the Secession Crisis. 
Lincoln and the Republicans had already outlined their idea of an acceptable 
compromise in the platform of 1860. The Crittenden compromise defied the platform 
by legitimising slavery in the Territories. The Corwin Compromise was far more 
moderate, yet was still met with animosity from the radical republicans and the few 
remaining Southern congressmen.279  
Neither Crittenden’s nor Corwin’s compromises were anywhere near 
acceptable to the Liberator Circle. Another political compromise to resolve secession 
was the worst possible outcome. Phillips believed that a compromise to prevent 
secession would risk: 
‘insurrection . . . the worst door in which freedom can enter. Let universal 
suffrage have free sway, and the ballot supersedes the bullet. But let an arrogant and 
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besotted minority curb the majority by tricks like these, and when you have 
compromised away Lincoln, you revive John Brown.’280  
It appears at first that Phillips is referencing the possibility of a slave 
insurrection, a violent means of abolition that the Circle did not support. Yet his 
reference to the democratic process of the ‘ballot’ and the potential for reviving John 
Brown in the face of a government that goes against the citizens shows that he 
speaks of the possibility of a Northern, abolitionist insurrection. So essentially 
northern disunion, but through revolution. As terrible as insurrection is, Phillips 
preferred action over yet another political compromise favouring the slaveholders. 
Whipple gave a charged call to arms in response to the possibility of 
compromise:   
‘. . . now, when the States that have so long outraged us are setting us free by 
taking themselves away, in God’s name, let us not interpose obstacles to their 
departure! Let us not offer protection to that villainous ‘institution’ which, having lived so 
far, because we have unjustifiably favored it, seems now to die! Let us not so absurdly 
uphold the continuance of slaveholding by Southern men, as to offer ourselves to be 
their slaves! If we have not manhood enough to act, to advance, in this emergency, let 
us at least stand still, and look at the enemy! Let us not retreat!’281 
At last, after years of agitation, Whipple saw the potential to further the cause 
of abolition in the Secession Crisis. Compromises such as Crittenden’s, Corwin’s, 
and even the Republican platform, represented nothing more than ‘obstacles’ to the 
departure of the slave states. George Hoyt, a tertiary circle member who spoke at 
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the annual meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society in 1861, favoured 
territorial restriction over another compromise to placate the save power.  
‘I have not, hitherto, understood that there was any inconsistency between a 
Republican, believing in political action as a remedy for the evils of slavery, and a 
conscientious abolitionist . . . I do not mean such Republicanism as represented by 
the recent Senatorial speech of William H. Seward; I do not mean such 
Republicanism as represented by the compromises of Tom Corwin; I do not mean 
such Republicanism as is represented by Charles Francis Adams, who proposes to 
admit New Mexico as a slave State. [The rioters – “Three cheers for Adams.”] I do 
not mean such Republicanism as is represented, for instance, by the Springfield 
Republican . . . I mean such Republicanism as would legislate eternal liberty into the 
Territories.’282 
Hoyt gave this speech at the height of the pro-Union protesters, labelled as 
‘rioters’ by Whipple, hence the “Three cheers for Adams’ included in the transcript.283 
By denigrated Adams’ conciliatory compromise and all conservative elements of the 
Republican Party, Hoyt is, in the eyes of pro-Union Northerners, just as much of an 
anti-American radical as Phillips and Whipple. Yet by recognizing the validity of 
Republican antislavery and professing that there is no ‘inconsistency’ between a 
Republican and ‘conscientious abolitionist,’ Hoyt departs from the traditional, anti-
political Circle principle in a major way. Specifically, Hoyt accepts the possibility of 
abolition through amending the constitution without outright repudiating it. 
Phillips, in contrast, remained committed to the immediatist tenets of the 
Liberator Circle. Like George Hoyt, Phillips’ speech at the Massachusetts Anti-
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Slavery Society was beset by pro-union hecklers. Unlike Hoyt, Phillips does not back 
down from the need for immediate repentence: 
‘I stand here to-day by the sacrifice of a life, to atone, as far as possible, for 
the sins of my father (applause and hisses,) and every man who loves his father is 
bound to be here to-day. (Applause.) [A Voice – “Three cheers for his father.” 
Another – “Three cheers for the Union.”] Well, we are here, friends, to make those 
cheers deserved. We are here to make the Union worthy of cheers within hearing of 
Fanueil Hall. (Applause and cries of “Good.”) We are here to wipe out the three-fifths 
slave basis, the slave cause of recapture, the pledge against insurrection, and every 
black stripe from the parchment of 1789; and when we have done it, we will go down 
to that old cradle of Liberty, and invoke Adams, and Otis, and Hancock to come and 
listen to our repentance, and to our jubilee together.’284 
Although Phillips remained intransigent during the Secession Crisis, his focus 
on striking ‘every black stripe from the parchment of 1789’ signifies an early change 
in how the Liberator Circle would come to change their view of the Constitution. For 
the past three decades Garrison and Phillips’s only solution for the ‘covenant with 
death’ was outright repudiation, which could only legally be achieved through 
northern disunion. Secession, although utterly treasonous and separate from 
disunion, could easily be intellectualized into a method of abolition that aligned with 
the Circle’s principles of the last three decades. With the slave states gone the 
‘agreement with hell’ was null and void. It had not been dissolved by an enlightened, 
abolitionist Northern populace, but the severance of the slave states created an 
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alternate form of disunion that opened up the possibility for radical abolitionist 
change. 
A tertiary correspondent signed as ‘God help THE PEOPLE’ goes a step 
further than Phillips, suggesting that the government capitalize on secession by 
swiftly amending the Constitution: 
‘Let the whole policy of government be openly and avowedly hostile to slavery, 
and let the people of the free states at once meet in Convention to wipe out every 
clause of the Constitution which has been, or can be, tainted with pro-slavery 
interpretation. This is the way, the only way, to set ourselves right-to be just, to be 
magnanimous, to be generous. Then, if civil war must come, let it come; then, if the 
South must perish, let it perish – we shall be innocent, we shall be saved, yet so as by 
fire.’285 
The amendment of the constitution that God help THE PEOPLE suggested 
aligns with the methods approved by the radical republicans. Alongside Hoyt’s 
support of Republican antislavery in the face of compromise, God help THE 
PEOPLE provides the first evidence of a small element of the Tertiary circle who are 
moving away from anti-political agitation and towards political abolition. The desire 
for progress towards abolition motivates them to contemplate a personal 
compromise, modifying their strident demands for disunion and immediatism and 
gradually becoming more open to alternate means of ending slavery. This move 
towards personal compromise occurred only on the fringe of the Circle during the 
Secession Crisis, and even God help THE PEOPLE would rather have war than a 
weak political compromise to keep the South in check. Of course, Civil War does 
come. With war between the Union and the Confederacy, all but ruling out disunion 
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as a realistic option, the Liberator Circle lost the principle that kept them in 
methodological unity. Questions of where to direct their agitation, what method of 
abolition to agitate for, and whether or not to move towards accepting politics, 
abounded between Fort Sumter and the Emancipation Proclamation. Garrison and 
his coadjutors were suddenly faced with the choice of compromising their anti-
political immediatism, or remaining true to their foundational principles.  
The Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter changed everything. Notable 
Charleston resident Mary Boykin Chesnut experienced the bombardment first hand. 
Her husband, former US Senator James Chesnut and then aide to Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis, had treated with Colonel Anderson, the Union 
commander of Sumter, earlier that evening. ‘Anderson will not capitulate,’ Chesnut 
wrote in her diary, and although her husband ‘felt for Anderson,’ everyone knew the 
ramifications of his refusal to surrender the Fort. Later on the night of the eleventh, 
Mary anxiously waited for news from James: 
‘I do not pretend to go to sleep. How can I? If Anderson does not accept 
terms at four, the orders are, he shall be fired upon. I count four, St. Michael's bells 
chime out and I begin to hope. At half-past four the heavy booming of a cannon. I 
sprang out of bed, and on my knees prostrate I prayed as I never prayed before.’286 
Chesnut, as a member of the Southern, slaveholding aristocracy, could not 
have been further from the Liberator Circle in ideology. Her reaction to 
bombardment, shock, hope, and prayer, was the same as Garrison and Phillips. With 
the aggressive assault on Sumter all Americans, Northern and Southern, abolitionist 
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and Fire-Eater, recognized that secession would not be resolved by compromise, but 
with conflict.  
Garrison, Phillips, and the entirety of the Liberator Circle were challenged by 
Fort Sumter on an ideological and personal level. Their earlier problem of how to 
react to the violent abolitionism of John Brown hinted at the gaps in the Circle’s 
certainty of principle, particularly in relation to non-resistance. The Civil War, 
however, was a moral crisis on a completely different level. Instead of grappling with 
the issue of whether individual violence was justified in the cause of freeing the 
slave, the Circle had to decide if outright war was acceptable along the path to 
liberty. This problem of means was further complicated by the immediate turn of 
Northern opinion against the South.  
For the first time in the three decades that the Circle had been agitating for 
immediate abolition, the sentiment of the North was not hostile or indifferent towards 
the Circle. This turn of opinion was not indicative of a widespread acceptance of 
abolition. Rather, the Northern moderates Whipple  
‘Up to this time it has been the duty of the abolitionists to stimulate an indifferent 
people to interest and action. All at once . . . swayed by motives other than ours, and 
working by means other than ours, the Northern people are now united in opposition to 
the power that upholds slavery. For the first time in this contest, it has become our part 
to “stand still, and see the salvation of God.” Our work is now doing by other hands 
faster than we can do it.’287  
Although this sentiment was inspired by a desire to preserve the Union and 
lacked any abolitionist character, the fact that the majority of the North were willing to 
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take action against the slaveholders was seen by Garrison and Phillips as a 
dramatic, positive change from the indifference of earlier years. Not all in the 
secondary or tertiary circle agreed with them. Lydia Child, Parker Pillsbury, and 
Stephen Foster felt that the pro-union prosecution of the war would limit any 
possibility for abolitionist action, or worse, result in a compromise to convince the 
Confederate States to re-join the Union. This element of dissent became more 
common as the war dragged on without progress. Yet in the days after Fort Sumter, 
the Liberator Circle was resoundly patriotic. 
The first issue of the Liberator published after Fort Sumter came out of the 
nineteenth of April, a mere two days after the bombardment ended. Although 
Garrison was fond of writing his editorials at the last possible moment before 
publication, he did not mention Fort Sumter or Civil War at all in this issue. Instead, 
he continued to campaign for disunion. Garrison had just responded to a tertiary 
correspondent by the name of B. G. Wright who argued that secession was the 
same as disunion.288 Wright would not back down from his opinion, however, and 
continued to debate with Garrison long into July when disunion was deemed to be an 
irrelevancy.289 Yet it made sense that qualifying disunion was at the forefront of 
Garrison’s mind just before Fort Sumter. Garrison was still an advocate of letting the 
South go in early April 1861, and as such displayed the same cautious optimism 
about Lincoln he had shown that past September: 
‘On the issue raised by the secessionists, they are wholly and fearfully in the 
wrong, while President Lincoln is indisputably in the right. On his side all the elements 
of freedom will coalesce, sympathetically and approvingly, as against their thoroughly 
                                            




infernal spirit and purposes, and a thousand times over wish him success in the 
struggle. At the same time, as pertaining to continued union with the South, God grant 
that the North may speedily see the folly, danger, and iniquity of trying it any longer!’290 
When the full gravity of the war and the complete turn of public opinion 
became apparent, however, Garrison was filled with jubilation. Not at the tragedy of 
war, but at the majority of the North finally being allied against the slavepower: 
‘Let nothing be done, at this solemn crisis, needlessly to check or divert the 
mighty current of popular feeling which is now sweeping southward with the strength 
and impetuosity of a thousand Niagaras, in direct conflict with that haughty and 
perfidious Slave Power which has long ruled the republic with a rod of iron for its own 
base and satanic purposes.’291 
Indeed, Garrison felt that the war was of such gravity that he postponed the 
meeting of the American Anti-Slavery Society in light of the ‘unparalleled excitement 
now existing throughout the country.’292 Garrison maintained and developed his 
support in his editorial for the first week of May. He acknowledged that ‘All this would 
have been spared if, at any antecedent period, liberty had been “proclaimed 
throughout the land to all the inhabitants.”’293 However, he rejoiced because 
‘Neutrality will not be tolerated. The change in Northern feeling since the capture of 
Fort Sumter is total, wonderful, indescribable – uniting the most discordant, and 
reconciling the most estranged.’294  
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Phillips was initially despondent after Fort Sumter fell. The Civil War had 
completed invalidated northern disunion as a method of abolition. The centrepiece of 
the Circle’s ideology and the outcome Phillips had committed thirty years of his life to 
had suddenly become irrelevant. Whereas secession could have been accepted as a 
separation of the slave states from the free, war between the Union and the 
Confederacy created a host of new variables that could not be reconciled the 
disunion theory. For Phillips, supporting the war would ‘. . . belie my pledges, 
disavow every profession of faith, bless those that I have cursed, start afresh with a 
new set of political principles, and admit that my life has been a mistake.’295 It took 
Phillips a week of contemplation to work out how he would respond to the 
uncertainty of war, knowing that whatever his opinion he would be criticised for 
seemingly abandoning anti-political disunion.296 At last, Phillips announced that he 
would address his views on the war at Tremont Temple on the twenty-first of April. 
Phillips’ first speech after Fort Sumter represents a major turning point in the 
history of the Liberator Circle. For Wendell Phillips, the notoriously hard-line, 
uncompromising, anti-political disunionist, had chosen to compromise his personal 
principles and endorse Lincoln and the Union in a positive light. Phillips’ speech was 
not a short one. Indeed, it serves as one of the most crucial pieces of evidence for 
dramatic change in the Circle. Bartlett and Stewart are correct in asserting that 
Phillips showed a significant turn in personal opinion towards politics and violent 
means.297 As the second most influential leader figure of the Circle, his views 
undoubtedly influenced many in the secondary and tertiary circle to move away from 
disunionism. Yet there was not a short, sharp, and permanent move within the Circle 
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towards Republican antislavery. Although Phillips was sincere in his patriotic turn, he 
was careful not to recant anti-political action or immediatism entirely. 
‘Civil war is a momentous evil. It needs the soundest, most solemn 
justification. I rejoice before God today for every word that I have spoken counselling 
peace; and I rejoice with an especially profound gratitude, that for the first time in my 
anti-slavery life, I speak under the stars and stripes, and welcome the tread of 
Massachusetts men marching to war. (Enthusiastic cheering.) No matter what the 
past has been or said; today the slave asks God for a sight of this banner and counts 
it the pledge of his redemption.’298 
While it is true that Phillips made a bold Unionist statement by choosing to 
‘speak under the stars and stripes and welcome the tread of Massachusetts men 
marching to war,’ he still acknowledged that Civil War ‘needs the soundest, most 
solemn justification.’ War could only be justified if it was in pursuit of ending slavery. 
Phillips rejoiced under the flag not because he was favour of a reconciliation with the 
South under the proslavery constitution, but because ‘the slave asks God for a sight 
of this banner and counts it the pledge of his redemption.’ Peaceful disunion would 
still have been the ideal means of abolition. But Phillips had begun to realize that the 
ideal means of abolition he had committed the past thirty years of his life to had been 
made irrelevant by the Civil War. Instead of championing disunion as the only means 
of abolition, Phillips had decided to ‘Acknowledge secession, or cannonade it, I care 
not which; but “Proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants 
thereof.” (Loud cheers.)’299 So long as slavery was abolished as a result of war, 
Phillips had no problem in supporting it. 
                                            




Not one to leave anything ambiguous, Phillips further clarified his reasoning 
behind supporting the war: 
‘. . . the cannon shot against Fort Sumter has opened the only door out of this 
hour. There were but two. One was Compromise; the other was Battle. The integrity 
of the North closed the first; the generous forbearance of nineteen States closed the 
other. The South opened this with cannon shot, and LINCOLN shows himself at the 
door. (Prolonged and enthusiastic cheering.) The war, then, is not aggressive, but in 
self-defence, and Washington has become the Thermopylae of Liberty and Justice. 
(Applause.)’300 
The first two sentences immediately show that Phillips has revised his thinking 
from the Secession Crisis. He stated that ‘There were but two [doors out of this 
hour]. One was Compromise; the other was Battle.’ At present, Fort Sumter had 
opened the door of battle. But throughout the Secession Crisis Phillips repeatedly 
suggested that there were three doors the United States could take: compromise, 
battle, and disunion. Of the three, Phillips campaigned wholeheartedly for disunion, 
with the backing of a united Liberator Circle. Phillips’ decision to omit northern 
disunion as an option shows that he recognized the Circle’s ideal method of abolition 
had been made irrelevant by Civil War. After April 1861 the United States was not 
divided by slave states that could be amicably ‘let go’ by the free, but by a 
Confederacy in open rebellion against the Union. The only answer to Confederate 
aggression that could maintain the ‘integrity of the North’ was a war of self-defence 
led by Lincoln at the door of battle.  
The second change Phillips showed was that he did not find any fault with 
Lincoln’s response to the Confederacy. In fact, he gave a tacit endorsement to the 




president and political party he had denigrated as political compromisers for the past 
year:  
‘I have always believed in the sincerity of Abraham Lincoln. You have heard 
me express my confidence in it every time I have spoken from this desk. I only 
doubted sometimes whether he was really the head of the government. To-day he is 
at any rate Commander-in-Chief. The delay in the action of government has 
doubtless been necessity, but policy also. Traitors within and without made it hesitate 
to move till it had tried the machine of government just given it. But delay was wise, 
as it matured a public opinion definite, decisive, and ready to keep step to the music 
of the Government march.’301 
Phillips shied away from endorsing Lincoln as president, instead praising his 
role as Commander-in-Chief. Yet he had rescinded his earlier view of Lincoln as an a 
compromising politician: one concerned only with maintaining consensus within his 
party. Phillips has decided that the Lincoln’s lack of decisive action during the 
Secession Crisis was not due to timidity or ineptitude, but a determined 
governmental policy. For ‘traitors, within and without,’ in the form of Northern 
Democrats and the few remaining Southern Congressmen sought to take advantage 
of an untried Republican government.302 Lincoln’s decision to delay allowed the 
general Northern public, many of whom were pro-union and in favour of 
reconciliation with the South, to mature their opinion to be ‘definitive, decisive, and 
ready to keep step to the music of the Government march.’303 Therefore, Lincoln’s 
inaction allowed the North to see the true intransigence of the secessionists and 






preventing any subversion of Buchanan’s lame duck Congress by pro-Southern 
democrats. 
 By presenting Lincoln’s patience as a tactic of moral suasion, Phillips made it 
palatable to himself and the Circle in hindsight. While the truth behind this theory is 
debatable, it at least shows how Phillips had rationalised his indifferent opinion of 
Lincoln during the Secession Crisis.  Furthermore, it is evident that Phillips believed 
that convincing Lincoln and the Republican Party of the necessity of abolition was no 
longer an invalid tactic. Phillips had not yet formulated the practical means of 
emancipation that the government should be striving for. It would fall to Garrison to 
clarify the means of emancipation through the war power that Phillips and several 
within the Circle would campaign for. Regardless of the specifics, Phillips had 
indisputably decided that ‘Nothing but victory will blot from history that sight of the 
Stars and Stripes giving place to the Palmetto. But without justice for inspiration, 
without God for our ally, we shall break the Union asunder; we shall be a 
confederacy, and so will they. This war means one of two things: emancipation or 
disunion. [Cheers.]’304  
Phillips was careful not to sever his connection to the disunionism and 
immediatist principles completely. He left the option of disunion open as the only 
acceptable alternative to emancipation under the war power. Yet there is little doubt 
that war had challenged the nature of the Liberator Circle’s agitation. Without the 
certainty of disunion to unify the disparate agitators under one means of abolition, 
every individual agitator had to question exactly how the community should proceed 
with their crusade. Garrison and Phillips began to lean towards influencing the 




Republican Party immediately after Fort Sumter. Their respective compromises of 
principle for action would not be finalized until the Emancipation Proclamation. But 
they did have the cognizance to recognize that the Civil War was the best chance 
they had to enact abolition. Not all of the Circle agreed with them. And as events 
unfounded outside of their control, Garrison and Phillips often had dramatic turns of 
opinion against Lincoln and the war. Crucially, however, after Fort Sumter both the 
de-facto leaders of the Liberator Circle had accepted the possibility of abolition 
through politics, in contrast to the past thirty years of outright dismissal. One of the 
most important questions of the past year, whether or not to consider targeting moral 
suasion towards the Republican Party, had been resolved for Garrison and Phillips. 
In light of the Civil War, it was increasingly likely that it was worth pursuing political 












Chapter Three: Compromise 
 
In January 1862 Garrison unambiguously stated that he was ‘with the 
Government,’ a hugely significant change of opinion from the former figurehead of 
anti-political disunion:  
‘And when I said I would not sustain the Constitution, because it was “a 
covenant with death, and an agreement with hell,” I had no idea I would live to see 
death and hell secede. (Prolonged applause and great laughter). Hence it is now that 
I am with the Government, to enable it to constitutionally stop the further ravages 
death, and extinguish the flames of hell forever. (Renewed applause).’305 
Garrison emphasized secession was the primary motivator for such a radical 
change of opinion towards the Constitution. However, the war power theory, a 
political method of abolition that did not require the repudiation of the Constitution, 
was far more critical to Garrison’s decision than secession alone. Formulated by 
former President and noted antislavery advocate John Quincy Adams, the war power 
theory stated that in the case of Civil War between the free and the slave states, 
Congress had the constitutional power to enact emancipation. Quincy referred to 
article 1, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution, which states that ‘Congress shall 
have the power to declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water;’306 Clause 11, the final clause of section 8, 
provides the keystone of the war power theory: ‘Congress shall have the power to 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for the carrying into Execution 
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the foregoing powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.’307 Simply put, Congress had the 
implied power to enact any laws that could be justified as necessary in the 
prosecution of war. Because slave labour was such a critical element of the 
Confederacy’s economy and utilized in manual tasks such as constructing defences, 
Congress could easily claim emancipation as an impactful war measure. Therefore, 
for Garrison, the Civil War changed the relationship between political antislavery and 
the immediatist abolition of the Liberator. Prior to Fort Sumter, there was no political 
method of abolition that aligned with the Garrisonian ideology. After Fort Sumter, the 
war power theory allowed for abolition to occur without repudiating the constitution 
entirely.  
The final change in the masthead slogan in December 1861 was directly 
related to Garrison’s decision to campaign for Constitutional abolition. Instead of 
directly denouncing the Constitution as the second slogan did, Garrison opted for the 
more generic ‘Proclaim Liberty throughout all the land, to all the inhabitants 
thereof.’308 Alongside the new slogan was a different quote from Adams, this time 
from his speech to Congress that established the war power theory of abolition. The 
important elements of the quote can be condensed down to: ‘I say that the military 
authority takes [during a war between the States] the place of all municipal 
institutions . . . [therefore] not only the President of the United States, but the 
Commander of the Army, has power to order the UNIVERSAL EMANCIPATION OF 
ALL THE SLAVES.’309 The fact that Adams’ argued that high ranking military 
commanders could enforce abolition was the source of much consternation for 
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Garrison. Union Generals Fremont, Butler, and Hunter attempted to emancipate the 
‘contrabands’ of slaves in their military jurisdictions, and Lincoln countermanded 
them all.310 Regardless of the repeated troubles with Lincoln, it was clear that with 
this final masthead change, Garrison had made a personal change in abolitionist 
priority, moving away completely from disunion and anti-political action. Garrison had 
decided that the war power theory was the best means of achieving abolition, 
despite going against the Liberator Circle’s fundamental principles of refusing any 
form of compromise and not engaging in political methods.  
Accepting the possibility of abolition under the Constitution was the beginning 
of Garrison’s personal compromise that would end with forgoing universal abolition in 
favour of the conditional emancipation of the Emancipation Proclamation. It could be 
argued that in choosing realistic, political abolition over the ideal of universal 
abolition, Garrison had betrayed the rigid morality with which he set out on his 
crusade. The Declaration of Sentiments makes it clear that ‘Ours forbid the doing of 
evil that good may come, and lead us to reject, and to entreat the oppressed to 
reject, the use of all carnal weapons for deliverance from bondage; relying solely 
upon those which are spiritual, and mighty through God to the pulling down of strong 
holds.’311 For thirty years Garrison had led a movement of individuals on the basis 
that the Constitution, politics, and all forms of violence were evil, ‘carnal weapons.’ 
Yet from 1861 onwards Garrison had no moral problem with justifying abolition 
through war as ‘doing evil so that good may come.’ He had come to accept the 
                                            
310 For Fremont and Hunter see Thomas, The Liberator, pp. 413-420; For Butler see Stewart, Wendell 
Phillips, pp. 248-249 
311 Garrison, Declaration of Sentiments 
113 
 
immoralities of war as tolerable, so long as it resulted in the end of slavery. Phillips 
agreed with Garrison, and believed that: 
‘The age of discussion is over. We have had fifty years, more or less, of what 
is called agitation, discussion, and party divisions. Now, a new act has opened. It is 
the hour of fight – the age of bullets. . . it does not take as much time for a nation to 
fight itself clear as it does to talk itself clear, only it is necessary that the talk should 
precede such a fight. I think it has been.’312 
Phillips’ fifty years of agitation refers to the entire career of organized 
American abolition, including the myriad of disagreements and divisions over means. 
He suggested that in light of the war all abolitionists should rethink the role of their 
activism in society, for ‘it does not take as much time for a nation to fight itself clear 
as it does to talk itself clear.’313  
From Fort Sumter to the Emancipation Proclamation, the abolitionists of the 
Liberator fluctuated between broad, uneasy agreement and division over abolitionist 
means. The rapidly changing events of the Civil War gave the community no time to 
react, intellectualize, and reach a consensus beyond extremely general principles of 
abolitionism. The definitions between radical, Garrisonian, and political abolitionists 
became muddied as Garrison, Phillips, and many in the outer circles adopted the 
war power theory as the best means of achieving abolition. Not all in the Circle 
agreed with the sudden change towards working under the ‘covenant of death’ and 
with compromising, morally corrupt politicians, particularly Pillsbury and the Fosters. 
Regardless of the detractor’s dissent, the Circle no longer had the certainty of 
northern disunion to ground them as a society, and over the course of 1861 to 1863 
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it became clear that both Garrison and Phillips had shifted from their traditional roles 
as chief anti-political agitators and unifying leaders. The Civil War created the 
hitherto unacceptable possibility of achieving abolition without repudiating the 
constitution, and Garrison and Phillips were quick to adopt emancipation as a war 
measure as the best chance for progress, even if it was inherently political. They 
both reached personal compromises, modifying their stance on political abolition, 
giving up the stringent demands of immediate disunion, and eventually accepting the 
localized abolition of the Emancipation Proclamation over the national, complete 
legal abolition they set out to achieve in the Declaration of Sentiments. Whether or 
not the rest of the Circle agreed with them was, as always, their choice to make as 
individuals.  
Exactly what it meant to be Garrisonian, radical, or political abolitionist 
became even more subjective over the war period. The loss of disunion as a 
grounding principle, the shift away from anti-political action, and the war power 
theory provoked a rethink in how the Circle should approach the Constitution. The 
majority of Circle members that followed the Inner Circle in accepting Adams’ war 
power theory became the new, moderate Garrisonians. The minority that held onto 
disunion, most vocally represented by Pillsbury, became the new radicals, refusing 
to accept any compromise with politics that violated their moral cores. Then there 
were those in the middle, the individual correspondents of the Wider Circle who had 
their own opinions about the events of the war and the mission of the Circle who did 
not necessary agree with Garrison or Pillsbury. The question of what role the Circle 
should take as agitators in light of the war, where to direct their moral suasion, and 
the extent in which the abolitionists of the Circle should involve themselves in politics 
were not resolved for any length of time nor any great satisfaction on a community 
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wide level. Garrison and Phillips often asserted that the unity of the Circle was the 
same as it had always been, and qualified their personal changes in opinion as being 
within the bounds of the Circle’s ideology repeatedly. Yet the community as a whole 
was never truly in unison as it was during the period of Certainty during 1860.  
The war power method helped the tertiary circle to resolve the issue of 
supporting violent means. For non-violent agitation, termed non-resistance by the 
Circle, was a defining principle of the Liberator’s form of abolition. The Declaration of 
Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery Society stated that Garrisonians would not 
engage in ‘physical resistance’ or the ‘marshalling of arms,’ instead seeking ‘the 
overthrow of prejudice by the power of love – and the abolition of slavery by the spirit 
of repentance.’314 Supporting war as a means of abolition meant compromising non-
resistance, even if the men and women of the Liberator did not personally enlist in 
the army. Garrison justified his compromise of non-resistance by separating the 
organized body of the American Anti-Slavery Society from the individual agitator: 
‘. . . [the members of the American Anti-Slavery Society] pledged themselves 
at the outset not to encourage, in their organized capacity, as an association, any 
insurrectionary movement among the slaves, or any measures of violence on their 
part, in seeking the overthrow of slavery . . . But, as individuals, acting on their own 
responsibility, while largely imbued with the spirit of peace, they have never adopted 
the doctrine of non-resistance, with a few exceptional cases.’315 
Garrison placed emphasis on individuals keeping in line with their own moral 
ideals, rather than following any organisations line. Another justification that Garrison 
would return to was that the Civil War was a symptom of the greater war of liberty 
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versus slavery. ‘For thirty years, the Abolitionists have been faithfully warning the 
nation that, unless the enslaved were set free, a just God would visit it with tribulation 
and woe proportional to its great iniquity.’316 Garrison and the Circle had campaigned 
unceasingly through moral suasion to convince the nation of the necessity of 
abolition, to get all Americans to repent for their sin of allowing slavery to exist. Yet 
their words went unheeded, and the consequence of refusing to enact true liberty 
was war. 
Abolition as a war goal unavoidably advanced violence, death, and all the 
immoralities of conflict. Yet for the majority of the secondary and tertiary circle the 
ends justified the means if universal abolition could achieved. Whipple took this view 
in regards to the war power theory: 
‘War, which is ordinarily evil, and only evil, has for once created the 
opportunity of doing a good thing, by instruments in which peace had no such power. 
As John Quincy Adams has clearly shown, in time of war, either the President or 
Congress has the right to abolish slavery utterly, throughout the country, and any 
General, operating in a hostile State, has the right to proclaim its utter abolition 
there.’317 
War was still unquestionable immoral. Yet without war the ‘instrument’ of 
abolition as a war measure would not be possible. A Tertiary correspondent who 
signed as ‘Insurrectionist’ took a more radical approach to the war, inspired by the 
violent means of John Brown: 
‘All is fair in war. Slavery is war. The South holds 4,000,000 prisoners of war. 
Who shall that any means, all means, are not honorable in accomplishing the right to 
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“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” by these millions? Insurrection would make 
slavery a hot coal in the in the bands of the South, and she would soon drop it. A 
property accursed, she would fly to the North, and try to sell out at any price.’318 
Although Insurrectionist advocated abolition as a war goal, they believed that 
a slave rebellion should follow in order to have the greatest impact on the South. 
Despite their radical method, Insurrectionist clarified that they ‘do not desire 
“revenge” on those who are in arms against the government, but we do desire 
peace, and hail with joy any instrumentality that will produce it for our common 
country.’319 This addendum is much more in line with the moderate spirit of the war 
power theory. Emancipation might bring insurrection, but it would also bring peace.  
The idea that abolition as a war measure would bring a swift end to the war 
was one that many in the secondary and tertiary circles could rally behind. An 
extension of this idea was the notion that the Circle supported the war of liberty 
against slavery, rather than a war between two nations. ‘The people of the North 
have no conflict with the people of the South,’ said Henry Wright, who wrote 
prolifically over 1861-1863, ‘but Liberty has a conflict with slavery. Every feeling and 
sympathy of my soul go with the object of this universal uprising of the masses – so 
far as that object is the abolition of slavery, and the ‘securing of liberty’ to ‘ourselves 
and our posterity,’ without regard to sex, sect, colour, clime or condition.’320 While 
Phillips expressed his unbridled patriotism at Tremont Temple, Wright placed a 
criterion on his support of the war. The object of the war had to be universal abolition 
in its most literal sense. Wright was consistent in this belief throughout the war, even 
up to the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation: ‘Bullets will kill slaveholders, but 
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slavery must be killed by an idea. Justice must kill Injustice. Right must kill Wrong – 
Liberty, Slavery. The bullet which carries not liberty to the hearts of the living, will be 
will be of but little use to freedom and free institutions, though it carry death to the 
hearts of ten thousand tyrants.’321 Not only had slavery had to be abolished, but 
discrimination of gender, religion, and race as well. Therefore, Wright had not 
deviated from the founding principles of the Liberator, set out in the Declaration of 
Sentiments. He was willing to compromise non-resistance and anti-political action, 
but not at the expense of creating a truly moral nation. 
Heywood agreed with Wright, believing that ‘the war is no cure’ for slavery.322 
‘We must rule the South, not by the weight of our fist, but by superior ideas, larger 
philanthropy, more beneficent civilization; for if this nation cannot come back to the 
basis of justice, God grant that it may sink forever from the sight of men!’323 Again, 
justice was paramount. Heywood also looked beyond the war, predicting that military 
might alone could not inspire the South to become a ‘beneficent civilization.’ The 
sooner that the Union adopted universal liberty as its watchword the sooner the war 
would end, otherwise, the nation would perish. Garrison solidified the idea of the war 
as being part of a national repentance by quoting Jeremiah: 
‘. . . nothing could more truthfully depict the cause of our national visitation 
than the words of the prophet: - “Thus saith the Lord: Ye have not harkened unto me, 
in proclaiming liberty, every one to his brother, every man to his neighbour; behold, I 
proclaim a liberty for you, saith the Lord, to the sword, to the pestilence, and to the 
famine.’324 
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Garrison utilized Jeremiah to emphasise the necessity of ‘proclaiming liberty, 
every one to his brother, every man to his neighbour,’ particularly now that it was a 
realistic possibility under the war power.325 
Given that the war power theory was legitimised through the Constitution, the 
Circle had reconsider their vilification of the ‘agreement with hell.’ The spectre of the 
‘covenant with death’ had been rendered irrelevant by war, just like northern 
disunion. This irrelevancy applied not only to Jefferson Davis and the leaders of the 
Confederacy, who relinquished ‘Whatever claims they once had upon the 
Constitution . . . the first moment they declared themselves out of the Union, set up 
their hostile confederacy, and made war upon the Government.’ 326  More 
importantly, it applied to the Republican led government. Through the war power 
theory, Lincoln had the opportunity to enact abolition within the bounds and in spite 
of the proslavery elements of the Constitution. Even though emancipation through 
the war power was political, it was also the most practical and potentially immediate 
means of freeing the slave. Therefore, Garrison, Phillips, and many in the secondary 
and tertiary circle were willing to compromise their anti-political core and work with 
the government to achieve some form of abolition.  
By 1862, the inner Circle of Garrison, Phillips, and Whipple had thrown their 
weight behind the war power method. Yet just because the inner Circle had decided 
to accept a political mode of abolition did not mean that they had lost their moral core 
of immediatism and universal abolition. ‘Tell the government that it shall commit a 
most heinous crime,’ Garrison began his speech, ‘if it shall allow any considerable 
                                            
325 Ibid. 




time to pass before proclaiming UNDER THE WAR POWER, freedom to all in 
bondage.’327 Although Garrison’s ideal means of abolition had changed, he had not 
modified his ideology. The benefit of legal abolition as a war measure (and, more 
importantly, as an act of humanity) was so obvious that it would be criminal not to 
enact it. Whatever abolition Congress enacts must also ‘provide freedom to all in 
bondage,’ there could be no half-hearted gradualist measures for Garrison.328 
Whipple, in an earlier editorial, demanded the same complete abolition Garrison 
advocated: ‘. . . freedom and justice must be conspicuously and unmistakeably 
incorporated into the Constitution of the United States, and reaffirmed in her laws 
and usages.’329 Instead of calling for the repudiation of the ‘agreement with hell’ 
Whipple calls for drastic abolitionist amendment. Furthermore, all changes to the 
Constitution must extend to all laws of the United States, so as to put an end to racist 
laws such as the infamous black laws of Illinois.  
Phillips stated his support for Constitutional amendment through the war 
power: 
‘I would claim of Congress – in the exact language of Adams, of the 
“government,” – a solemn act abolishing slavery throughout the Union, securing 
compensation to loyal slaveholders. As the Constitution forbids the States to allow 
nobles, I would now, by equal authority, forbid them to make slaves or allow 
slaveholders.’330 
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Again, Phillips calls for universal abolition. Slavery must be abolished 
‘throughout the Union,’ even if it meant compensating the slaveholders of Kentucky, 
Maryland, and Delaware. Here Phillips touches on a controversial point for the 
Liberator Circle as a whole: what to do about the ‘loyal’ slaveholders that stayed with 
the Union. Some in the Wider Circle equated compensating these slaveholders with 
tacitly endorsing slavery, for the government would be buying the slaves’ freedom.331 
Indeed, the Declaration of Sentiments expressly forbids any form of compensation 
for slaveholders, because ‘freeing the same is not depriving them [the slaveholder] of 
property . . . but righting the slave – restoring him to himself.’332  For Phillips, 
however, compensating the slaveholders within the Union would help make abolition 
immediate, and therefore was a small compromise to make. Many small, personal 
moral compromises like accepting compensation were characteristic of the Inner 
Circle’s acceptance of political emancipation.  
The Circle proper and the wider readership responded favourably to the 
primary circle’s new stance on the Constitution. Given that disunion was out of the 
question and the Union was fighting against the slavepower, several in the 
secondary circle agreed that the Constitution did not have to be a monolithic 
obstacle to abolition. Henry Wright came to the conclusion that ‘While the Union 
meant slavery, God and the Constitution required us to alter or abolish it. Now that it 
means freedom, (as the slave-seceding tyrants assert,) it is our right and sacred duty 
to sustain it, so far as questions concerning liberty and slavery are concerned.’333 
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The Confederacy separated from the Union in protest of a Constitutionally elected 
President, and can no longer exert their political influence to block any abolitionist 
attempts at amendment. There were still ‘questions considering liberty and slavery,’ 
the most pressing being convincing Lincoln to adopt abolition as a war goal.334 But 
Wright believed that they could and should be resolved within the Union.  
British abolitionist George Thompson also justified his support of the 
Constitution through the treason of the Confederacy:  
‘. . . the North is released forever from the Constitution of ’87. The despots of 
the South are traitors in arms. They have trampled the Constitution in the dust. . . 
they have reversed the Declaration of Independence: they have proclaimed the 
rightfulness of human slavery; they have proscribed on the cornerstone of the 
atheistical edifice they seek to rear “The black man is always, and forever, the 
property of the white man.”’335 
Thompson transferred the demonization that used to be reserved for the 
Constitution to its Confederate counterpart. In comparison to the Confederate 
Constitution which enshrined slavery as its ‘cornerstone,’ the United States 
Constitution became a flawed, proslavery document, but not an insurmountable 
obstacle to abolition. The North was ‘released forever’ from the Constitution of 1787 
as a result of secession.336 Like Wright, Thompson could see how the Civil War had 
dramatically changed the nature of their abolitionist crusade relates to the Union, 
political methods, and the Constitution. W. summarized the change in the Circle’s 
relationship to the Constitution: ‘Let the “Union, the Constitution, and the Laws,” be 
as ever the watch-words of both soldier and citizen; but let the Union be one in 
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reality, the Constitution with a free and not a slaveholders interpretation, and the 
Laws bear with equal justice.’337 Writing in June of 1862, W had had time to develop 
his opinion of how the Constitution should be treated by abolitionists. Constitutional 
amendment alone would not be acceptable. They call for a Constitution free of 
slaveholder’s influence, laws that reflect and protect universal equality, and a Union 
that is unanimously dedicated to upholding those laws. W’s sentiment echoes 
Whipple’s and Phillips’. Those that compromised with political means did not give up 
their demand for the solidification of all citizen’s rights under the law, without 
prejudice based on race or gender.  
Gerrit Smith, a long-time political abolitionist who had been involved with the 
Liberty and Free Soil Parties, praised Garrison and Phillips for showing ‘common 
sense and preeminent liberality’ in their approach to the war, in particular their 
changed attitude towards the constitution.338 Indeed, Smith believed that the Inner 
Circle’s newfound acceptance of the Constitution was so important that he was 
willing to re-join the correspondence of the Liberator Circle. ‘The Garrison and 
Phillips school of Abolitionists have wisely suspended their strictures on the 
Constitution, and I would that the other school might suspend their defences of it. 
Just now, there is not one minute, no, nor half a minute, to be spared to either school 
for presenting its view of the Constitution.’339 Smith alluded to the long-standing 
debate between political abolitionists and Garrisonians about whether or not the 
Constitution was proslavery. Having worked to transform antislavery sentiment into 
voting power, Smith was firmly in favour of working under the Constitution.340 The 
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urgency of the war and the potential it had for abolition convinced the Inner Circle to 
drop such differences of means and work for Constitution under the war power, 
therefore Smith felt he could reunite with the Liberator Circle.341 By May 1862 Smith 
had collaborated with the Circle enough to give his own analysis on the change in 
the ‘Garrisonian abolitionist,’: 
‘The people were infatuated enough to be pro-slavery, whatever might be the 
character of the Constitution; they will now, I trust, sacrifice slavery to save the 
nation. If they fell below the Constitution before, I trust they are willing, if need be, to 
rise above it . . . Hence, with all consistency, the “Garrisonian Abolitionist” is now a 
Unionist. There is a conversion. There is a change, but it is around him, and not 
him.’342 
In Smith’s view, the people of the North had become more willing to accept 
abolition, regardless of the character of the Constitution. The choice for the Circle 
now was how they engaged with this newfound antislavery sentiment. Smith claimed 
that in supporting the Union, the Circle had remained consistent with their pre-war 
ideals. The Circle certainly stuck to their immediatism and the demand for universal 
abolition, at least until the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. But to be wholly 
consistent would have meant steadfastly calling for northern disunion and the 
repudiation of the Constitution. The Inner Circle and the majority of the Wider Circle 
abandoned disunion and revised their opinion on the Constitution, accepting the war 
power theory as their chosen method of abolition and gradually coming to the 
conclusion that ending slavery through Emancipation was enough, rather than 
seeking universal, unconditional abolition. 
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Most of the Liberator Circle could rationalize their support of the Civil War as 
being in the name of the greater war of liberty versus slavery. Whether or not one 
chose to be a non-resistant was entirely up to the individual agitator. The vilification 
of the Constitution was now irrelevant in light of the war power theory. Provided that 
Lincoln and the Republican Administration made abolition the clear purpose of the 
war, those in the Circle that agreed with Garrison were willing to engage in political 
abolition. However, not everyone in the Circle rallied behind Garrison. From 1861 to 
the Emancipation Proclamation a radical group in the secondary circle remained 
staunchly anti-political. Stephen Foster, Abbey Foster, Parker Pillsbury, and Lydia 
Child made up the core of the new radical minority. Several in the tertiary circle did 
not acquiesce to Garrison’s viewpoint, and others still continuously revised their 
opinion based on events of the war. Garrison utilized his editorial capacity to debate 
and disclaim opinions that run contrary to the war power theory. But he also 
emphasizes the right of each individual Circle to have their opinion and to express it. 
Simply because what it meant to be a Garrisonian had changed as a result of 
Garrison’s compromise with political methods did not mean that the entirety of the 
Circle had to agree with him. Censorship or following a party line had never been a 
part of the Liberator community. Still, Garrison tirelessly advocated the war power 
theory as the best course of action, and called on the readers of the Liberator to do 
the same. The detractors slowly became a radical minority within a minority as the 
individuals of the Circle came to realize their new place as agitators within the Union, 
not extremists outside of it. 
The new radicals of the Circle were the only Garrisonians that remained truly 
consistent in their principles during the war. Smith, therefore, was not entirely right in 
claiming that all Garrisonians had stayed true to their founding principles in the wake 
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of the Civil War. Disunion, anti-political action, and a refusal to compromise any of 
their morals defined these detractors, and they regretted that so many of their 
coadjutors had turned towards political abolition. ‘It does seem to me that the 
infatuation of our government is only paralleled by that of those abolitionists who 
believe that our mission, as abolitionists, is ended,’ Pillsbury lamented. ‘To my 
apprehension, it would be far more rational to consider ourselves rather the prophets 
of the anti-slavery millennium, then its heroes, to wear its laurels, or be the theme of 
its songs.’343 Abolitionists becoming unionists was bad enough, but the few 
individuals who thought that their time as agitators had finished were worse. 
Futhermore, Pillsbury implies that by compromising unconditional, anti-political 
beliefs and aligning with the government, the majority of the Circle had become 
dangerously enamoured with popularity, or, at the very least, not as concerned with 
agitating for radical change. He did not wish to be a ‘hero’ of incomplete abolition 
now, but the ‘prophet’ of a true abolitionist millennium.344 Pillsbury was prescient in 
this sentiment, as the Emancipation Proclamation was nowhere near the universal 
equality that the Circle sought in the Declaration of Sentiments. Indeed, part of the 
Garrisonian’s compromise was placing aside the demand for unconditional abolition 
in return for the progress of the Emancipation Proclamation. Pillsbury, however, 
could not compromise the moral core he had sustained and been agitating for for 
‘twenty years,’: 
‘I do not wish to see this government prolonged another day in its present form. On 
the contrary, I have been for twenty years attempting to overthrow the present dynasty. I do 
not quite agree with some of my friends, that a change has taken place that releases me 
                                            




from my former course of action. If I do not misjudge the Constitution, whatever may have 
been its real character, it was never so much an engine of cruelty and of crime as it is at the 
present hour.345 
Pillsbury admitted that his opinion was not monolithic. He did not claim to 
know the ‘real character’ of the Constitution, and admitted that he very well could 
have misjudged it entirely. Regardless, in his opinion the ‘dynasty’ of Constitutional 
politics had not changed enough to warrant giving up disunion. 
Abbey Foster summarized the feeling of the radical Circle members towards 
the Administration. ‘When we are ready to accept the lesser of two sinners, the 
serpent of compromise has crept into our midst.’346 To the detractors, Lincoln, the 
Republicans, and all politicians were still compromisers unable to uphold moral 
principles. The Civil War, although momentous in directing Northern opinion against 
the slaveholder, did not change the fundamentally immoral nature of American 
politics. The first two years of war prosecution by the Government did not help to 
convince Foster or the other radicals that Congress had suddenly become 
abolitionists. The attempted military emancipations of Generals Fremont and Hunter 
were hailed as steps in the right direction by the Circle.347 But Lincoln 
countermanded both of their orders, which again earned him criticism from Garrison 
and the Circle.348 Stephen Foster argued that ‘. . . the events of the past year have 
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made no essential change in the spirit or action of our national government . . . our 
position towards it is unchanged, and we renew our avowal of our purpose to have 
no lot or part in a Union which tolerates the presence of a single slave.’349 Instead of 
a rethink, Foster called for a renewal of disunionist principles, even as late as June 
1862. 
One of the radical detractor’s greatest criticisms of Garrison’s decision to seek 
abolition through the Republican administration was that the North, while certainly 
anti-South, were far from abolitionist. ‘The cry for the Union means, with three-
fourths of all who shout for it, the same old Union that has been cemented by the 
blood of the slave for nearly three generations,’ tertiary correspondent J. T. Everett 
proclaimed in the early months of the war.350 They rightfully claimed that ‘Mr. Lincoln 
has never expressed any intention or desire for the emancipation of the four millions 
of slaves.’351 Everett had not forgotten the lack of abolitionist measures in Lincoln’s 
First Inaugural Address, the racism the President displayed in the Douglas Debates, 
and his constant assertions of restoring the Union as it was under the present 
Constitution. Whipple agreed that Lincoln had ‘. . . never shown any care or interest 
for the slaves; and . . . is [at this juncture] directly pledged to enforce enslavement of 
those whose masters are still faithful to the Constitution and the Union.’352 For, to 
quote tertiary circle member Orson S. Murray: ‘. . . while slavery is the immediate 
cause of the war, the remote cause is the Constitutional compromise that has 
prolonged slavery and made it potent . . . President Lincoln wants this fatal folly re-
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enacted . . .’353 Whipple did show a hint of moderate Garrisonianism by 
acknowledging that war time emancipation would be a very effective measure in 
maintaining the Union, and as such Lincoln’s goal of Constitutional restoration could 
work with some form of abolition.354 
 ‘True, there is a North, but a North only for white men,’ a correspondent that 
signed as ‘Yale College’ declared in May 1861 in response to Phillips’ Tremont 
Temple speech supporting the war.355 Unlike the Inner Circle, the Yale collegiate had 
not departed from radical abolitionism, preferring the righteous violence of John 
Brown to Lincoln’s war for reunification: ‘True, the North are burning with hate for the 
South, but not with love for the slave. No John Brown is leader in this war.’356 
Furthermore, ‘John Brown fought to destroy the Union. The Union to him meant 
slavery. Tell me wherein it has changed.’357 The Union meant slavery, therefore the 
Union had to be destroyed. Whoever made up the ‘Publius’ of Yale College, they did 
not see any reason to drop disunion in light of the war. Yale College did not write to 
the Liberator again during the Compromise period, but it is clear from their single 
piece of correspondence that they remained firm members of the radical minority. 
In contrast to Yale College’s defence of disunion, Phillips argued his personal 
case for moving away from the old principle in December 1861: 
‘Well, I was a Disunionist, sincerely, for twenty years. I did hate the Union, 
when Union meant lies in the pulpit and mobs in the street, when Union meant 
making white men hypocrites and black men slaves. (Cheers). I did prefer purity to 
peace; I acknowledge it . . . I did prefer disunion to being the accomplice of tyrants. 
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But now . . . when I see that you cannot have Union, without meaning justice . . . why 
should I object to it? (Loud applause).’358    
Here Phillips had unambiguously stated that forgoing disunion was a part of 
his personal compromise in accepting political abolition. For twenty years Phillips 
preferred ‘[moral] purity to peace . . . [and] disunion to being the accomplice of 
tyrants.’359 Yet with the war the Union no longer had to cater towards the 
slaveholders nor uphold the proslavery clauses in the Constitution. And, through the 
war power method, the Constitution had the potential to end slavery once and for all. 
‘My policy,’ Phillips proclaimed, ‘therefore, is, give the administration generous 
sympathy; give it all the confidence for honesty of purpose you can. They mean now 
only the Union. . . but they are “willing” we should make them anything more we 
please.’360 Even if it took some time for the North to realize the necessity of abolition, 
Phillips rejoiced in the belief that slavery could not survive the war. 
Garrison, while disdaining from taking part in protracted debates with 
correspondents, increased his frequency of short replies to single letters in contrast 
to before the Civil War. These replies are almost exclusively in response to hard-line 
anti-political disunionists and those that rejected abolition under the constitution. This 
was the closest Garrison came to enforcing an editorial policy, at least in terms of 
ideological censorship. Although he refrained from outright censorship of opinions he 
did not agree with (other than favouring publishing certain articles and 
correspondence over others, citing a lack of space) he certainly became more 
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concerned with propagating his support of abolition as a war goal and differentiating 
dissidents from the wider Circle.361  
The first two replies in this vein appear in response to the element in the 
Liberator who held on to the fringe methods of insurrection and disunion in the face 
of war. Garrison responded to Insurrectionist with a disclaimer reasserting the 
freedom of expression he gives to his correspondents and noting that neither he nor 
the wider Liberator Circle claimed responsibility for the particular views expressed by 
Insurrectionist.362 ‘An Old Line Abolitionist’ argued against Phillips’ pro-Union speech 
of April 1861: ‘In these “trying times,” let every abolitionist be true to his cause, not 
forgetting “those in bonds as bound with them.” My motto is, and ever will be, “No 
Union with Slaveholders!”’363 Garrison responded to this correspondence, clarifying 
that Phillips was defending the government in regards to its stance on secession, not 
declaring the constitution to be suddenly anti-slavery.364 There were also a series of 
rejoinders to tertiary Correspondent J. W., who questioned if war was the best 
method of abolition ‘. . . so as not to destroy the body politic by one rude exit of the 
cancer, so long existing and firmly rooted,’ as slavery is sanctioned in the Bible.365 
Garrison’s last response to J. W., while not going into outright ‘exigesis,’ clarified that 
the Bible recognized slavery alongside other immoral acts, but did not sanction 
them.366  
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Alfred H. Love, a tertiary correspondent, represented the middle-ground 
between the consistent radicals and the moderate compromisers. He warned against 
becoming too supportive of the war, particularly at the cost of losing their position as 
moral exemplars to the rest of the nation: 
‘Abolitionists! Your title has been the synonym of purity, love and perfection. Liberty 
has been your watchword; and now beware lest you become the slaves of the sword! Not 
that the North will not be victorious in this struggle, for that is beyond doubt; but you have 
been regarded as occupying a stand-point high above war, revenge, and immorality. Take 
care that you do not become drift-wood! The rushing, swelling tide has overleaped its banks. 
Drift-wood won’t dam it, won’t control it, - rock masonry will!’367 
Essentially, Love was warning against compromising too much principle in the 
name of progress. He did not condemn the war power theory or the moderate 
Garrisonians who had adopted it. But he did caution against being swept up by the 
tide of popular opinion, even if it was in the name of abolitionist progress. Garrison 
responded to Love, justifying his support of compromise in light of the momentous 
occasion of an anti-Southern North:  
‘. . . the uprising of the entire North, without distinction of party or sect . . . in defence 
of whatever freedom remains in the land, and in direct and deadly conflict with the slave 
power, [is] a hopeful sign of the times even for the sacred cause of peace, in comparison 
with that moral paralysis and compromising spirit which have so long held mastery over the 
minds of the people of the North.’368 
Even though the Union was far from demanding universal abolition, their 
willingness to act against the slaveholders was to Garrison an important 
                                            




improvement in the nation’s moral core, an improvement that could be capitalized on 
to fulfil true abolition. Just as Garrison celebrated the North’s movement away from 
‘moral paralysis and compromising spirit,’ he made a personal move from the moral 
stridency of disunion and accepted the compromise of abolition through war. For  
‘The blindest [of the North] are beginning to see that . . . the abolition of slavery is 
essential to the unity and safety of our republic. How that beneficent, all-reconciling measure 
shall be consummated, - whether directly under the war power by the government, or by 
some method of compensation as a peace offering, - there is yet considerable diversity of 
opinion; but, evidently the feeling is growing that . . . SLAVERY MUST BE ABOLISHED, 
before peace can be restored . . .’369 
Whether he recognized it or not, Garrison’s willingness to progress abolition 
through political means and belief that slavery must end before peace could be 
restored represented the core elements of a personal compromise of radical 
abolition and a transition towards moderate Garrisonianism. 
The Civil War brought abolition into the forefront of Northern thought and 
made the Liberator Circle a relevant minority instead of a fanatical, fringe one. 
Despite the official purpose of the war being to preserve the Union under the 
constitution, slavery and all, it was becoming increasingly obvious to all Americans, 
not just abolitionists or fire-eater extremists, that the incongruity of slavery in the land 
of the free had to be resolved. A correspondent signed as ‘**’ flatly stated that ‘. . . it 
matters not a straw whether our soldier believes he is fighting for the flag, or for the 
Union, or as it may be, for the administration, or for self-preservation and home; the 
result must be partial or entire subjugation, dismemberment, compromise, or 
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extermination of slavery.’370 ** did not believe that the motivations of each soldier or 
even each politician mattered when it came to the greater course of the war. The 
place of slavery within the Union would be resolved regardless. ** represented the 
only true certainty that the Liberator Circle held in the period of Compromise: that 
slavery would, somehow, end as a result of the war. 
For Garrison and the moderate Circle members that followed him, 
emancipation through the war power was the paramount issue. One of the greatest 
concerns the Wider Circle had about Garrison’s focus on political means was the 
potential to get separated from the cause of changing the heart of the nation through 
repentance. The abolitionists of the Liberator agreed that they still had a role to play 
as agitators. Exactly what that role should be in aid of was a question that was never 
satisfactorily resolved. On the whole, individual correspondents followed Whipple’s 
belief that: 
‘. . . the Anti-Slavery element should resume its prominence, and full activity, as soon 
as it can without dividing the force which is now opposing and weakening the rebellious 
States; as soon as the condition of things is so changed that a moral opposition as 
slaveholders will not check the existing physical opposition to them as rebels.’371 
Whipple continued to believe that in spite of each individual’s thoughts about 
abolition through war, all abolitionists should still work to advance abolition, even if 
they were not morally perfect:  
‘Whatever varied opinions existed on other topics, all agreed the antislavery work still 
requires assiduous and unfaltering exertion of its friends. Whatever may be the providential 
advancement of our cause, however emancipation may come, more or less extensively, as a 
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military necessity, or as a work of political expediency, our work is the preaching of 
righteousness in relation to it.’372 
Whipple called for ‘prominence’ and ‘unfaltering exertion’ in the ‘preaching of 
righteousness.’ In other words, moral suasion should continue, whatever form 
abolition might come in. Whipple believed that emancipation would result from the 
war and that it would be a ‘providential advancement.’ Yet emancipation as a military 
necessity or political expediency would not instantly change the hearts of Americans 
away from racial prejudice. Therefore, the Liberator Circle still had a role in securing 
the true repentance of the nation.  
Pillsbury spoke for the radical minority that did not accept political means, 
recognizing a change of circumstance but refusing to any involvement with the 
government:  
‘Our mission, from the beginning, has been one and the same – emancipation 
without conditions. A change of circumstance has come, it is true; there have always been 
changes: now, perhaps growing more and more marked. But I know of no conditions that 
could discharge me from my anti-slavery obligations. At present, we were no part of the 
government in peace, and not any more can we be in war.’373  
‘Emancipation without conditions,’ remained a non-negotiable demand for 
Pillsbury. He had not strayed from the Declaration of Sentiments, and still believed 
that the Circle’s mission as abolitionists should be focused on a nation-wide change 
of heart.  
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Garrison represented the main discourse that moral suasion should be 
directed towards the administration to convince them to adopt the war power 
method. Furthermore, the Liberator Circle was the best group to pursue this moral 
suasion, due to their past status as anti-political activists: 
‘For more than a quarter of a century, we have stood aloof from all participation in the 
government . . . neither casting a ballot in any instance, nor endorsing any political party as 
such. Our mission has been to criticise and condemn, more or less, all parties, and every 
succeeding administration . . .  [Therefore] we can render true judgement between the 
contending parties at the present time.374 
The Confederacy were unquestionably traitors. Therefore, the government of 
the Union was in the right, and, provided they seek abolition through war, they 
should be supported by the Circle.  
Whipple also promoted the importance of Lincoln himself proclaiming 
emancipation:  
‘We ask him [Lincoln] to do this, because he is the only person who can do it, and 
because it would be most efficacious towards the accomplishment of his object, the 
reestablishment of the rightful authority of the general Government. If, in addition, the same 
movement will partially accomplish our object, crippling the Slave Power, and restoring a 
certain proportion of the slaves to freedom – so much the better.’375 
Here Whipple has framed emancipation as a basic compromise between the 
Circle and the government. Proclaiming emancipation simply made sense as a war 
measure, and it would also assist in the Circle’s object of abolition. Notably, Whipple 
stated that he did not mind if emancipation only ‘partially accomplished’ the Circle’s 
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goal of complete abolition.376 As early as September 1861, Whipple had come to the 
conclusion that war time emancipation, though far from national abolition, was a 
realistic means of abolition and worth pursuing, particularly if it meant that the Circle 
only had to convince Lincoln of its necessity, not the entirety of the North.  
There was a real concern amongst the Circle that Lincoln, instead of being the 
herald of emancipation, would lead the nation back into proslavery through a peace 
status quo antebellum. The Union had mixed success in prosecuting the war over 
1861-1863. A succession of inept generals prevented any decisive military victory, 
and there a strong anti-war element grew as it became apparent that there would not 
be a swift Union victory.377 Furthermore, Lincoln’s decision to countermand the 
selective military emancipation of Generals’ Fremont and Hunter sent the Circle into 
despair, and gave further cause to believe that Lincoln sought peace without 
abolition.378 Restoring the Union as it was, slavery and all, represented the form of 
amoral, compromising politics that the Circle hated the most. Indeed, reuniting the 
Union under the Constitution would be a giant step backwards in the cause of 
abolition that would reinstate all the proslavery compromises of 1787, remove the 
virtuous means of the war power theory, and place the nation again at the mercy of 
an ‘agreement with hell.’ Undoubtedly such a compromise for peace would have 
provoked a third change in the Liberator masthead. 
Lincoln ending the war with slavery intact was a worst case scenario for the 
Liberator Circle, but one that they took very seriously. Despite the adoption of 
constitutional means of ending slavery, the Circle had not discarded their 
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interpretation of American history. Wright succinctly restated the Liberator Circle’s 
view of history regarding the Constitutional compromise: 
‘The people of the Eastern States, however reluctantly, recognize[d] the wrong [of the 
Constitution] and, for the sake of the Union, lent it their aid. The result has been, that, for 
seventy years, the slave oligarchy have controlled and wielded the power an resources of 
the nation, for their own selfish purposes, viz., “the preservation, extension and perpetuation 
of that wicked institution.”’379 
Reuniting the Union without ending slavery would do nothing more than 
reinstate the ‘slave oligarchy.’ All of the promise that Lincoln had as an antislavery 
president would be cast aside as he revealed his true Whig colours. Orson S. Murray 
wrote to that effect: ‘. . . while slavery is the immediate cause of the war, the remote 
cause is the Constitutional compromise that has prolonged slavery and made it 
potent . . . President Lincoln wants this fatal folly re-enacted . . .’380 Slavery, as the 
immediate cause of the war, had to be abolished immediately to secure a 
satisfactory peace. The ‘remote cause’ of the Constitution, at present, allowed for 
emancipation through the war power theory. But Murray did not simply discount the 
proslavery elements of the Constitution; they had to be resolved for abolition to be 
complete, and, most of all, they could not be reinstated in any form. 
Whipple wasted no time in denouncing any form of political compromise over 
slavery in the name of peace: 
‘Against this [compromise for peace] . . . the voice of the Abolitionists must again be 
uplifted like a trumpet. That it may have more force then, let it rest in comparative quiet now. 
                                            
379 Wright, ‘President Lincoln and His Messages’, Vol. 32 No. 27, 04/07/1862 
380 Orson S. Murray, ‘The President’s Message’, Vol. 32 No. 13, 28/03/1862 
139 
 
The “reserve” is not the least important part of the army. But, that it may be a reserve, it must 
needs wait until some fighting has been done by the main body.’381 
Writing in May 1861, Whipple’s call to let the abolitionist voice ‘rest in 
comparative quiet’ reflected his desire not to adversely check the North’s desire to 
act against the slaveholder. He likened the Liberator Circle to the ‘reserve’ of the 
army, a regiment of moral agitators ready to support the war by ensuring that Lincoln 
and government does not stray from the cause of antislavery and into a premature, 
overtly conciliatory peace.  
Garrison too was early and unequivocal in his renewed condemnation of the 
proslavery elements of the Constitution. He still recognized that ‘. . . the deadly 
venom of slavery was infused into the Constitution of freedom,’ regardless of his 
current support for Constitutional emancipation.382  Garrison was firm in his view that 
the Constitution never should have been adopted, the Founders were blind to 
believe in gradual emancipation, and the Civil War was part of God’s divine justice 
for the curse of slavery.383 ‘No compromise can ever bring us into safe and 
permanent relations again,’ Phillips proclaimed in November 1862, ‘This revolution 
was not produced by Calhoun or Garrison; it was produced by the seventy years that 
precede Calhoun and Garrison.’384 Like Murray and Garrison, Phillips called back to 
the first proslavery compromise of the Constitution. He maintained that the Liberator 
Circle’s view of history still applied during the Civil War: 
‘This war really began when the disastrous compromise was made in 1787. What 
cripples McClellan today is, that his fathers, in 1787, bound one of his hands, and left him 
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only one to fight with. What shows Fremont’s courage and statesmanship at once is, that the 
first use he made of his sword was to cut his own hands loose for the conflict.’385 
Phillips refered to two Union Generals: McClellan, who was a northern 
democrat notorious for failing to capitalize on his victories and for overall inaction, 
and Fremont, a hero of the Circle who attempted to emancipate the slaves in his 
military governorship of Mississippi. Although McClellan was a Democrat, far from an 
antislavery figure, and held no popularity amongst the Circle, Phillips used him here 
as an example of what a true ‘statesman’ really was. McClellan remained cloistered 
in the Constitution by refusing to take an abolitionist stance and ignoring the war 
power theory. Fremont, and his fellow abolitionist general Hunter, did not wait for 
presidential approval, but acted immediately in emancipating all contraband slaves in 
their occupied districts.386 They were unafraid to ‘cut [their] own hands loose’ with the 
‘sword’ of Adams’ war power theory, which allowed not only the President and 
Congress but also the ‘Commander of the Army’ to ‘emancipate all the slaves in the 
invaded territory.’387 Lincoln countermanded both Fremont and Hunter’s orders of 
emancipation. The Circle decried the President’s insistence on halting real 
abolitionist progress, and gave them all the more reason to believe that Lincoln 
wanted to end the war with a proslavery compromise. This anti-Lincoln sentiment 
was particularly common amongst the radicals: ‘Until this Government makes 
atonement for the injustice done to the slave and his race,’ Pillsbury declared, as 
staunch as ever in his refusal to compromise ‘the injustice done to Fremont, the 
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injustice done to the Anti-Slavery cause, I shall hold it to be the enemy of liberty, and 
of course the enemy of God.’388 
Because of the looming threat of yet another proslavery compromise, the 
Inner Circle became primarily concerned with educating Lincoln and the Republican 
administration of the necessity of war time emancipation over 1861-1863. Garrison, 
Phillips, and Whipple did not cease their criticism of the government, particularly 
when Lincoln appeared to be moving further and further away from any sort of 
antislavery action. Garrison professed that the abolitionists, now that they were 
acting under the political means of the war power theory, were more ‘loyal’ to ‘free 
government’ than Lincoln: 
‘Yes, I maintain, that the Abolitionists are more loyal to free government and 
free institutions than President Lincoln himself; because, while I want to say 
everything good of him that I can, I must say that I think he is lacking somewhat in 
backbone, and is disposed, at least, to make some compromise with slavery, in order 
to bring back the old state of things . . . Still, we are both so bad that I suppose if we 
should go amicably together down to the South, we should never come back again. 
(Laughter and cheers).’389 
Although admitting that Lincoln lacked ‘backbone’ Garrison did not harshly 
criticize the president for his desire to compromise with the South. For in the eyes of 
the slaveholders, Lincoln and Garrison were two sides of the same antislavery coin. 
Both posed a threat to slavery, therefore, both could not be tolerated.  
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Phillips accepted that Lincoln was unquestionably fighting a political war but ‘. 
. . the only question is, in service of which political idea shall the war be waged – in 
the service of saving the Union as it was, or the Union as it ought to be? Mr. Lincoln 
dare not choose between the two phrases.’390 Lincoln’s inability to decide between 
the two was the main point of criticism for the radicals of the Circle and source of 
frustration for the Garrisonians who rallied behind the war power theory. Indeed, 
Phillips and Outer Circle member Reverend Moncure Conway spoke at the 1862 
meeting at Abingdon against Lincoln in a fatalistic fashion. Conway believed that: 
 ‘Mr. Lincoln will never save this country . . . if we can succeed . . . in keeping 
the ship together for a year or so, then either we will elect a Democratic president 
who will put us under the heel of Jeff Davis, or we shall have Fremont in the 
presidential chair, and Gen. Hunter will be Secretary of War. (Loud Applause).’391 
 Lincoln had already proven to be a moral failure as president. As such, 
Conway looked forward to the election of 1864, where he intended to campaign for 
true abolitionists Fremont and Hunter. Fremont would attempt and fail to be the 
Republican nominee, despite being supported by Phillips in this endeavour.392 
Despite Conway’s dismissal of Lincoln, his endorsement of Fremont shows that he 
counted himself amongst the individuals of the Circle who had accepted political 
means. 
Phillips was as disapproving of Lincoln as Conway was at Abingdon: 
‘I have no hope . . . that the intelligent purpose of our Government will ever 
find us a way out of this war. I think, if we are to find any way out of it, we are to 
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stumble out by the gradual education of the people, making their own way as, a great 
mass, without leaders. I do not think that anything we call the Government has any 
purpose to get rid of slavery. On the contrary . . . I believe Mr. Lincoln is conducting 
this war, at present, with the purpose of saving slavery.393 
It might appear that Phillips was moving back towards an anti-political stance 
here. He was certainly highly critical of the present Government and its leaders. But 
in this harsh criticism Phillips was fulfilling the role of the agitator, calling out the 
failings of the Government in order to educate and inspire the people to demand 
emancipation. By referring to the problems of the present Government, Phillips also 
kept open the option for future governments, such as one headed by Fremont, to 
end the war through abolition.  
The main issue with Lincoln’s Administration for Phillips was that they were 
too cautious in acting on the righteous means of the war power theory. Phillips had 
adopted this position of moral suasion a month before Abingdon, believing that the 
Circle should act as a moral translator for the ‘masses’:  
‘. . . [the Circle must] approach the servants of the people with some 
intimation of the real sentiments of the masses. I do not believe the majority of the 
North are ready at this moment to demand emancipation as the policy which is to 
guide the nation out of this war; but I believe Abraham Lincoln has secured that 
amount of confidence and admiration, that if he were to announce anything, the 
millions of the North would say “Amen!”394 
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Garrison shared Phillips’ exasperation at Lincoln’s lack of abolitionist pace, 
but was also willing to give the president some leeway because of the vagaries of his 
political position: ‘I am willing to believe that something of this feeling weighs in the 
minds of the President and the Cabinet, and that there is some ground for hesitancy, 
as a matter of mere political expediency.’395 The disunionist Garrison of 1860 would 
never have used the phrase ‘political expediency,’ much less use it as a justification 
for ‘hesitancy’ in the cause of abolition. By June 1862 Garrison believed that ‘The 
president hesitates, not so much from pro-slavery feeling as from timidity and 
excessive caution. He fails to realize the extent of public sentiment in favour of the 
total abolition of slavery.’396 Unlike Phillips, who did not think that the North was 
ready to accept abolition, Garrison thought that the public either had or could rally 
around political emancipation in the name of prosecuting the war.  
First and foremost, Lincoln had a war to fight and a union to restore. Hence 
Phillips criticized Lincoln as a ‘second-rate man,’ a follower, not a leader.397 While 
not ready to personally campaign for emancipation, Phillips believed that the 
‘majority of the North’ had enough faith in Lincoln that they would accept 
emancipation if he proclaimed it.398 Of course, Lincoln did not share Phillips’ view of 
the Northern populace. As President, he felt he had to balance two conflicting views 
regarding the war: the abolitionist and the moderate. Lincoln explained as much to 
the Chicago Delegation in Favour of National Emancipation that met with him on the 
Thirteenth of September: 
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‘I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by 
religious men, who are equally certain they represent the Divine Will. I am sure that 
either one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and that, perhaps in some 
respects, both . . . it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. 
And if I can learn what it is, I will do it! These are not, however, the days of miracles . 
. . I must study the plain, physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and 
learn what appears to be wise and right.’399  
 Lincoln had a duty to all Americans, Northern and Southern, abolitionist or 
unionist. Therefore, he could not just enact an executive order ending slavery 
wherever it existed, even if he desired it, as Phillips believed. As for emancipation, 
the only definitive answer Lincoln could give to the Circle was that 
‘I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the 
matter under advertisement. And I can assure you that the subject is on my mind, 
day and night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God’s will, I shall 
do.’400 
A diplomatic answer that outright pleased no one, but hinted at the potential 
for a favourable outcome. For ‘God’s will’ was ambiguous, and held different 
definitions for the Circle and anti-war Northerners. Lincoln was in the process of 
studying ‘the plain, physical facts, ascertain[ing] what is possible, and learn[ing] what 
appears to wise and right.’401 
Despite the need to educate Lincoln to the level of abolitionist morality, and 
the threat of a compromise that reverted the Union to operating under the ‘covenant 
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with death,’ Garrison was certain that Adams’ interpretation of the Constitution was 
worth following, worth living under, and would become a reality before the war was 
through. Furthermore, he was adamant that in accepting Constitutional means of 
abolition the Liberator Circle had not strayed from their original mission: 
 ‘Our mission is the same now that is was thirty years ago. Through many and 
strange changes, we have slowly but steadily advanced towards its fulfilment; but 
there are many inclinations that our work is not yet in a state to be safely left in other 
hands. We have been, and must still be, a fire to warm the atmosphere of public 
opinion. More than a quarter of a century ago, the fire was kindled with generous zeal 
. . .not all the cold water that politicians, merchants, and ecclesiastical bodies could 
throw upon it has sufficed to extinguish the flame, or even to prevent it from 
spreading. The moral thermometer can never again fall to the old freezing point.’402 
Pillsbury and the radical detractors of the Circle disagreed with Garrison’s 
interpretation of their mission. Yet despite their criticisms, Garrison did not relent 
from his belief that compromising and accepting political means was the best course 
of action for all abolitionists. The Circle’s abolitionist fire had thrived in the face 
resistance from the majority of Americans who decried them as fanatics. Secession 
and Civil War challenged the Circle and forced them to first modify and then outright 
change their ideal means of abolition from anti-political disunion to constitutional war 
power. But the Civil War also motivated the majority of the North against the 
slaveholder. The soldiers of the Union were not all fighting to end slavery. But they 
were certainly more open to antislavery sentiment, especially if Lincoln himself 
proclaimed emancipation. Therefore, Garrison believed that the ‘moral thermometer’ 
of the Union could never fall to the low of compromise over slavery. Rather, provided 
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that the Liberator Circle could continue to be a ‘fire to warm the atmosphere of public 
[and political] opinion,’ the Union would be made whole again without slavery.403 
Until Lincoln made a conscious practical effort in the name of war time 
emancipation, all of the Liberator Circle, Garrisonian compromisers and disunionist 
radicals, had no choice but to sit and wait, unsure of what would become of their 
decades long activism. ‘Trust in God is best shown by doing God’s work, acting on 
his principles,’ Whipple wrote in September 1862, ‘Trust in God calls our timid, 
procrastinating President to neutralize slavery and rebellion together in a 
proclamation of universal freedom.’404 Whipple would only have to wait three more 
days for the Government to move towards abolition at last. Lincoln’s ‘timid and 
procrastinating nature,’ the Circle’s greatest criticism of the Commander-in-Chief, 
would be resolved with Lincoln’s first practical commitment to abolitionist progress: 
the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Issued in the wake of a Union victory at 
Antietam, the preliminary proclamation gave the rebellious states until the first of 
January 1863 to surrender and return to the Union, otherwise all of the slaves within 
their borders would be declared free.405 It was far from the universal abolition that the 
Circle claimed in the Declaration of Sentiments. Nor did it immediately emancipate 
all American slaves: the loyal slaveholders of Kentucky and Maryland were not 
affected, and if the Confederate States accepted Lincoln’s peace ultimatum, slavery 
would continue to exist. Despite these discrepancies, the Inner Circle and those in 
the Outer Circles that followed their personal compromise accepted the 
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Emancipation Proclamation as a momentous step forward in abolitionism: Adams’ 
Constitution would serve as the foundation for the United States.  
Garrison’s initial reaction to the Proclamation was tempered, rational, yet 
positive. He described it as ‘not at all the exigency of the times . . . [yet] still it is an 
important step in the right direction, and an act of immense historical consequence, 
and justifies almost universal gladness of expression and warm congratulation . . .’406 
Garrison continued to praise Lincoln for dispelling the positive pro-slavery stance he 
impelled by remaining silent on abolition and endorsing the war as one simply to 
restore the Union.407 He saw the Proclamation as an ‘Ithurial spear’ transforming 
‘pseudo-loyal’ Northerners from ‘half-rebels’ into antislavery advocates.408 Unlike the 
premature celebration the Circle had in response to the North finally fighting against 
the South, the Proclamation was truly abolitionist, and at last designated the purpose 
of the war as fighting slavery. 
Whipple shared Garrison’s positive response to the Proclamation:  
‘Let us stand by the President in enforcing this edict of emancipation. And let 
all good citizens plainly show their conviction that this is our right and indispensable 
policy, that if events shall show Mr. Lincoln the need of consummating this great 
movement before the first of January, he may feel that in doing so, he will be heartily 
approved and sustained by the Northern people.’409 
For Garrison and Whipple, the earlier dilemma of the Northern populace and 
Lincoln both waiting on the other to commit to emancipation had been resolved by 
the Proclamation. Now that Lincoln had made a positive turn towards abolition, it was 
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up to ‘all good citizens’ to support him. Whipple’s only criticism was that 
emancipation was not immediate. But three months was hardly a long time to wait, 
especially after three decades of agitation.  
Phillips was pleased that the Proclamation confirmed Adams’ interpretation of 
the Constitution, proclaiming confidently that ‘We are the Constitution and the 
patriots, everything else is treason.’410 ‘I am not going to criticize the President.’ 
Phillips stated in November, ‘I believe that to-day he has turned the corner, and 
recognizes the fact, not simply the slave of rebels, but that slaves must be freed. 
(Applause).’411 Unlike Garrison and Whipple, Phillips looked to the future, and 
claimed of the President three things: ‘. . . a Cabinet, a General, and a Confiscation 
that shall open up the Southern States to Yankee civilization, and give the loyalists of 
the South an opportunity to co-operate with us.’412 Phillips would go on to become 
actively involved in politics supporting Fremont’s campaign for the Presidency in 
1864.413 His demand for an abolitionist administration, not just an antislavery 
president, shows that his compromise with politics had taken on a different character 
to Garrison’s. The two most vocal and influential members of the Circle would 
eventually feud over Phillips’ political actions and whether or not the Liberator Circle 
should be disbanded after the war, as Garrison thought.414 Therefore, the community 
aspect of the Circle continued to devolve from the unity of 1860 as Garrison and 
Phillips increasingly developed opposing ideas of individual agitation. 
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Reverend Daniel Foster, a secondary circle member who had enlisted in the 
army as a medic, detailed the positive effect the Proclamation had on the soldiers: 
‘The proclamation has infused new life into the army. The soldiers all bless 
Abraham Lincoln for it. At length, we know what we are fighting for. At length, we 
renew the pledge of the old Revolution, and mutually put life, property and honor all 
in the issue for a free and united Fatherland. We begin to hope for a country built on 
Justice and Liberty, and protection under Constitution and Law for all classes and 
conditions of men. We can thank God for the prospect of leaving to our children a 
country, all free, united, blessed, worthy of the fondest affection of all noble souls, 
‘example and the hope of the world.’415 
‘At length, we know what we are fighting for. At length, we renew the pledge 
of the old Revolution.’ Foster was overjoyed to proclaim that the Union army now 
fought for the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the application of 
Adams’ antislavery Constitution. There was now a direct connection with the 
Revolution of 1776 amongst the army; at last, they could defeat the political tyranny 
of the slaveholders and the moral tyranny of slavery.416 Foster saw in the 
Emancipation Proclamation a chance to modify the Constitution and the Law to truly 
protect the rights of ‘all classes and conditions of men.’417 Although the Proclamation 
was not confirmation of Constitutional amendment, Foster was confident that 
abolitionist reformation would soon come now that the army was a mobilized force of 
emancipation.  
Unlike Whipple, tertiary correspondent W. P. G. was not concerned with the 
three months Lincoln allowed for the Confederacy to accept peace: 
                                            





‘The President has not stepped backward, on the whole, but forward. We 
trusted Jefferson Davis to make good the deficiencies of Abraham Lincoln. He would 
see it that the rebellion should last till January first; the Northern capital, rushing upon 
the heels of our victorious armies, should demand the retention of labor on the soil 
where it is indispensable. God himself, final, would ensure the rejection of the chance 
of reunion under the old conditions. Our instincts thus far have not been deceived. 
Shall we quarrel with that measure which has become the test of the loyalty of the 
North?’418  
At first it appears that W. P. G. was advocating continued slavery ‘on the soil 
where it is indispensable.’ However, they wished slavery to continue only until 
January First, when the Emancipation Proclamation would strike it from the South. 
W. P. G. trusted in the Union army to achieve many rapid victories before 1863, and 
hoped that the South would not be compelled to surrender before Lincoln’s 
emancipation ultimatum ran out. Of course, W. P. G. was not too concerned, as God 
‘would ensure the rejection of the chance of reunion under the old conditions.’419 
Furthermore, the Proclamation was the ‘test of the loyalty of the North,’ a measure 
that prompted a choice between liberty and slavery for the Northern populace that 
was far more effective and immediate than the Circle’s moral suasion.420 W. P. G., 
therefore, viewed the Proclamation as a major step forward towards abolition. 
Henry Wright took W. P. G.’s view of the Proclamation as a moral choice for 
the North to a strict, binary conclusion: ‘Neutrality and compromise are no longer 
possible about here. Are you for freedom or slavery – for free labor or slave labor – 
for free institutions or slave institutions – for a government based on freedom to the 
                                            





laborer, or on slavery to the laborer? These are the only questions.’421 The debate 
over slavery was no longer about the possibility antislavery gradualism or reaching a 
compromise with the South, but about what system would be dominant in the United 
States.  
In the same letter, Wright gave his appraisal of the Circle’s abolitionist 
campaign in light of the Proclamation: 
‘You, dear friend, with your coadjutors, have labored, in a war of ideas, by 
appeals to reason and conscience, to get the nation to swallow the needed does. 
The nation has made up terrible faces at you and your medicine. Nevertheless, its 
mouth is open, and it has begun to swallow the medicine . . . A few years ago . . . 
Abolition was more dreaded more than the virus of their oldest and deadliest 
rattlesnakes by all. Now, they are eager to swallow the largest does of Abolitionism 
that the most radical Garrisonian Abolitionist can administer to them!’422 
The radical detractors still advocated disunion, the very same medicine that 
Americans had been making ‘terrible faces’ at for decades. Regardless, Wright’s 
positive metaphor is not entirely unjustified. The Garrisonian compromisers of the 
Circle saw the Proclamation as a changing point, one laden with finality that heralded 
the end of a proslavery Union. 
Pillsbury, representing the disunionists, remained as adamant as ever in the 
face of the Proclamation. He believed the nation needed to be born again, without 
the Constitutional taint of slavery, and emancipation had to come about as part of a 
national repentance and true justice, not a military necessity: 
                                            




‘For eighty years, our guilt has been festering like electricity in tropical skies; 
and now the thunder-bolts are descending, “red with uncommon wrath,” and no 
thatched roofs of “military necessity,” no pious lightning rods of “prayer and fasting,” 
will avail to shield us, until we repent and “do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly” 
before the God we now defy, even in the midst of his fierce judgements.’423 
Pillsbury’s apocalyptic metaphor was a provocative critique of the 
compromisers of the Circle. He agreed with Garrison that the war was a form of 
judgement for allowing slavery to exist and prosper, manifested in thunder-bolts of 
‘uncommon wrath.’ Yet the ‘thatched roof’ of military necessity would not protect the 
Union from righteous judgement, nor would it immediately provoke an abolitionist 
turn. True, universal abolition would only be achieved when all Americans 
recognized the evil of slavery and racial prejudice, repented for their sins, and 
demanded abolition because it was morally right, not because it would help win the 
war. 
In a rare moment of agreeance with Pillsbury, Gerrit Smith believed that 
simply ending slavery in the rebellious states would not provoke moral repentance: 
‘The nation can be saved and become really one only by conquering the 
South through the heart of the South. It is true that slavery will soon cease. But 
unless it shall cease through penitence, and through pity and love for the black man, 
the nation will continue to be two nations in spirit.’424 
Although he wrote the above before the Proclamation, Smith turned out to be 
prophetic. Institutionalized enslavement ceased in the United States through war 
time emancipation. But racist values persisted. There was no ‘penitence’ on the part 
                                            
423 Pillsbury, ‘Letter of Parker Pillsbury’, Vol. 32 No. 50, 12/12/1862 
424 Smith, ‘Speech of the Hon. Gerrit Smith on the Country [Twenty-Eighth Congregational Society, 
Music Hall, 15/06/1862]’, Vol. 32 No. 28, 11/07/1862 
154 
 
of the North or the South. The Garrisonian’s focus on achieving the practical goal of 
swift emancipation through the war power had the consequence of submerging the 
deeper problems of racial inequality. To quote Sinha, ‘Abolitionists and their 
antislavery allies in the North may have won the war, but former slaveholders and 
their conservative allies won the peace.’425 Still, despite his misgivings about the 
greater moral cause of abolition, Smith saw the Emancipation Proclamation as a 
step in the right direction:  
‘There is at last hope, good hope, for our deeply endangered country. The 
President, who is both an able and honest man, is doing his duty. He will do his 
whole duty . . . The people must encourage him to multiple his bold and righteous 
steps by sustaining him in those he has already taken.’426  
There was hope for abolition in the Proclamation. Not certainty, as northern 
disunion had. But hope. And to the Garrisonian compromisers, that hope, combined 
with the practical end of slavery in the Union, was a major achievement. Issues 
surrounding loyal slaveholders aside, as the Union army advanced all slaves would 
be freed. What place free blacks would have in the Union, whether their rights as 
citizens would be upheld, and whether they would be treated as true equals, was up 
to the people. Unconditional, universal abolition, however, gave way to the limited 
emancipation of the Emancipation Proclamation. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments did not stop racial discrimination in the law or in the hearts of American 
citizens. Apart from the remaining disunionists, everyone in the Liberator Circle, 
regardless of their individual opinions, recognized that Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation was a welcome advancement of abolitionism. Whether it was as a 
                                            
425 Sinha, ‘Did the Abolitionists Cause the Civil War?’, p. 85 
426 Smith, ‘Address of Gerrit Smith’, Vol. 32 No. 44, 31/10/1862 
155 
 
worthy step on the road to complete abolition, or as the end result of decades of 
agitation, the Proclamation represented a firm abolitionist commitment from the 
government. Garrison accepted this commitment as the final confirmation of his 
personal compromise towards political means. 
Garrison’s decision to deviate from anti-political disunion and towards war as 
an acceptable method of abolition marked the beginning of a personal compromise 
that would reach maturity by the Emancipation Proclamation and culminate with the 
termination of the Liberator in 1865. Garrison was certainly in line with the 
individualist culture of the Liberator Circle in making this compromise. Yet by giving 
primacy to his personal compromise over maintaining the means that unified the 
Circle as a whole, Garrison, consciously or unconsciously, changed the function and 
formation that the Liberator Circle held for the past three decades. For Garrison 
chose to pursue a constitutional, political mode of abolition completely on his own 
accord. He did not spend weeks convening with the Circle, comparing individual 
opinions and debating the practical merits and moral disadvantages of abandoning 
anti-political disunion. Instead, Garrison made a personal decision as to what he 
thought best served the cause, and advocated it in his editorials. The rest of the 
Circle were free to accept, reject, and debate Garrison’s shift in means as always. 
But Garrison stuck by his opinion, even as Pillsbury, Stephen and Abbey Foster, and 
Lydia Child challenged his compromise of anti-political principle. Rather than 
continuing his role as the de-facto leader of the Circle, the second unifying beacon of 
the society alongside northern disunion, Garrison chose to assert his place as an 
individual agitator amongst equals. 
In the last of issue of the Liberator of 1862, days away from the signing of the 
Emancipation Proclamation, Garrison’s editorial was hopeful and reflective:  
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‘When the Liberator commenced . . . there was no agitation, no discussion of 
[slavery] in any quarter. Every thing has since been “made manifest in the light.” The 
rod of Aaron has swallowed up the rod of the Egyptian magicians. Abolitionism is 
now the question of questions, eliciting more inquiry, thought, feeling, debate, than all 
others combined, and moving onward with an earthquake tread.’427 
Garrison’s idea of what abolitionism was trying to achieve had evidently 
changed. He had moved away from the concise, strict demands of the Declaration of 
Sentiments and had accepted the prominence of abolitionist discussion in a nation 
that had eschewed abolitionists as fanatics for decades as a change worth of being 
deemed a success. Furthermore, this discussion was accompanied by the practical 
progress of the Emancipation Proclamation, a move that was not in line with ideal, 
universal abolition, but, crucially, represented a commitment by the Government 
towards ending slavery and amending the immorality of the ‘covenant with death.’ 
The abolition that had been brought to the forefront of Northern discussion was not 
the immediate, universal abolition that the Liberator Circle set out to achieve. But it 
was a dramatic change, and, provided it allowed for practical abolitionist measures to 






                                            





The Liberator Circle was vehemently against political means from January 
1860 to the eve of the Civil War. From the bombardment of Fort Sumter to the 
Emancipation Proclamation, Garrison, Phillips, Whipple, and the individual agitators 
of the Wider Circle that followed them compromised their ideal, anti-political means 
of abolition and accepted political emancipation under Adams’ war power theory. 
Garrison and his coadjutors still achieved their initial masthead goal of ‘NO UNION 
WITH SLAVEHOLDERS!’. ‘Proclaiming liberty throughout the land’ just occurred as 
the result of political action, rather than an abolitionist revolution. In accepting 
political action over absolute morality, the Garrisonians had engaged in Santayana’s 
process of accepting ‘feeling free under American liberty’:  
‘A certain vagueness of soul, together with a great gregariousness and 
tendency to be moulded by example and by prevalent opinion, is requisite for feeling 
free under American liberty. You must find the majority right enough to live with; you 
must give up lost causes; you must be willing to put your favourite notions to sleep in 
the family cradle of convention.’428  
Before the Civil War, the Liberator Circle believed the ‘family cradle’ of the 
Union, the Constitution, was an unacceptable basis for any sort of compromise. Over 
1861 to 1863, Garrison and those in the Circle who agreed with him saw the 
potential of the Adams’ element in the Constitution to end slavery, and felt that it was 
worth it to accept imperfect abolition under the Constitution over no abolition at all.  
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Of course, the abolitionists of the Circle were not politicians, and did not make 
a direct political compromise with Lincoln. Rather, they made a personal 
compromise, separate from any formal political act and purely on an individual level. 
‘You must have a certain vagueness of soul,’ and be willing to modify your opinion in 
order to feel free, without it: 
‘. . . there can be no honest co-operation, no satisfying compromise. Every 
concession, under such circumstances, would be a temporary one . . . it would 
amount to a mutilation of one’s essential nature, a partial surrender of life, liberty, and 
happiness, tolerable for a time, perhaps, as the lesser of two evils, but involving a 
perpetual sullen opposition and hatred.’429  
During the decades of disunionist certainty, the Circle prided themselves on 
being everything but vague, and refusing any concession of means to be a 
‘mutilation of [their] essential nature.’430 Justice, and a Union that truly reflected the 
liberty expressed in the Declaration of Independence, were their demands, and 
nothing was acceptable aside from the repudiation of the Constitution and the 
abolition of all injustice based on prejudice. Garrison and his coadjutors were free to 
espouse their moral principles through moral suasion, but they did not achieve any 
realistic progress towards abolition, because any means other than disunion was 
immoral and involved personal compromise, the ‘partial surrender of life, liberty, and 
happiness.’431 Regardless of what political compromise took place in Congress, if the 
individual citizen was not willing to make a personal compromise of principle in order 
to align with it, then it would be intolerable and invoke ‘perpetual sullen opposition 
and hatred.’ It is this critical interaction between personal and political compromise 
                                            





that has been overlooked in the examination of Garrison and the Liberator Circle 
from 1860 to 1863. Garrison, Phillips, Whipple, and the majority of the Liberator 
Circle engaged in a personal compromise and went along the path from anti-political 
agitators to accepting emancipation by political means. For in relaxing their demands 
for universal equality and compromising their moral core in the name of the practical 
abolition of the Proclamation, the radical anti-political agitators of the Liberator Circle 
forfeited their separate, ideal community in favour of creating abolitionist change in 
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